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i“Privacy isn’t about hiding something. It’s about being able to control
how we present ourselves to the world.”
— Bruce Schneier,
Cryptography and Security Specialist
“You have to ﬁght for your privacy or you lose it.”
— Eric Schmidt,
Executive Chairman of Google Inc.
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Abstract
During the last few years, the technological progress in collecting, storing
and processing a large quantity of data for a reasonable cost has raised seri-
ous privacy issues. Many online services (e.g., Facebook, Google) now have
the ability to proﬁle their customers to oﬀer them targeted advertising. The
revelation by Edward Snowden in May 2013 of a massive global surveillance
program run by the NSA demonstrates that intelligence services are also col-
lecting and exploiting a large quantity of personal data. Therefore, on a daily
basis, many entities spy on users interactions, but most Internet users do not
measure the extent of the collection. The main reason is that online services
do not oﬀer their users the possibility to access the collected data. In addi-
tion, their terms of service do not precisely inform users about what data is
collected, and the purpose of the collection.
Privacy concerns many areas, but is especially important in frequently
used websites like search engines (e.g., Google, Bing, Yahoo!). These services
allow users to retrieve relevant content from an increasing amount of data
published on the Internet. The good quality of their results comes from the
exploitation of user personal data. As a direct consequence, search engines
are likely to gather and store sensitive information about individual users
(e.g., interests, political and religious orientations, health condition). In this
context, developing solutions to enable users to query these search engines in
a privacy-preserving way is becoming increasingly important.
In this thesis, we introduce SimAttack an attack against existing solutions
to query a search engine in a privacy-preserving way. This attack aims at
retrieving the original user query by exploiting unprotected user queries pre-
viously collected by an adversary. We use SimAttack to assess the robustness
of three representative state-of-the-art privacy-preserving solutions. We show
that these solutions are not satisfactory to protect the user privacy.
We therefore develop PEAS a new protection mechanism that better pro-
tects the user privacy (according to SimAttack). This solution leverages two
types of protection: hiding the identity of the user and masking her queries.
The former is achieved by ciphering and sending queries through a succession
of two nodes, while the latter hides queries by combining them with several
fake queries. The main challenge in our approach is to generate realistic fake
queries. We solve it by generating queries that could have been sent by other
users in the system.
Finally, we present mechanisms to identify sensitive queries. Our goal
is to adapt existing protection mechanisms to protect sensitive queries only,
and thus save resources (e.g., CPU, RAM). Indeed, a common query on a
cake recipe does not need the same protection as a query on an HIV infec-
tion. We design two modules to identify sensitive queries and deploy them on
real protection mechanisms. We establish empirically that adapting existing
protection mechanisms dramatically improves their performance.

Résumé
Au cours des dernières années les progrès technologiques permettant de col-
lecter, stocker et traiter d’importantes quantités de données pour un faible
coût, ont soulevés de sérieux problèmes concernant la vie privée. De nom-
breux services web (ex. : Facebook, Google) ont maintenant la possibilité de
créer un proﬁl de leurs clients pour par exemple, leur oﬀrir de la publicité
ciblée. La révélation par Edward Snowden en mai 2013 d’un programme de
surveillance massif et généralisé opéré par la NSA démontre que les services se-
crets collectent et exploitent massivement les données personnelles. Ainsi, de
nombreuses entités espionnent quotidiennement les interactions des utilisa-
teurs, alors qu’une majorité de ces utilisateurs n’en a toujours pas conscience.
Cette ignorance s’explique en partie par le fait que ces services web ne permet-
tent pas à leurs utilisateurs de consulter les données qu’ils collectent. De plus,
les conditions générales d’utilisation n’informent pas précisément l’utilisateur
sur la nature des données collectées ainsi que sur l’objet de leur collecte.
La protection de la vie privée concerne de nombreux domaines, en partic-
ulier les sites internet fréquemment utilisés comme les moteurs de recherche
(ex. : Google, Bing, Yahoo!). Ces services permettent aux utilisateurs de
retrouver eﬃcacement du contenu parmi une quantité grandissante de don-
nées publiées sur internet. La pertinence de leurs recommandations s’explique
par l’exploitation des données personnelles des utilisateurs. Par conséquent,
les moteurs de recherche sont susceptibles de collecter et stocker des données
sensibles d’utilisateurs (ex. : leurs centres d’intérêt, leurs opinions politiques
et religieuses, leurs conditions de santé). Dans ce contexte, développer des
solutions pour permettre aux utilisateurs d’utiliser ces moteurs de recherche
tout en protégeant leurs vies privées est devenu très primordial.
Dans cette thèse, nous introduirons SimAttack, une attaque contre les
solutions protégeant la vie privée de l’utilisateur dans ses interactions avec les
moteurs de recherche. Cette attaque vise à retrouver les requêtes initialement
envoyées par l’utilisateur en exploitant d’anciennes requêtes non protégées
précédemment envoyées par l’utilisateur. Nous utiliserons cette attaque pour
analyser la robustesse de trois mécanismes de protection représentatifs des
solutions existantes. Nous avons montré que ces trois mécanismes ne sont
pas satisfaisants pour protéger la vie privée des utilisateurs.
Par conséquent, nous avons développé PEAS, un nouveau mécanisme de
protection qui améliore la protection de la vie privée de l’utilisateur (en parti-
culier par rapport à SimAttack). Cette solution repose sur deux types de pro-
tection : cacher l’identité de l’utilisateur et masquer sa requête. La première
protection chiﬀre et envoie les requêtes via une succession de deux serveurs
tandis que la deuxième protection masque la requête de l’utilisateur en la com-
binant avec des fausses requêtes. La diﬃculté majeure de notre approche est
de générer des fausses requêtes réalistes. Nous avons résolu ce problème en
générant des requêtes qui auraient pu être envoyées par d’autres utilisateurs
du système.
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Pour ﬁnir, nous présenterons des mécanismes permettant d’identiﬁer la
sensibilité des requêtes. Notre objectif est d’adapter les mécanismes de pro-
tection existants pour protéger uniquement les requêtes sensibles, et ainsi
économiser des ressources (ex. : CPU, mémoire vive). En eﬀet, une requête
banale sur une recette de gâteau n’a pas besoin de la même protection qu’une
requête sur une infection liée au VIH. Nous avons développé deux modules
pour identiﬁer les requêtes sensibles et nous avons déployé ces modules sur
des mécanismes de protection. Nous avons établi qu’adapter des mécanismes
de protection améliore considérablement leurs performances.
Zusammenfassung
In den letzten Jahren sind durch den technologischen Fortschritt im Bereich
des Sammelns, Speicherns und Verarbeitens von großen Datenmengen mit
überschaubaren Kosten schwerwiegende Datenschutzbedenken entstanden.
Viele Online-Dienste (z.B. Facebook, Google) besitzen nun die Möglichkeit
detaillierte Proﬁle ihrer Nutzer zu erstellen und mit gezielter Werbung anzus-
prechen. Die Veröﬀentlichungen von Edward Snowden im Mai 2013 brachten
die tiefgreifende globale Überwachung durch die NSA ans Licht die zeigten
wie Geheimdienste ebenfalls große Mengen an persönlichen Daten sammeln
und nutzen. Tagtäglich werden die Aktivitäten von Nutzern von vielen
Seiten ausspioniert, aber die meisten Nutzer sind sich des Ausmaßes der
Überwachung nicht bewußt. Der Hauptgrund liegt darin, dass Online-
Dienste ihren Nutzern nicht die Möglichkeit geben auf ihre gesammelten
Daten zuzugreifen. Darüberhinaus informieren die Nutzungsbedingungen
nur ungenügend über die Art der gesammelten Daten und den Zweck der
Sammlung.
Datenschutz betriﬀt viele Bereiche, ist aber besonders wichtig für häuﬁg
besuchte Webseiten wie Suchmaschinen (z.B. Google, Bing, Yahoo!). Diese
Dienste ermöglichen es Nutzern relevante Inhalte aus dem stetig wachsenden
“Datensee” im Internet herauszuholen. Die gute Qualität ihrer Ergebnisse
beruht auf der Nutzung persönlicher Daten. Als direkte Konsequenz ist es
wahrscheinlich, dass Suchmaschinen sensible Informationen über einzelne
Nutzer sammeln und speichern (z.B., Interessen, politische und religiöse
Orientierung, Gesundheitszustände). In diesem Zusammenhang gewinnt
die Entwicklung von Privatsphäre-schützenden Lösungen, die es Nutzern er-
lauben Suchmaschinen zu befragen, an Wichtigkeit.
In dieser Arbeit, präsentieren wir SimAttack als Angriﬀ gegen existerende
Lösungen um eine Suchmaschine in Privatsphäre-erhaltender Weise anzufra-
gen. Dieser Angriﬀ zielt darauf ab die ursprüngliche Nutzeranfrage wieder-
herzustellen, indem man ungeschützte Nutzeranfragen verwendet die der An-
greifer zuvor gesammelt hat. Wir nutzen SimAttack um die Robustheit von
drei repräsentativen State-of-the-Art Privatsphäre-erhaltenden Lösungen zu
evaluieren. Wir zeigen, dass diese Lösungen die Privatsphäre der Nutzer nicht
zufriedenstellend schützt.
Deshalb entwickeln wir PEAS als neuen Mechanismus, um den Schutz
in Bezug auf SimAttack zu erhöhen. Dazu verfolgt PEAS zwei Ansätze: ver-
bergen die Identität der Nutzer und maskieren der Suchanfragen. Ersteres
wird erreicht durch Verschlüsseln und Versenden der Anfragen durch eine
Folge über zwei Knoten, während letzteres Anfragen verschleiert indem sie
mit mehreren imitierten Anfragen vermischt. Die Hauptherausforderung
unseres Ansatzes ist es realistische, imitierte Anfragen zu erzeugen. Dazu wer-
den Anfragen erzeugt, die von einem anderen Nutzer des Systems geschickt
hätten werden können.
Letztlich präsentieren wir ein Verfahren um sensible Anfragen zu iden-
xtiﬁzieren. Unser Ziel ist es existierende Schutzmechanismen anzupassen
um nur sensible Anfragen zu schützen und damit Ressourcen zu schonen
(z.B. CPU, RAM). In der Tat braucht eine gewöhnliche Anfrage nach einem
Kuchen-Rezept nicht das gleiche Ausmaß an Schutz wie eine Anfrage nach
einer HIV-Infektion. Wir entwerfen zwei Module um sensible Anfragen zu
identiﬁzieren und kombinieren sie mit real-existierenden Schutzmechanis-
men. Wir zeigen empirisch, dass diese Modiﬁkation die Leistung existerender
Schutzmechanismus dramatisch verbessert.
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The advent of social networks in the 2000s has been followed by several con-
troversies about personal information [1, 2]. At that time, users did not real-
ize that making their private life publicly available could have serious conse-
quences, in particular be used many years later against them. The exploitation
of personal data has become important for marketing purposes. In recent
years, the technological progress in collecting, storing and processing a large
quantity of data for a reasonable cost has enabled Web providers to proﬁle
their users. For instance, Facebook has based its business model on targeted
advertising. It delivers relevant advertisements to Facebook users by exploit-
ing their user proﬁles. These proﬁles are constructed from the interactions
made by users (e.g., likes or posts on Facebook) and contain all topics users
are interested in (e.g., football, politics). Nevertheless, this is not respectful
of the user’s privacy as users are not aware which data is precisely collected by
the platform and what type of mining techniques is applied. Indeed, terms of
service are usually vague: they do not clearly indicate which data is collected
and which operations are performed. For instance, Google speciﬁes that it
stores data that “you upload, submit, store, send or receive to or through our
Services” and their “automated systems analyze your content” [3]. Private data
exploitation does not only concern online providers. The revelation by Ed-
ward Snowden in May 2013 of a massive global surveillance program run by
the NSA [4], convinced even the most skeptical people that the exploitation
of personal data is a reality. To prevent such an exploitation, users should
control information that they explicitly put online (e.g., tweets, posts) but
also information they share with online services. For that reason, most ma-
jor online services have been developing settings to enable users to conﬁgure
their own privacy policy. Nevertheless, as shown by a study on Facebook [5],
there is often a gap between what the user wants for her privacy and what she
achieves in practice. It is explained by two facts: either users do not correctly
set up their privacy settings or there is no option to conﬁgure what they desire.
Regarding the last reason, the European Union is pushing Web providers to
implement some privacy settings. For instance, Article 12(b) of the EU Di-
rective 95/46/EC [6] gives a person the right to ask for her personal data to
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be deleted, if her data is incomplete or inaccurate. In practice, some Web
providers ignore such a regulation. For instance, Google was condemned in
May 2014 by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) because
it refuses to withdraw some data from its index [7]. Therefore, Google was
forced to introduce a right to be forgotten in its search results. Since then,
Google has already received 639,271 requests to remove 1,794,862 URLs [8].
In 2016, the European Union modernizes its data protection rules through
the Regulation 2016/679 [9]. The noticeable changes concern non-European
Web providers that have to respect European protection rules. This regula-
tion also inverses the burden of proof (i.e., Web providers have to prove the
relevance of the data; not the individuals), forces Web providers to inform
third parties that a person wants her data to be deleted, and imposes ﬁnes
to companies that do not respect regulations (up to 2 of the annual world-
wide turnover). Nevertheless, these privacy regulations are only available in
Europe and Web providers chose not to generalize them globally [10, 11].
Search engines (e.g., Google, Bing, Yahoo!) have become an incontrovert-
ible way for ﬁnding content on the Internet. In the 90s, retrieving speciﬁc
content was not an easy task even if the quantity of accessible websites was
much lower. Web directories (e.g., the WWW Virtual Library [12], LookS-
mart [13]), maintained by human editors, were at that time the main solution
for users to discover new websites. Because of the increasing amount of data
populating the Web, search engines have become the natural way to access in-
formation on the Web. In twenty years, they have made incredible progress
to retrieve accurate information among this large quantity of data. This is
mainly due to the collection and the exploitation of usage data [14, 15]: infer-
ring user interests from their query logs, reﬁning recommendations based on
the popularity of a result or on the time a user spent on the result. That is, a
better understanding of users and their interactions allows search engines to
personalize their answers and improve their recommendations.
While gathering all this data has been a key factor in improving the qual-
ity of the results returned by search engines, it has also raised serious issues
regarding user privacy. With the huge number of queries stored by a search
engine, the latter knows better than anyone the interests of its users. By using
a search engine, users do not imagine that they expose themselves to a mas-
sive leak of information. In 2006, AOL published a set of queries previously
issued by their users [16]. Its objective was to give real data to the research
community. These logs contain approximately 21 million queries formulated
by 650,000 users over three months (March, April, and May 2006). Even
though these logs are pseudo-anonymized (meaning that explicit user iden-
tiﬁers, e.g., name, email address, are removed; instead, users are identiﬁed
by a unique number), the identities of a few users could have been retrieved
based on information contained in their queries [17]. Beyond the scandal of
publishing real search queries without asking for the user consent, this release
has allowed many studies on real search queries [18, 19, 20, 21]. In terms of
privacy, these studies mainly focus on understanding what personal informa-
tion is extractable from these logs (e.g., [22]). Indeed, these queries contain
explicit and implicit information about their requesters. Explicit information
is contained in the information embedded in the query itself. For instance,
the person behind the user id 4417749 in the AOL log dataset was identiﬁed
as Thelma Arnold. Indeed, it was deduced from her queries (and other pub-
lic information) that she was a sixty years old single woman living in Lilburn
with three dogs. Explicit information either reveals straightforward facts to
infer the identity of the user (e.g., names, social security numbers, address)
or discloses personal behavior about the user. For instance, in the query “my
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head feels sensitive to the touch after doing cocaine” sent by the user 1879967,
we understand that this user consumes illegal drugs and put her health in dan-
ger. On the other hand, implicit information is extracted from the whole set
of logs using advanced techniques (e.g., data mining methods [23, 22]). For
instance, it is possible to infer the age of a user by analyzing her queries. In-
deed, it can be assumed that queries about video games are made by a young
person while queries about retirement pensions are made by an older person.
The same reasoning can be made for other categories (e.g., wealth, sex, loca-
tion). As a consequence, query logs oﬀer a wealth of information as explicit
and implicit data reveals many details about users’ lives.
One might argue that inferring and disclosing information about herself
is not a problem as “she has nothing to hide”. But, as mentioned by Solove
in [24], the term “privacy” is not reduced to the disclosure of secret informa-
tion. It also includes the exploitation of personal data, which can be seen as
watching all the comings and goings of individuals. Nevertheless, as it is hard
for users to assess the outcome of such a data exploitation, Marx [25] deﬁnes
privacy as “a value which may only be appreciated once it is lost”. Indeed, in-
dividuals often underestimate the impact of their data. This is pointed out
by Schneier in an article entitled “The Eternal Value of Privacy” where he de-
nounces potential abuses of the exploitation of private data. He illustrated his
speech by quoting Cardinal Richelieu: “If one would give me six lines written
by the hand of the most honest man, I would ﬁnd something in them to have him
hanged.” [26]. Schneier wants to emphasis that the exploitation of personal
data can have disastrous consequences. For instance, in the context of Web
search, a malevolent search engine could sell information on the wealth or
diseases of their users to banks or insurance companies.
As the current search engines lack dedicated privacy-preserving features
and do not fulﬁll people’s expectations in terms of privacy, alternative search
engines have emerged: metasearch engines (e.g., DuckDuckGo [27], Start-
Page [28] and search engines (e.g., Qwant [29]). The former enhance existing
search engines by focusing on the privacy-protection of their users, while the
latter develops a search engine that does not exploit users’ information. Nev-
ertheless, these alternatives do not implement any speciﬁc privacy-preserving
mechanisms. Instead, they claim, in their terms of service, that they do not
collect personal information about individuals. For instance, DuckDuckGo
aﬃrms that they “also save searches, but again, not in a personally identiﬁable
way, as we do not store IP addresses or unique User agent strings” [30]. How-
ever, as we have seen in the AOL scandal, pseudo-anonymized logs are not
suﬃcient to correctly protect users. Besides, as their implementations are
not publicly available, and as they do not explicitly provide the data they log,
users cannot be conﬁdent on the privacy protection obtained by these solu-
tions. Users can only trust these services and hope that their data is saved in
a privacy-preserving way.
To overcome this issue, researchers have been investigating solutions to
create search engines that ensures a privacy-protection by design. Under these
schemes, users can query a search engine without revealing the query content.
In practice, such solutions rely most of the time on homomorphic encryption
and speciﬁc recommendation algorithms (e.g., [31, 32]). These approaches are
promising as they ensure a full-privacy protection (i.e., search engines do not
manipulate data in an intelligible format). Nevertheless, cryptographic oper-
ations increase the computation time on both clients and search engines [33]
and impact the quality of the results (as several information retrieval tech-
niques, e.g., query expansion, cannot be applied to encrypted queries). Apart
from these technical reasons, search engines have no interest to deploy such
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algorithms. They would lose the ability to exploit personal data and thus
to make money with targeted advertising. Therefore, as their deployment
seems unrealistic in practice, we do not consider in this thesis such a type of
solutions.
1.2 Problem Statement
In this thesis, we aim to ﬁnd solutions to preserve the user privacy in their
interactions with Web search engines. Solutions must be compatible1 with
existing search engines (i.e., no modiﬁcation is required on search engines).
Regarding the privacy requirements, we consider an adversary that aims to
collect personal data about users. In practice, the adversary can be seen as a
curious search engine. Therefore, private solutions must prevent search en-
gines from collecting accurate data on users and thus, deducing their interests.
Furthermore, we assume that search engines received from their users non-
protecting queries (i.e., before their users use any protection mechanisms).
Consequently, search engines own a query history about their users that
they can use to bypass privacy-preserving mechanisms (e.g., de-anonymized
anonymous queries). Therefore, private solutions must ensure that they are
resilient to an exploitation of these queries. We also assume that the adversary
has access to all additional public knowledge (typically, information available
on the Internet).
Private solutions also have requirements in terms of eﬃciency. These tech-
niques introduce mechanisms that have a non-negligible cost for users. They
might require extra computation time (e.g., to generate fake queries) or in-
crease the latency (i.e., the time waited by users to obtain their results) due,
for instance, to query anonymization. Consequently, a ﬁrst requirement is to
have a reasonable overhead such that it does not degrade the user experience.
A third set of requirements concerns the quality of the results returned by
search engines. Private Web search solutions often degrade the quality of the
results (due to the protection applied to queries). Protecting the user privacy,
and at the same time obtaining irrelevant results, is not satisfactory and makes
protection mechanisms useless. Due to this reason, protection mechanisms
should preserve the quality of the results as much as possible.
1.3 Research Objective
Solutions to tackle this problem already exist in the literature. They are classi-
ﬁed into two categories. The ﬁrst one, called unlinkability, consists in hiding
the user’s identity from the search engine (typically her IP address2). Unlinka-
bility solutions are mainly ensured by anonymous communication protocols
(e.g., Onion Routing [38], Tor [39], Dissent [40, 41], RAC [42]). There are
also peer-to-peer solutions (e.g., UPIR [43], Crowds [44]) in which users,
grouped in a community, send their queries to a search engine on behalf of
each other. The second type of solutions, called indistinguishability, aims at
either altering the user’s queries or hiding the user’s interests. In practice they
add extra queries to the original query (e.g., GooPIR [45]) or send periodi-
cally fake queries to the search engine (e.g., TrackMeNot [46]). Nevertheless,
1The term “compatible” refers to technical aspects. Privacy-preserving techniques might not be
conformed to the terms of service provided by search engines or the legislation in force in the country
of use. Nevertheless, these legal aspects remain outside the scope of this thesis.
2In the thesis, we assume that users employ solutions (e.g., [34, 35, 36, 37]) to (i) remove all
quasi-identiﬁers in her queries (e.g., cookies, HTTP header, set of plugins) and (ii) block all tracking
systems that could lead to the identiﬁcation of the user.
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attacks against unlinkability and indistinguishability techniques [47, 48, 49]
have shown that they are not satisfactory to protect all queries. As these two
types of solutions are complementary (i.e., the former modiﬁes the IP address
of the requester while the latter modiﬁes the content of the query), a natu-
ral question that arises is whether a combination of these approaches would
solve the problem. In the literature, no solution combining both unlinka-
bility and indistinguishability solutions has been proposed. Therefore, we
attempt to address the two following research questions through this thesis:
 Q1: Are current state-of-the-art solutions (e.g., GooPIR, Tor, TrackMeNot)
satisfactory to query a search engine in a privacy-preserving way? What
kind of protection is the best for users?
 Q2: Can the combination of an indistinguishability mechanism over an
unlinkability protocol improve the privacy preservation of users’ data? Can
new mechanisms give a better user privacy protection?
Furthermore, solutions from the literature give the same protection to
queries. They do not adapt their protection to the sensitivity of a query:
a query about HIV infection is protected as a common query about a cake
recipe. Consequently, current protection mechanisms waste resources to pro-
tect non-sensitive queries. Therefore, we also address the following research
question:
 Q3: Is it possible to assess the sensitivity of a query? If yes, can the eﬃciency
of private Web search solutions be improved by adapting their protection
mechanism to the sensitivity of a query?
1.4 Contributions
Regarding the ﬁrst research question Q1, previous studies [47, 48] established
that an adversary with a user query history is able to break the protection
achieved by both unlinkability and indistinguishability solutions. Neverthe-
less, the impact of the attack is limited as it does not scale regarding both
the number of queries and the number of users. For that purpose, we design
a new attack, SimAttack, that requires less computation time and succeeds
in breaking a larger proportion of queries. As a result, we show that today’s
state-of-the-art methods are not satisfactory to protect users.
For the second research questionQ2, we show empirically that running an
existing indistinguishability solution over an unlinkability protocol improves
the user protection but not enough to signiﬁcantly boost the user protection.
It is the reason why we design a protocol called PEAS (Privacy, Eﬃcient and
Accurate Web Search). PEAS relies on new unlinkability and indistinguisha-
bility solutions. Our approach has a better tolerance against an adversary that
owns a user query history. In addition to a better privacy preservation, the un-
linkability part of PEAS is designed for a more suitable eﬃciency (compared
to state-of-the-art solutions) while the indistinguishability part of PEAS aims
at obfuscating user queries without a signiﬁcant degradation of the quality of
the results.
Concerning the last research questionQ3, current private Web search solu-
tions can be improved by adapting their protection mechanisms to the query
sensitivity. Instead of protecting all queries similarly, private Web search
mechanisms can focus on sensitive queries. This would signiﬁcantly improve
their eﬃciency while the privacy protection would remain barely unchanged
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Our three contributions
presented in a single scenario.
for users. We identify two types of sensitivity: (i) queries related to an em-
barrassing topic (semantic) and (ii) queries close to its requester proﬁle (link-
ability). Our third contribution identiﬁes sensitive queries with two mod-
ules: SAM (Semantic Assessment Module) and LAM (Linkability Assessment
Module). We deploy these modules on existing solutions and show that they
can signiﬁcantly improve their performance.
We summarize the three contributions presented in this thesis through the
scenario presented in Figure 1. A user sends a query through a private Web
search solution. The sensitivity of the query is assessed and PEAS (the private
Web search solution) adjusts its query protection accordingly. Finally, an ad-
versary (e.g., the search engine) uses SimAttack to break the query protection
and retrieves both the user identity and the user query.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 focuses on
some relative work. Chapters 3 to 5 describe the three contributions devel-
oped in this thesis. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and presents its perspec-
tives.
A more detailed overview of the content of each chapter follows:
 Chapter 2 — We present in this chapter the related work that has been
reported in the literature. In particular we focus on two aspects: the
protection of the user privacy and the identiﬁcation of sensitive data.
Regarding the ﬁrst aspect, we mention several solutions that allow users
to send their queries to search engines in a privacy-preserving way. For
each of them, we discuss their shortcomings. Regarding the identiﬁca-
tion of sensitive data, we ﬁrst exhibit diﬀerent deﬁnitions of sensitive
data and then review solutions that identify sensitive queries.
 Chapter 3 — The third chapter presents SimAttack, an eﬃcient attack
against private Web search solutions. SimAttack uses a query history of
users (i.e., non-protected queries previously collected by the adversary)
to bypass most privacy Web search protections. SimAttack bases its
decision on a similarity metric between a protected query and the query
history. We assess the robustness of three representative solutions with
SimAttack and then analyze properties that inﬂuence the results of the
attack.
 Chapter 4 — The fourth chapter presents PEAS, a new private Web
search solution. PEAS combines an unlinkability mechanism with an
indistinguishability mechanism. The former hides the identity of the
requester by sending queries through a succession of two nodes (i.e., the
privacy proxy), while the latter hides user queries by merging them with
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realistic fake queries (i.e., queries that could have been sent by other
users in the system).
 Chapter 5 — The ﬁfth chapter introduces SAM and LAM, two mod-
ules to identify semantically sensitive and linkable queries. Then, these
modules are used to adapt three representatives solutions and only pro-
tect sensitive queries. As a result, SAM and LAM decrease the cost of
protecting queries without signiﬁcantly reducing the user protection.
 Chapter 6 — The last chapter summarizes and discusses the three con-
tributions detailed in the thesis. It also focuses on the possible future
work regarding these three contributions.
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State of the Art
We overview in this chapter related works about solutions that enable users to
query search engines in a privacy-preserving way. We also examine metrics to
assess these solutions in terms of privacy protection, accuracy of their results,
and performance. Finally, we exhibit the existing methods to detect sensitive
queries.
2.1 Private Web Search Solutions
Solutions to privately query search engines can be classiﬁed in two categories:
(i) systems ensuring unlinkability between requesters and their queries, and
(ii) systems guaranteeing indistinguishability of user interests. Privacy-aware
mechanisms can also be directly implemented on the search engine through
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocols.
2.1.1 Unlinkability Protocols
One approach to protect user privacy from a too curious search engine is to
prevent the latter from identifying her real identity. As mentioned in [50, 51],
the identity of a user can be tracked through multiple identiﬁers: IP address,
cookies, HTTP headers, set of browser plugins, etc. Separately, each iden-
tiﬁer might not be suﬃcient to uniquely identify a user (in that case, they
are called quasi-identiﬁers) but they can often be combined to create a unique
identiﬁer. To avoid an adversary from creating such a unique identiﬁer, quasi-
identiﬁers have to be removed (e.g., [34, 35, 36]) or changed with fake values
(e.g., [52]). Nevertheless, these techniques cannot be applied on IP addresses.
To mask this speciﬁc identiﬁer, we can distinguish two approaches: (i) a
proxy-based approach, in which distant servers hide user IP addresses, and
(ii) a user-based scheme, in which users make their queries sent by other users
in a peer-to-peer community.
2.1.1.1 Proxy-based Approaches
Basic techniques to hide the IP address leverage a Proxy [53] or a VPN [54]
server as a relay. This distant server forwards user queries to the search engine
on behalf of the user and then returns its results to the user. Unfortunately,
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these mechanisms only shift the privacy problem from the search engine to
the relay, which can collect and analyze queries sent by users. Nevertheless, as
users might have more trust in proxies than in search engines, these solutions
still improve the data protection.
Similarly, commercial services (e.g., DuckDuckGo [27], StartPage [28])
provide a search tool based on other search engines (e.g., Google, Wikipedia).
These services claim that they do not collect personal information about in-
dividuals. But, to monitor their platform and identify issues, they collect
anonymized user interactions. For instance, DuckDuckGo aﬃrms that they
“also save searches, but again, not in a personally identiﬁable way, as we do not
store IP addresses or unique User agent strings” [30]. Nevertheless, having “no
unique User agent string” is not enough to protect users. For instance, mul-
tiple strings can be combined to create a unique identiﬁer. As shown by the
AOL scandal, protecting logs is not trivial. For that reason, users cannot be
conﬁdent about the privacy protection brought by these platforms.
To overcome these issues, several anonymous techniques have been de-
veloped to prevent a third party from identifying the requester behind an
anonymous query. For instance, Chaum suggested in 1981 a routing proto-
col named Mix network [55] to exchange untraceable electronic mail. This
technique uses a chain of proxy servers called mix to hide the participants of
an exchange. The protocol works as follows for a user U that wants to send
a message M to the destination A. The user U ciphers ﬁrst her message M
and a random string R0 with pkA, the public key of A. Then, she ciphers
the previous cipher text and a random string R1 with pk1, the public key of
the mix. This double encrypted message is sent to the mix (left-hand side of
Equation 1) that deciphers it and obtains the right-hand side of Equation 1
(the random string R1 is removed).
fR1; fR0;MgpkAgpk1 ! fR0;MgpkA (1)
Finally, the message fR0;MgpkA is sent to its ﬁnal destination A which deci-
phers it with its private key to retrieve the messageM . For a better protection,
Chaum suggests in his paper to use multiple mixes (also called cascade). The
use of a cascade requires small changes in the protocol. Instead of ciphering
the message with one public key (pk1 in the previous example), the message
is ciphered successively with the public keys of the n selected mixes:
fRn; fRn 1; : : : ; fR2; fR1; fR0;MgpkAgpk1gpk2 : : : gpkn 1gpkn
Furthermore, to prevent an eavesdropper from analyzing the order of mes-
sages received and sent by each mix, a mix reorders the traﬃc to change the
messages’ order of arrival.
Web Mixes [56] is based on the idea of Mix network introduced by Chaum.
The core of the protocol remains unchanged (i.e., queries are sent through
multiple mixes before reaching the search engines), but Berthold et al. sug-
gest several improvements: (i) the protocol prevents an adversary from know-
ing the sender and the receiver of a query (i.e., sender anonymity and re-
ceiver anonymity), (ii) the protocol requires an authentiﬁcation that makes
ﬂooding attacks impossible or very expensive, (iii) the protocol includes a
feedback system to inform users about their current level of protection, and
(iv) the protocol incorporates a cache proxy for better performance. Regard-
ing the ﬁrst aspect, sender anonymity and receiver anonymity are achieved
by sending dummy queries and dummy answers. The quantity of dummy
queries (answers) is adjusted such that all senders (receivers) in the protocol
send (receive) the same amount of data during each period of time. This
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prevents an adversary from identifying a sender and a requester using traf-
ﬁc analysis techniques. Regarding the second aspect, before sending queries,
users have to authenticate themselves to each mix and generate a ticket. To
do so, they individually contact each mix that veriﬁes their certiﬁcate. Then,
users have to provide the mix with a blinded message. The message is signed
by the mix and returned to the users who in turn verify the signature. As
detailed in Mix network, each encryption step requires the use of a random
string (R1, R2, ..., Rn in the example above). Web Mixes replaces random
strings by the unblinded messages generated by users (called tickets in the
protocol). Regarding the third aspect, users are informed about their protec-
tion level. Indeed, considering a dynamic group of users (i.e., new users are
continuously joining the protocol and some users are leaving the protocol),
an adversary could deduce possible senders with an intersection attack. The
protection level indicates the potentiality of such an attack. It corresponds
to the number of users in the anonymity group (i.e., the group of possible
senders obtained with the intersection attack). This group is computed using
information periodically published by each mix: the number of active users
and the logout time for each user who leaves the anonymity group. If the
group becomes too small, users are alerted. Regarding the last aspect, Web
Mixes introduces a cache-proxy between the Mix network and the distant
server. The cache-proxy receives queries from the last Mix and sends them
to the search engine. Then, it sends answers received from the search engine
back to the user using the same mixes in a reverse order. The cache-proxy is
also responsible to generate dummy answers.
West et al. [57] ﬁnd a vulnerability in the authentication process. They
pointed out that a mix has no guarantee that the ticket sent with messages was
created in the current session. An attacker can use the ticket generated for an
older message and thus bypass the authentication process. The authentication
process has for objective to limit ﬂooding attacks (as they would have been too
expensive). By exploiting this ﬂaw, an adversary is able to perform a ﬂooding
attack at a low cost.
Syverson et al. proposes a new technique called Onion Routing [38]. This
technique establishes an anonymous connection between a user and a search
engine using a sequence of intermediate nodes called onion routers. Onion
routers are connected by a permanent connection. The user deﬁnes a route
through the onion routing network, prepares an onion to establish the anony-
mous connection and sends it to the ﬁrst onion router. An onion contains
(i) information about the next hop in the route, (ii) a key seed for generating
symmetric keys and (iii) an embedded onion. It is ciphered with the public
key of the onion router to which the onion is sent. An onion router that
receives an onion, removes its outer later using its private key, generates sym-
metric keys from the key seed and retrieves the next onion router. Then, it
forwards the embedded onion to this onion router. As soon as the onion
reaches the last onion router, the anonymous connection is established and
thus the user can communicate with the search engine anonymously. To send
data through the anonymous connection, the user encrypts successively her
data for each onion router in the route (using the symmetric keys generated
from the key seeds sent in the onion). Each onion router, receiving a mes-
sage, removes (or adds, if data is sent backwards by the search engines) a layer
of encryption and forwards it to next onion router. Finally, the last onion
router retrieves the plaintext and transmits it to the search engine.
For instance, if the user wants to establish the anonymous connection
involving the onion routersOR1,OR2, andOR3, she generates the following
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onion:
fOR1; seed1; fOR2; seed2; f?; seed3gpk3gpk2gpk1
where pk1, pk2, and pk3 are respectively the public keys of OR1, OR2, and
OR3; seed1, seed2, seed3 are the key seeds for generating symmetric keys;
and ? indicates to OR3 that it is the last router. Then, when the anonymous
connection is established, the user ciphers her query q successively with K3,
K2, andK1; whereK1,K2, andK3 are the symmetric keys established respec-
tively with OR1, OR2, and OR3. Then, she sends the cipher text to the ﬁrst
onion router that applies the protocol. When the cipher text reaches OR3
(the last onion router in the path), it deciphers the cipher text and sends the
query q to the search engine.
Tor [39] is the most famous onion routing technique (more than 3 million
daily active users [58]). Tor is a second implementation of Onion Routing
that addresses several of its limitations: congestion control, integrity check-
ing, perfect forward secrecy, etc. Similarly to Onion Routing, Tor sends each
query through multiple nodes using a cryptographic protocol. Queries are
encrypted multiple times (creating diﬀerent layers) and routed through ran-
domly selected nodes. Each node deciphers the cipher text (removing each
layer) and forwards it to the next node until it reaches the exit node. The
exit node retrieves the query and sends it to the search engine. For sim-
plicity, we detail the protocol using only two onion routers OR1 and OR2
(by default, Tor established a connection through three onion routers). As
depicted by Figure 2, the user starts by negotiating a symmetric key with
each onion router (OR1 and OR2). She sends the ﬁrst half of the Diﬃe-
Hellman handshake (gx1) to the ﬁrst router (OR1) and in return gets the
other part (gy1), i.e., messages 1 and 2 in the ﬁgure. Using the two parts
of the handshake, the user and OR1 are able to compute a symmetric key
K1 = (g
x1)y1 = (gy1)x1 = gx1y1. Similarly, the user performs the same
exchanges with the second router (OR2) through a ciphered connection with
OR1 (using the symmetric key K1) , i.e., messages 3 – 6 in the ﬁgure. We
denote by K2 = gx2y2 the second symmetric key between the user and OR2.
Then, the user ciphers her query successively with K2 and K1. She sends
the cipher text to OR1 (messages 7 ) which deciphers the ﬁrst layer using the
symmetric keyK1. The onion routerOR1 forwards the remaining message to
OR2 (messages 8 ). Then, the router OR2 deciphers the message it received
from OR1 using the symmetric key K2. Finally, OR2 sends the initial query
to the search engine. As soon as it receives the results from the search engine,
the router OR2 ciphers the results with the symmetric key K2, forwards the
message to OR1 that ciphers it with the symmetric key K1, i.e., messages 9 –
Client Search engineRelay 2Relay 1
   : E(gx1)
   : gy1
   : {E(gx2)}    : E(gx2)
   : gy2   : {gy2}
   : {{Q}}    : {Q}
: TCP handshake
: Q
: A   : {A}   : {{A}}
Legend: 
E(x): RSA encryption 
{x}: AES encryption
(link is TLS-encrypted) (link is TLS-encrypted)
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Figure 2
Sending a query to a search
engine through the Tor protocol.
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12 . Finally, the router OR1 forwards the message to the user that deciphers
it with successively the symmetric keys K1 and K2 to retrieve the results of
her query.
The Tor protocol presents a major drawback when it is used to protect
search queries. Symmetric keys (in the example above K1 and K2) can be
used to protect multiple queries, as they are regenerated only when the path
changes. In practice, Tor changes the path every 10 minutes meaning that,
during this period of time, the exit node can use its symmetric key (in the
example above K2) to identify all queries coming from a unique requester.
As shown by the AOL scandal [17], linking several queries together reveals
information that can lead to the identity of the user.
Moreover, Tor does not prevent freerider nodes from misbehaving. Freerid-
ers have no interest in acting as a relay. They will drop messages whenever
they can. To overcome this issue, nodes should be monitored to verify that
they behave correctly. RAC [42] enhances Tor with such a feature. Under this
protocol, nodes are organized on several virtual rings such that, for a given
ring, a node has a predecessor node and a successor node. A node might
be part of several rings and thus have multiple predecessors and successors.
To ensure that no message is dropped by a freerider, nodes have to broad-
cast all messages they relay. Broadcast messages have to circulate through all
nodes in the ring such that if a node does not receive a message from one of its
predecessors, it considers this predecessor as a freerider. Regarding the perfor-
mance, the modiﬁcations made by RAC dramatically decrease its throughput,
as RAC has a throughput 20,000 times lower than Tor.
Notwithstanding, all the aforementioned techniques [56, 38, 39, 42] rely
on a non-collusion assumption. No router in the network has all the infor-
mation about the query and its requester: the initial node knows the identity
of the requester (i.e., her IP address) but has no information about her query
(as it is ciphered); the last router knows the content of the query but has no
knowledge about the identity of the requester; the intermediate nodes have
no clear information about either the query or the user identity. If all routers
in the path collude, they can break the anonymity property and associate the
query with its requester. To decrease the probability of such an event, Tor of-
fers the possibility to increase the number of nodes used to forward messages.
2.1.1.2 User-Based Schemes
User-based schemes also aim at hiding the user’s IP address but using a fully
decentralized architecture. They consider that a group of users who want
to send queries can cooperate to send queries on behalf of each other. For
instance, UPIR [43] proposes a protocol that allows users to get their queries
sent by another user in the group. Users do not contact each other directly.
They share memory sectors on a simple wiki-like collaborative environment.
Users save their queries on an encrypted sector and then, another user sends
them to the search engines. Answers are stored in the encrypted sector as well.
The collaborative environment does not need to be trusted as queries and
answers are stored in an encrypted format. Nevertheless, this solution is not
satisfactory in practice as its response time (i.e., time required to receive the
results) is relatively high. If we consider a system of 993 users, the best and the
worst response time achieves by the solution (depending on the settings) are
respectively 5.13 seconds and 30.74 seconds (without including the network
latency).
Reiter and Rubin suggest a more eﬃcient protocol with Crowds [44].
The protocol organizes users in a community such that they are able to send
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queries on behalf of each other. Before sending queries to the search engine
or to another user, users ﬂip a coin to decide if they either forward the query
to another user in the group or submit the query to the search engine. In
Crowds, intermediate users know the content of the query, but as they are
not sure about the identity of requesters (depending on the results of the coin
ﬂipping, the number of forwards may be long or short), they cannot aggregate
queries sent by a single user. Viejo et al. [59, 60] propose some modiﬁcations
to this protocol. The forward decision is no longer chosen by ﬂipping a coin
but users automatically forward queries that they consider harmful for them
(decision based using the Proﬁle Exposure Level, metric further detailed in
Section 2.1.4.1). Besides, the protocol allows users to refuse to forward queries
they receive from another user (for selﬁsh reasons for instance). In that case,
the user can ask another user to forward her query. If ultimately all users in
the community refuse to forward the query, the user has to send it by her-
self. This means that her query is not protected. Viejo et al. have designed
this protocol for high performances. They show that on average the response
times is 0.73 seconds (much lower than 5.13 seconds required by [43]). Never-
theless, this protocol presents a major drawback. If all users refuse to forward
queries, the user cannot get her query protected.
For that reason, Castellà-Roca et al. propose UUP [61], a more secure so-
lution to exchange n queries in a privacy-preserving way. UUP uses crypto-
graphic primitives to implement a private shuﬄing algorithm. All users in the
group cipher their queries qi with a shared key y and send them to each other.
UUP gives a predeﬁned order to each user in the group. One after the other,
users shuﬄe queries, re-mask them (to obtain re-encrypt queries) and for-
ward them to the next user. When the last user has re-masked and permuted
the queries, she broadcasts the results fc1; :::; cng to all the group members,
where c1; :::; cn are the initial ciphered queries fq1gy; :::; fqngy permuted and
re-masked. Then, each user deciphers her assigned query (according to her
position in the protocol). Due to the n re-masking steps, the decryption re-
quires from the n users to send their shares. They correspond to the initial
cipher queries fqigy re-ciphered with their private key i. As soon as they
obtain queries, users forward them to the search engine. Finally, as users do
not know the identity of the initial requester, they cannot forward them the
results of their queries. For that reason, upon receiving the results from the
search engine, users broadcast them to all the n users. The initial requesters
analyze the broadcast messages to identify the results corresponding to their
initial queries.
Romero-Tris et al. [62] point out that UUP introduces a delay of 6.8 sec-
onds. This is due to the cryptographic primitives and the broadcast mes-
sages. Romero-Tris et al. suggest modiﬁcations to decrease the response time.
Firstly, they propose to decipher queries before the last broadcast. This mod-
iﬁcation has two advantages: (i) decrease the broadcast time as messages are
shorter and (ii) users do not need to exchange their shares. Secondly, as broad-
casting all query answers produces the most signiﬁcant overhead, Romero-
Tris et al. remove this step. Instead, all users query the search engines with
all queries (including her own query). These two modiﬁcations reduce the
delay from 6.8 seconds for UUP to 3.2 seconds for the new protocol.
Moreover, Lindell et al. [63] identify that UUP is not resistant to mali-
cious adversaries. The shuﬄing algorithm proposed by UUP does not ensure
that the n users correctly follow the protocol. For that reason, Lindell et al.
introduce a veriﬁcation step after the shuﬄing protocol to ensure that no
user cheats during the shuﬄing stage. The veriﬁcation step proves that all
users involved in the protocol shuﬄe queries correctly and do not modify
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messages. Then, when it is established that no malicious user takes part in
the exchange, queries are deciphered and sent to the search engine. Due to
a higher number of cryptographic operations, authors claim that their pro-
tocol is twice as expensive as UUP. An empirical evaluation conducted by
Romero-Tris et al. [64] indicates that, for three users, the protocol is about
seven times more expensive than UPP. Knowing that UUP introduces a delay
of 6.8 seconds [62], the solution proposed by Lindell et al. seems impractical.
Due to this reason, Romero-Tris et al. propose a new protocol with similar
guarantees [64]. For better eﬃciency, they create a new shuﬄing algorithm
based on Optimize Arbitrary Size (OAS) Benes network [65]. It enables the
permutation of n inputs with 2  2 switches (2 inputs and 2 outputs). To
have a multi-party version of the OAS Benes network, Romero-Tris et al.
use t OAS Benes network, where t depends on the minimum number of
honest users in the system. They also improve the veriﬁcation step by using
zero-knowledge proof protocols based on ElGamal [66] (i.e, PEP [67] and
DISPEP [67]). By improving the shuﬄing step and the veriﬁcation step,
Romero-Tris et al. decrease the number of messages sent on average (i.e.,
4n   4 messages for their proposal and 4n   2   2/n for Lindell et al. [63],
where n is the number of users). They also analyze the computation time
of their protocol and note that it is about two times lower than then one
obtained with [63] (considering either three, four, or ﬁve users in the system).
A recent approach [68] points out that the solution proposed by Lindell
et al. [63] suﬀers from a malicious user. They claim that malicious users are
able to modify the query sent to search engines. To ﬁx the protocol against
such misbehaving users, they propose (similarly to [62]) that users send the
n queries to the search engine (instead of sending only one query). Sending
all queries does not disclose more information but increases dramatically the
computational time and the number of messages sent on the network.
Furthermore, Lindell et al. [63] detects if a malicious user does not execute
the protocol correctly, but it does not identify which user is the malicious
one. Another solution called Dissent [40, 41] increases the user protection
by identifying the malicious user. Compared to Lindell et al. [63], Dissent
implements another shuﬄing algorithm. Each user encrypts her query qi
with all members’ secondary public keys z1; :::; zn (the ciphered queries are
denoted C 0i). Users store their own C
0
i for later use, and encrypt C
0
i with all
members’ primary public keys y1; :::; yn (the cipher text is denoted by Ci).
Then, each user sends Ci to the ﬁrst member. One after another, users per-
mute the order ofC1; :::; Cn, re-mask queries by deciphering cipher texts with
their private key, and forward the message to the next user. Finally, the last
user obtains a permutation of C 00; :::; C
0
n and broadcasts it to all users. Users
can verify the correctness of the protocol by identifying that her own C 0i is
included in the results. If the protocol is executed correctly, users broadcast
their secondary private key such that they have in ﬁne all keys to decipher
all C 0i and retrieve the queries qi. Otherwise, users start a blame phase iden-
tifying the malicious user. They reveal their own C 0i allowing each user to
replay the protocol. By comparing, the messages eﬀectively sent and the ones
replayed, users are able to point out which user misbehaves. However, it was
shown by [42] that Dissent does not scale when the number of users increases.
According to this paper, the node throughput drops down to (almost) zero
when the number of nodes is higher than 50.
In addition, the work presented in [69] models a situation in which a
user gets part of her queries submitted on her behalf by other users and the
remaining part is sent by herself to the search engine. The authors illustrate
with a mathematical study how users can mutually beneﬁt from exchanging
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their queries. They model user behavior by a probability distribution and
assess the privacy leakage with the Shannon entropy [70].
2.1.2 Indistinguishability Mechanisms
With indistinguishability solutions, search engines are only able to collect
inaccurate users queries and interests. Consequently, as the users’ interests
cannot be truly discovered, the user privacy is preserved. To distort user pro-
ﬁles, most of these solutions send fake queries (in addition to users’ queries)
but other approaches rely on speciﬁc techniques: splitting the user proﬁle,
not sending the original query, etc.
2.1.2.1 Indistinguishability Based on Fake Queries
The main challenge for indistinguishability solutions based on fake queries is
to generate plausible and realistic fake queries. Indeed, fake queries must not
be distinguishable from real ones (otherwise the protection is broken). Most
solutions ensured this by generating fake queries close to users’ interests. In
that case, by computing a user proﬁle, an adversary has only access to generic
information about the user but she cannot infer their speciﬁc topics of inter-
est. PRAW [71, 72, 73] is a tool that generates dummy Web transactions to
confuse eavesdroppers about the real user’s interests. In the context of Web
search, these dummy transactions are fake queries sent to the search engines.
PRAW sends on average Tr fake queries for each real user query. These fake
queries are constructed from two diﬀerent sources: an internal user proﬁle
(describing exact users’ interests) and an internal database of terms (contain-
ing terms related to the general interests of the user). These resources are
collected from the Web pages accessed by users. Furthermore, a similar ap-
proach called Plausibly Deniable Search (PDS) [74] diﬀers in the generation
of fake queries. PDS aims at generating fake queries which could have been
sent by the user on her regular basis. As a consequence, PDS allows the user
to deny to any organizations having one of her queries sent as she can pretend
that one of the fake queries was her original query and thus claim that the
problematic query was only a fake query generated by PDS. The PDS fake
queries are generated from a large collection of Web pages. It exploits the
relation between the terms contained in Web pages to generate realistic fake
queries. Another recent approach presented by Viejo et al. [75, 76] generates
fake queries based on a user proﬁle extracted from social networks. They ar-
gue that user proﬁles extracted from social networks are more accurate than
constructing them from Web pages accessed by the user. Consequently, fake
queries derived from these user proﬁles are more realistic.
GooPIR [45] (Google Private Information Retrieval) is a Java program
to query Google in a privacy-preserving way. This protection mechanism
can also be used with other search engines but only Google is supported by
the application. GooPIR generates k fake queries for each user query but,
contrary to PRAW, GooPIR introduces fake queries inside real user queries.
Speciﬁcally, it generates a new query composed of the initial query and the
fake queries; all these queries are separated by the logical or operator. Fake
queries are generated by randomly selected keywords in a dictionary. Any
type of dictionary can be exploited. In the current implementation, the dic-
tionary is computed using news articles from WikiNews [77], but GooPIR’s
authors mention in [45] that query logs can also be used. In practice, to gener-
ate fake queries, GooPIR selects ﬁrst, for each keyword contained in the initial
query, k words that have a similar usage frequency. Then, from the k  n
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words selected keywords (considering that the initial query is composed of n
keywords), GooPIR creates k fake queries of n words. By default, GooPIR
generates three fake queries (i.e., k = 3) but users can manually modify this
value. Finally, as Google returns documents related to the initial query and
the fake ones, GooPIR implements a ﬁltering step to remove the irrelevant
results introduced by fake queries. The algorithm tests for each result if its
title or its description contains all keywords of the initial query. If so, the
result is displayed, otherwise it is discarded.
TrackMeNot [78, 46] (from now on referred to as TMN) is a Firefox plu-
gin which periodically generates fake queries to hide user queries in a stream
of related queries. Fake queries are sent independently of real user queries.
TMN aims, with the use of fake queries, to ensure that user proﬁles created
by the search engine do not reﬂect users’ real interests. After the installation
of TMN, users can deﬁne diﬀerent settings according to their desired level of
protection. Two main parameters impact the user protection: the RSS feed
lists and the delay between two fake queries. The RSS feeds list is composed
by default of four RSS feeds coming from: cnn.com, nytimes.com, msnbc.com
and theregister.co.uk. Users can modify this list to remove or add extra RSS
feeds. Modifying this setting is crucial, as keeping the initial list might help
an adversary to distinguish between real queries and fake ones. However, it is
not trivial for users to ﬁnd good RSS feeds, as they should ﬁnd RSS feeds that
cover all their ever-changing interests. Moreover, TMN gives users the pos-
sibility to customize the protection by choosing the time between two fake
queries. They can choose between several possibilities: from 10 fake queries
per minute to 1 fake query per hour. Consequently, TMN allows users to de-
cide the quantity of noise they want to introduce in their user proﬁle created
by the search engine. Also, users have the possibility to activate the “burst
mode”. In that case, when a real query is issued, TMN sends at the same
time multiple fake queries to cover it. To generate fake queries, TMN trans-
forms titles of articles listed in RSS feeds into queries. To do so, it randomly
selects a title and extracts its keywords. Then, from all available keywords,
it randomly selects between one and six keywords to form the fake query.
The randomness prevents TMN from generating deterministic fake queries.
A given title can produce several diﬀerent fake queries. Consequently, two
TMN users using the same RSS feeds do not in general create the same fake
queries.
More recently, Viejo et al. [79, 80] address the trade-oﬀ between pri-
vacy and the accuracy of the results. They argue that as GooPIR or TMN
fake queries do not share the same interests as the original queries, these
two solutions decrease the accuracy of the results. They propose to gener-
ate semantically-related fake queries in such a way that they can control the
distance between fake interests and real ones. Their solution works as fol-
lows: (i) it assigns to each term contained in the query a predeﬁned category
using an ODP taxonomy [81] or Wordnet [82]; (ii) for each category, it se-
lects related categories in the taxonomy (called fake categories); (iii) for each
fake category, it retrieves fake terms; (iv) by combining fake terms, it gener-
ates fake queries. Nevertheless, the authors do not show that their approach
achieves better results than GooPIR or TMN. They only validate the fact that,
if search engines extract their user proﬁles using the same ODP taxonomy,
their approach preserves about 57 of categories in the user proﬁle. More-
over, the proposed solution partially protects users, as it only generalizes users’
interests. For instance, instead of knowing that a user practices sailing, the
search engine knows that the user is interested in water sports. As a result,
the solution does not give any guarantee about the user protection. For in-
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stance, in the case of a disease, the solution hides the name of the disease but
does not prevent search engines from knowing that the user is infected by a
disease.
Other works [83, 84] focus on a theoretical analysis of fake queries. They
deﬁne criteria that fake queries should follow to protect users correctly in their
interactions with search engines. For instance, Optimized Query Forgery
(OQF) [83] suggests that fake queries should be generated such that the
Kullback-Leibler divergence between the user keyword distribution and the
population keyword distribution is low. Nevertheless, OQF mathematically
solves the problem but does not indicate in practice how to generate these fake
queries. Similarly, Noise Injection for Search Privacy Protection (NISSP) [84]
conducts a theoretical study on noise injections. They obtain criteria for gen-
erating the optimal noise. But the authors do not mention if such noise is
obtainable in practice with real data.
2.1.2.2 Indistinguishability Based on Query Transformation
In this section, we address approaches that do not rely on fake queries. To
obfuscate user proﬁles, they all use diﬀerent techniques. For instance, Query
Scrambler (QS) [85, 86] protects users by not sending their queries but, rather,
by issuing similar queries. More precisely, for each user query, it generates a
set of related queries by generalizing the concepts used in the initial query
and then, by merging and ﬁltering all the results obtained with these related
queries, QS retrieves the potential results for the initial query. However, this
solution suﬀers from a low accuracy as there is a low overlap between the
results obtained with the related queries and the ones obtained with the initial
query.
Another approach, Dispa [87, 88, 89], tries to ﬁnd a trade-oﬀ between user
privacy and user proﬁle exploitation. It assumes that search engines identify
users with a cookie. Therefore by generating multiple cookies for a single user,
Dispa creates diﬀerent user proﬁles on the search engine. The search engine
does not know that these diﬀerent user proﬁles refer to the same user. Besides,
Dispa uses the cookies such that each user proﬁle contains a speciﬁc trend of
user interest. As a result, Dispa reduces the information disclosure without
introducing noise in user proﬁles. Nevertheless, this approach relies on the
strong assumption that search engines identify users with their cookies; other
elements such as the IP address, or HTTP headers are not considered.
2.1.2.3 Indistinguishability Based on User Profile Obfuscation
To obtain personalized results while keeping the user’s privacy protected, so-
lutions [90, 91] have been proposed to send an obfuscated user proﬁle with
the query. The exploitation of these user proﬁles allows search engines to per-
sonalize the results. Nevertheless, these solutions require cooperative search
engines as they need to modify their personalization algorithm to accept ob-
fuscated user proﬁles.
In [90], the authors suggest constructing a hierarchical user proﬁle from
all users’ personal documents (e.g., browsing history, emails). The user pro-
ﬁle contains the frequent terms used in these documents, as they indicate a
possible user interest. The construction of a hierarchical user proﬁle is based
on two metrics: one to detect similar terms and another one to ﬁnd parent-
child terms. Then, the solution protects the user privacy by removing speciﬁc
domains from the user proﬁle (i.e., the bottom of the hierarchy). This generic
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user proﬁle contains enough data to personalize the results but not enough
to compromise the user privacy.
In UPS [91], contrary to the previous solution, they generalize the user
proﬁle according to the query. Indeed, topics non-related to the user query
are not relevant to personalize the results; they only disclose more user inter-
ests. Besides, as the user proﬁle is based on an existing hierarchy (e.g., ODP,
Wikipedia), UPS ensures that an adversary cannot infer topics that have been
removed from the hierarchy. For instance, considering a given node in the
hierarchy, depending on the number of its children, it is possible to infer
a more speciﬁc interest. UPS uses such information to generalize the user
proﬁle.
2.1.3 Private Information Retrieval
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) could be used by search engines to oﬀer a
service that enables a privacy protection by design (e.g., [31, 32]). Under such
protocols, users access information stored on the distant server without reveal-
ing to the search engine what information they access. The only information
known by the search engine is that the user has sent a query. In general, PIR
protocols consist in three algorithms: constructing protected queries (key-
words are at least encrypted), performing the information retrieval (in such
a way that the search engine has no access to the query and the results), and
ﬁnally reconstructing the result list on the client side.
For instance, Pang et al. [31] present a system that protects queries by de-
composing them into multiple buckets of words. These buckets are then ci-
phered with a homomorphic encryption scheme. Encrypted buckets are not
a problem for the search engine as it uses the homomorphic properties1 to ma-
nipulate initial data. Therefore, with the homomorphic properties, the search
engine gives a relevance score to each document indexed in its database. Rel-
evance scores are not accessible by the search engine as they are still ciphered
with the homomorphic encryption scheme. Finally, the search engine re-
turns the list of relevance scores to the user. The user deciphers this list and
identiﬁes the documents with the highest relevance scores.
PIR schemes ensure a privacy-protection by design: no third party can ac-
cess the content of the query. Nevertheless, in practice, such protocols suﬀer
from many limitations. Homomorphic encryption schemes are costly [33].
They engender extra computation time on the search engines (due to the
ciphered buckets). Besides, as the plain text is not accessible by the search en-
gine, several information retrieval techniques cannot be applied (e.g., query
expansion). Finally, such schemes require speciﬁc recommendation algo-
rithms on the search engine. But, as search engines are interested in personal
data, they have no interest in deploying such protocols.
2.1.4 Private Web Search Metrics
Private Web search solutions contain approaches that rely on a large number
of methods (e.g., anonymous network, group exchange, fake queries). This
diversity of solutions made researchers evaluate their work diﬀerently. In this
section, we introduce the metrics used to quantify the user protection (pri-
vacy). We also review metrics to estimate their cost (performance) and the
quality of the results they return (accuracy).
1Example of a homomorphic property: the product of two cipher texts E(x) and E(y) is equal
to ciphering the product of the two plain texts E(x y), where x and y are the plain texts, and E(:)
the ciphering function.
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2.1.4.1 Privacy Protection Metrics
To obtain a measure about the user privacy protection, existing solutions pro-
tect real search queries with their solution and try to retrieve the initial infor-
mation. They consider whether a static adversary (i.e., comparing the data
collected by the adversary with and without protection) or a dynamic adver-
sary (i.e., running privacy attacks to bypass the protection). Furthermore,
other approaches perform a theoretical evaluation to show that their proto-
cols have speciﬁc guarantees.
 Privacy Quantiﬁcation — Privacy quantiﬁcation methods consider an
adversary that collects user queries and quantify the knowledge that the
adversary has obtained if a protection mechanism is used or not. Several
methods have been proposed in the literature:
– Search engines — TrackMeNot [46] uses Yahoo! to quantify the
data leakage. Contrary to the other well-known search engines,
Yahoo! makes public the lists of interests it infers from the user
queries. As a result, the evaluation of TrackMeNot studies how
the list of interests evolves with the introduction of fake queries.
– Entropy — Another metric uses the entropy to quantify the user
privacy. Indeed, the entropy [70] estimates the quantity of infor-
mation represented by a discrete random variable. Applied to our
context, the entropy measures the quantity of information an ad-
versary has on a given user. The discrete random variable models
the user. For instance, it takes the set of keywords used by the
user as the sample space. If we denote by X the random variable
with the keywords fx1; :::; xng, the entropy H(X) is expressed as
follows:
H(X) = E[ log
2
(p(X))] =  
nX
i=1
p(xi)  log2p(xi); (2)
where p is the probability mass function of the discrete random
variable X (i.e., the probability that a given keyword was used by
the user).
– Proﬁle Exposure Level — The entropy measures the knowledge
that an adversary has obtained on a user. Nevertheless, this metric
needs to be compared with the one obtained without protection.
For that reason, Erola et al. [59, 60] deﬁne the Proﬁle Exposure
Level (PEL). If we consider two random variables: X representing
the queries which are originally sent by the user (i.e., without any
protection mechanism) and Y representing the queries issued with
the protection mechanism, the Proﬁle Exposure Level equals the
normalized version of the mutual information between X and Y .
More precisely, considering H(X) the entropy of the original set
and I(X;Y ) the mutual information between X and Y , the PEL
is deﬁned by:
PEL =
I(X;Y )
H(X)
 100:
This metric measures the percentage of user information that is
exposed when Y is disclosed.
– Degree of anonymity — The entropy is also used in [92] to deﬁne
the degree of anonymity provided by an unlinkability solution. It
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quantiﬁes the ability of an adversary to link the query back to its
requester by an attack. Let X be the discrete random variable rep-
resenting the potential requesters in the system. The entropy of X
is expressed by Equation 2 where p(xi) represents the probability
that the user xi is the original requester. We denote by HM the
maximum entropy of the system:
HM = log2(n);
where n is the number of users in the system. Finally, we deﬁne
the degree of anonymity d as follows:
d = 1  HM  H(X)
HM
=
H(X)
HM
:
In other words, the degree of anonymity considers the quantity
of information the attacker has learned by collecting queries (i.e.,
HM   H(X)) normalized by the maximum entropy HM . This
metric d varies between zero and one: a value of 0 means that
one user is identiﬁed as the initial requester with a probability one
while a value of 1 means that all users are identiﬁed as the potential
requester with the probability 1/n.
 Privacy Attacks— The literature contains several attacks against private
Web search solutions. We can distinguish between active attacks [93,
94, 95] and passive attacks with machine learning algorithms [47, 48,
96, 49]. A ﬁrst type of active attacks is a timing attack. As detailed
in [93, 96], measuring the time taken by users to access a particular page
discloses information. Indeed, most browsers implement a caching sys-
tem to reduce the bandwidth consumption. Nevertheless, the caching
system also reduces the time needed for users to access information.
Consequently, according to the access time, an adversary deduces if the
user has already accessed such information. By exploiting this, an ad-
versary can identify several interactions made by a given user. It is also
possible to de-anonymize an interaction if a user accesses a service with
and without anonymizing her queries. Another type of attacks [95] ob-
serves changes in traﬃc patterns to de-anonymized queries. They show
that they can follow messages through anonymous networks by causing
congestion in the network. If they follow messages from its sender to
its destination, the anonymity provided by the network is broken.
On the other hand, machine learning attacks are also used to bypass
privacy-preserving solutions. These techniques use either supervised
machine learning (e.g., Support Vector Machine [97], Logistic Regres-
sion [98]), or clustering algorithms (e.g., k-means [99]).
– Support Vector Machine [97] — For a binary classiﬁcation, a sup-
port vector machine ﬁnds the hyperplane that separates the two
classes with the largest distance between the nearest data point of
the two classes. More formally, if we denote by ~w  ~x   b = 0
the equation of the hyperplane, where ~w is the normal vector and
b/jj~wjj the distance to the origin, the problem consists in ﬁnding
~w and b that minimize
1
2
jj~wjj2;
22 Chapter 2
subject to the constraint
yi(~w  ~xi   b)  1; 8i 2 J1; nK;
where n is the number of points and ~xi is a data point belonging to
the class yi (either 1 or -1). Nevertheless, as the two classes might
not be linearly separable, Vapnik and Cortes imagine the concept
of soft margin [97]. They introduce slack variables i to tolerate
errors in the training classiﬁcation. The optimization problem is
modiﬁed as follows: minimize
1
2
jj~wjj2 + C
X
i
i;
subject to the constraints
yi(~w  ~xi   b)  1  i and i > 0; 8i 2 J1; nK;
where C is a constant to control the trade-oﬀ between minimiz-
ing the number of errors in the training set and maximizing the
margin. By combining multiple binary SVM classiﬁers, it is pos-
sible to obtain a multi-class SVM classiﬁer. It has been shown
in [100] that the one-against-one method [101] is more suitable for
practical use than other aggregation methods (e.g., one-against-all
method [101], DAGSVM [102]).
– Logistic Regression [98] — For a binary classiﬁcation problem,
logistic regression models the probability that an observation ~x
belongs to the positive class C+:
Pr(Y = C+jX = ~x) (also denoted by p(C+j~x));
where Y = fC+;C g is the binary output variable (i.e., the pre-
dicted label), and X is the input variable (i.e., the vector of fea-
tures). The simplest model deﬁnes p(C+j~x) as a linear function of
the covariates ~x. Nevertheless, as a linear function is not bounded
between zero and one, it is not possible to model such a probability
with a linear function of ~x. To remove the range restrictions, the
logistic regression operates on the logistic function of p(C+j~x):
logit
 
p(C+j~x)

= log
 p(C+j~x)
1  p(C+j~x)

:
The logistic function maps probabilities from a range of ]0; 1[ to
the full range of real numbers. Then, by modeling the logistic
function of p(C+j~x) as a linear function of the feature vector ~x,
we obtain:
log
 p(C+j~x)
1  p(C+j~x)

= 0 + ~x  ~;
where ~ is the regression coeﬃcients and 0 is the error term. As a
result, the probability p(C+j~x) is expressed by:
p(C+j~x) = 1
1 + e (0+~x~)
:
The decision rule can be determined with a threshold of 0.5. If
p(C+j~x)  0:5, ~x belongs to the positive class. Otherwise, it be-
longs to the negative class. The algorithm can be extended to a
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multi-class problem with the multinomial logistic regression [103].
Considering that the output variable Y has n possible outcomes
(instead of two), a multinomial logistic regression runs n 1 inde-
pendent binary logistic regression models (one outcome is chosen
as a “pivot”).
– k-Means [99] — The k-means clustering algorithm attempts to
split n observations into a ﬁxed number k of clusters (each obser-
vation belongs to the cluster with the nearest mean). Speciﬁcally,
given a set of observations ( ~x1; :::; ~xn), k-means clustering splits
this data in k sets S1; :::; Sk such that it minimizes the within-
cluster sum squares. In other words, minimize over all k sets
S1; :::; Sk the quantity:
kX
i=1
X
~x2Si
jj~x  ~ijj2;
where ~i is the mean of the observations contained in the set Si.
In practice, a common method to initialize the clusters (and deﬁne
each ~i) is the Forgy method [104]. It randomly chooses k observa-
tion from the n observations and uses them as initial means. Then,
the remaining observations are associated with their nearest mean.
The algorithm computes the k new means, as the centroid of each
of the k clusters. Finally, the two previous steps are repeated (i.e.,
assignment of the observations and means calculation) until a con-
vergence is reached.
Attacks based on supervised machine learning algorithms [47, 48] aim
to (i) identify the issuer of an anonymous query or (ii) retrieve the initial
query from an obfuscated query. In the ﬁrst case, they consider a system
with n users and want to determine in which class C1; :::;Cn an anony-
mous query q belongs. In the second problem, the attacks consider two
classes, one for real queries and one for fake queries. They want to de-
termine in which class the query q belongs (in other words, if the query
q is a real query or a fake one). Supervised machine learning algorithms
work in two phases. They ﬁrst learn a model from prior knowledge and
then classify data according to this model. In our context, the learning
phase extracts from existing queries discriminant criteria to characterize
users or fake queries. Then, the attack applies these criteria on queries
to retrieve their requester (in the case of anonymous queries) or retrieve
the real queries (in the case of indistinguishability mechanisms).
Similarly, clustering algorithms [48, 96, 49] distinguish between real
queries and fake ones. Nevertheless, they do not require any prior
knowledge on fake queries. Considering a set of queries q1; :::; qn, the
clustering algorithm splits queries in two clusters: one for fake queries
and one for real ones.
The success of these attacks is measured by the precision and the recall
(two classical metrics for information retrieval problems). The computa-
tion of these measures can be done using two averaging operations [105]:
macro-averaging and micro-averaging. The former computes the preci-
sion and the recall per class and then aggregates values by computing
their means while the latter computes the precision and the recall with-
out distinguishing between classes. For instance, if we consider an at-
tack against anonymous solutions, the precision and the recall for the
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macro-averaging are deﬁned by:
precision1 =
1
jU j
X
u2U
TPu
TPu + FPu
;
recall1 =
1
jU j
X
u2U
TPu
TPu + FNu
;
where U is the set of users in the system, TPu is the number of true
positives for the user u (i.e., the number of queries issued by user u
and successfully retrieved by the adversary), FPu is the number of false
positives for the user u (i.e., the number of queries issued by a user v
but considered by the attack as sent by u 6= v), and FNu is the number
of false negative (i.e., the number of queries sent by u but considered
by the attack as sent by v 6= u). On the other hand, the precision and
the recall for the micro-averaging are deﬁned by:
precision2 =
P
u2U TPuP
u2U TPu + FPu
;
recall2 =
P
u2U TPuP
u2U TPu + FNu
:
We note that the micro-averaging approach gives the same weight to
all queries while the macro-averaging approach balances the weight ac-
cording to the quantity of queries sent by each user. For our problem,
the macro averaging metrics make more sense, as we are studying the
user privacy protection individually. Besides, in the case of an unbal-
anced number of queries, the micro averaging metrics reﬂect only the
protection of the most active users. Due to these reasons, approaches
in the literature also use the macro-averaging metrics (e.g., [47, 49]).
 Theoretical Analysis — Some private Web search solutions aim to guar-
antee theoretical properties (e.g., unlinkability between the requester
and her queries). As presented by Guha et al. [106], these properties
can be theoretically proved by a protocol veriﬁer based on the Dolev-
Yao model (e.g., ProVerif [107], Avispa [108]). These veriﬁers take as
input (i) the protocol transposed in a domain speciﬁc language or -
calculus (a mathematical formalism) and (ii) the information that an
adversary wants to access. For instance, in anonymous networks, an
adversary wants to link a query with its requester or more generally, in
a cryptographic protocol, an adversary wants to access the plain text
contained in a cipher text. To perform such a veriﬁcation, the veriﬁer
derives all possible states in the protocol (e.g., by forging new messages
or replaying existing ones) and ensures that, in all possible states, the
adversary cannot obtain the information she is interested in. The ma-
jor drawback of these veriﬁers is the transcription of the protocol in a
domain speciﬁc language, any diﬀerence with its real implementation
might hide a potential ﬂaw.
2.1.4.2 Performance Criteria
Protecting queries engenders an overhead for the entities involved in the pro-
tocol. Firstly, on the client’s computer, the generation of fake queries or the
cryptographic primitives have a non-negligible cost. Secondly, on search en-
gines, fake queries produce extra computation, as they have to compute and
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return results for these fake queries. Lastly, some private web search solutions
require the use of extra entities (e.g., in anonymous protocols). Therefore, the
multiple query forwardings impact the latency. Consequently, an evaluation
of the performance considers the impact that private Web search solutions
have on these entities. Their eﬃciency can be measured with the following
metrics:
 Network traﬃc — Using extra relays or sending fake queries impacts
the network. There are more messages sent over the network or the
packet size is greater. A basic evaluation of the performance compares
the number of extra messages exchanged or the extra packet size sent.
 Latency [62] — The latency is the time a user needs to wait for her
answer. More formally, it corresponds to the time between the gen-
eration of the query and the reception of the results. A comparison
between the latency with and without protection gives an idea about
how the protection impacts the user experience.
 Throughput [109] — The throughput is the number of queries the
search engine or the private solution is able to deal with per second.
This measure is bounded as all systems are limited either by the net-
work or the computing power. If the maximum throughput is reached,
new queries are put on hold and thus the latency increases (more times
to get the results). A low maximum throughput makes the solution
impractical as few users can use the solution at the same time.
 CPU cycles [110] — The CPU cycles are the number of instructions
a processor executes to complete the execution of an algorithm. By
comparing the number of cycles required for sending queries with and
without using a protection mechanism, this metric measures precisely
the extra computation introduced by the protection mechanism.
 Energy consumption [111] — By mesuring the energy consumption
required to create, send and process queries, it is possible to quantify
the cost due to private Web search mechanisms.
2.1.4.3 Quality of the Results
The results returned through a private Web search solution diﬀer from the
ones returned for a non-protected query. Firstly, to protect the user privacy,
most private solutions introduce noise in users’ queries and thus two diﬀerent
queries produce two diﬀerent sets of results. Secondly, private Web search
solutions are not compatible with personalization, as their use prevents search
engines from collecting personal data about users.
To assess the quality of the results obtained with a private Web search
solution, the evaluation compares the results obtained with a non-protected
query and the ones obtained with a query issued through a private Web search
solution. We denote by S1 the original results, by S2 the results obtained with
the private Web search solution and by rankL(r) the rank of a result r in a set
L. Ideally, the two sets of results S1 and S2 should contain the same results
in the same order, indicating that the private solution does not degrade the
quality of the results. As it is not the case generally, we present several metrics
to precisely compare S1 and S2:
 Proportion of results in S1 contained in S2 — GooPIR [45] evaluates
the accuracy with QM1. This metric assesses the proportion of results
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retrieved with the original query (S1) that are contained in the results
retrieved with the obfuscated queries (S2):
QM1 =
jS1 \ S2j
jS1j
This metric can be seen as a recall. If we deﬁne all results in S1 as
relevant results, QM1 is the proportion of relevant results retrieved in
S2. GooPIR asks search engines to return 25 results for each query (i.e.,
jS1j = jS2j = 25) but QM1 can be computed with a diﬀerent number
of results.
 Spearman’s Footrule— Spearman’s Footrule [112] computes the average
displacement of all results between S1 and S2. It is deﬁned by:
F =
P
r2S1\S2
jrankS1(r)  rankS2(r)j
jS1 \ S2j
 Kendall’s Tau — Kendall’s Tau [113] is a metric to evaluate the corre-
lation between two rankings. It counts the total number of inversions
between the two rankings. More formally, Kendall’s Tau  is deﬁned
by:
 =
X
(r1;r2)2(S1\S2)2
rankS1 (r1)<rankS1 (r2)
1rankS2 (r1)>rankS1 (r2)
where 1X is equal to 1 if the condition X is true. Otherwise, it equals 0.
 Normalized discounted cumulative gain (NDCG) — NDCG [114]
evaluates the usefulness of the ranking based on the graded relevance
of the results. The NDCG is deﬁned by:
NDCG =
DCG
IDCG
;
where IDCG is the ideal discounted cumulative gain (i.e., the DCG
obtained with the results contained in S1) and DCG is the discounted
cumulative gain deﬁned as:
DCG = rel(r1) +
jS2jX
i=2
rel(ri)
log
2
(i)
where ri 2 S2;
where rel(r) is the relevance value assigned to each result r in S1. For
instance, if S1 contains 15 results, we can deﬁne the relevance of these
results by assigning to the ﬁrst ﬁve results the relevance of 3; to the ﬁve
following results the relevance of 2; and to the remaining ﬁve results
the relevance of 1. Otherwise, the results have the relevance of 0. More
formally, the function rel presented in this example is deﬁned by:
rel(r) =
8>><>>:
3 r 2 S1 and rankS1(r) 2 J1; 5K
2 r 2 S1 and rankS1(r) 2 J6; 10K
1 r 2 S1 and rankS1(r) 2 J11; 15K
0 otherwise
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 Mean Average Precision (MAP) — MAP expresses the mean over mul-
tiple queries of the average precision. For one query, we deﬁne AP the
average precision by:
AP =
1
jS1j 
X
r2S1\S2
P (r);
where P (r) is the precision at cut-oﬀ r in the set S2. In other words,
P(r) is the number of relevant results contained in the ﬁrst rankS2(r)
results in S2 divided by rankS2(r). If we consider that S1 = fa; b; cg
and S2 = fb; c; dg where a; b; c; d are results, the average precision is:
AP =
1
3
 [
b2S1z}|{
1
1|{z}
rankS2 (b)
+
(b;c)2S1S1z}|{
2
2|{z}
rankS2 (c)
] =
2
3
:
If we consider now that S2 = fb; d; cg, the average precision is:
AP =
1
3
 [1
1
+
2
3
] =
5
9
:
2.1.5 Discussion
In this section, we summarize the aforementioned privacy-preserving solu-
tions and compare them according to our objectives. We ﬁrst recall the fea-
tures they provide. Then, we summarize their required hypotheses and precise
the criteria we use to compare these solutions (the retained criteria are based
on the metrics previously presented). Finally, considering their features, hy-
potheses and criteria, we draw a comparison between all these solutions.
2.1.5.1 Feature Provided
The unlinkability solutions (i.e., solutions that hide the user identity by send-
ing queries through multiple nodes) give diﬀerent level of protection. The
basic one is the unlinkability between the sender and her message. Several pro-
tocols (e.g., [56, 42]) guarantee a further protection: sender anonymity, and
receiver anonymity. The former property ensures that the sender cannot be
distinguished among all users in the system, while the latter ensures that the
receiver cannot be determined. Other unlinkability solution (e.g., [46, 45])
generate fake queries to introduce some noise in the user proﬁle created by
the search engine or make the user query indistinguishable among a set of
queries. We characterize each of these solutions according to the sources
from which they generate fake queries: Web Pages (W), Social Networks
(SN), Dictionary (D), RSS Feeds (R) and ODP Taxonomy / WordNet (O).
Lastly, we distinguish another type of indistinguishability solutions. Such
solutions transform the user query: sending similar queries, modifying her
headers, etc. We denote these solutions by query transformation.
2.1.5.2 Required Hypotheses
Private Web search solutions have made several considerations for the deploy-
ment of their solution. Some of them consider ﬁrst that the nodes employed
in their protocol do not collude. For instance, unlinkability solutions send
queries through multiple nodes. If all the nodes in the path collude, the un-
linkability protection is bypassed as the nodes can associate the query with
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its requester. The non-collusion assumption ensures that such a misbehavior
is not permitted. Nevertheless, this hypothesis does not prevent nodes from
free-riding. They might not be interesting in following the protocol (e.g., not
forwarding queries to the next node). Some protocols implement mecha-
nisms to detect free-riders and exclude them from their protocol. Otherwise,
the remaining protocols assume that no free-riders are deployed in their proto-
col. Nevertheless, these hypotheses do not protect against a node that modi-
ﬁes the user query. As mentioned in [68], such a guarantee is obtained only
if the user sends her queries directly to the search engines. Finally, privacy at-
tacks [47, 48, 49] have shown that an adversary that has previously-collected
queries can bypass protection mechanisms. Most of these protections do not
consider such an attack. Therefore, they assume that the adversary was not
able to collect prior knowledge on users.
Metrics Range Description
Entropy [70] [0; 1] Quantity of information contained in
a user proﬁle.
Proﬁle Exposure
Level [60]
[0; 100] Percentage of user information dis-
closed.
Degree of
anonymity [92]
[0; 1] Quantify if an adversary is able to
identify the requester of an anony-
mous query.P
ri
va
cy
Recall & precision of
privacy attacks
[47, 48, 49]
[0; 100] Attacks that try to bypass protected
queries and retrieve its requester or its
initial content.
Theoretical Analysis
[107, 108]
f0; 1g Prover that indicates if there is a ﬂaw
in a protocol.
Network traﬃc [0;1[ Number of messages sent on the net-
work.
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
Latency [62] [0;1[ Time needed to receive the results
from the search engine.
Throughput [109] [0;1[ Number of queries sent per second
(on average).
CPU cycles [110] [0;1[ Number of instructions taken by the
processor to send a query.
Energy
consumption [111]
[0;1[ Energy uses to send queries to a search
engine
GooPIR (QM1) [45] [0; 1] Proportion of results retrieved with-
out protection that are also retrieved
with a protection mechanism.
Spearman’s Footrule
[112]
[0; n/2] Compute the average displacement
between two rankings.
Kendall’s Tau [113] [0; n] Evaluate the correlation between two
rankings.A
cc
ur
ac
y
NDCG [114] [0; 1] Evaluate the usefulness of a ranking.
Mean Average
Precision
[0; 1] Evaluate the quality of a ranking.
Table 1
A summary of metrics to assess
the privacy protection, the
performance and the accuracy of
private Web search techniques.
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2.1.5.3 Evaluation Criteria
Private Web search solutions have to protect users without signiﬁcantly im-
pacting the performance and the accuracy of the results. As we have seen in
Section 2.1.4, private Web search solutions have been assessed with a large
variety of metrics. We summarize them in Table 1. As we can notice these
metrics complement each other. For that reason, no unique metric has been
used in the literature to assess private Web search solutions. In addition, no
existing evaluation in the literature makes a comparison between the afore-
mentioned private Web search solutions. To overcome this issue, we establish
a qualitative comparison between solutions. This comparison is performed
according to the following criteria:
 Privacy — As previously mentioned, we consider a system in which
the adversary has been able to collect user queries (i.e., before using
any protection mechanism, users sent their queries in clear texts). Most
solutions in the literature (e.g., [46, 45, 39, 62]) do not consider such hy-
pothesis. Therefore, by considering an adversary with prior knowledge
on users, privacy attacks [47, 48, 49] show disparities in the privacy
protection. Our qualitative comparison tries to emphasis this disparity.
Furthermore, privacy guarantees oﬀered by private solutions diﬀer. For
instance, some solutions tolerate free-riders while others do not. Our
qualitative evaluation considers such diﬀerent levels of guarantees.
 Performance — The performance established for private solutions are
usually not suitable for comparison. The authors evaluate their solu-
tions on diﬀerent architecture with diﬀerent settings (e.g., number of
users). To establish a comparison in terms of performance, we exploit
how the authors position their papers with each other.
 Accuracy — Few solutions evaluate the impact that protecting queries
has on the quality of the results returned to the user. The accuracy of
the results is diﬃcult to assess as it is search engine dependent. Search
engines implement their own algorithm to exploit user data, and there-
fore, from one implementation to another, the quality of the results
obtained with the private Web search solutions might diﬀer. There-
fore, we focus our evaluation on the search engine personalization. In
particular, we study the accuracy of the user proﬁles created by search
engines.
2.1.5.4 Comparison Between Private Web Search Solutions
Using criteria established in the previous sections, we compare the private
Web search solutions presented in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2. We exclude from
this comparison PIR solutions [31, 32], as they are not compatible with our
requirements (i.e., they require from search engines speciﬁc recommendation
algorithm). We summarize in Table 2 the aforementioned private Web search
solutions. “4” is used if a given solution implements a feature or requires
a hypothesis, “6” indicates that a feature is not provided or a hypothesis
is not required for a given solution. Regarding the evaluation criteria, our
qualitative comparison is displayed through the ﬁve balls: “ ” indicates a
very bad score, “ ” a bad score, “ ” a neutral score, “ ” a good score, and
“ ” a very good score.
Regarding the privacy protection ensured by private Web search solutions,
we note from Table 2 a large disparity. Firstly, solutions like Viejo et al. [79],
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Proxy [53] 6 6 4 - - - 4 4
VPN [54] 6 6 4 - - - 4 4
Mix network [55] 6 6 4 - - 4 4 4
Web Mixes [56] 4 4 4 - - 4 4 4
Tor [39] 6 6 4 - - 4 4 4
RAC [42] 4 4 4 - - 4 6 4
UPIR [43] 6 6 4 - - 4 4 4
Crowds [44] 6 6 4 - - 4 4 4
Erola et al. [60] 6 6 4 - - 4 4 4
U
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UUP [61] 6 6 4 - - 4 4 4
Romero-Tris et al. [62] 6 6 4 - - 4 4 4
Lindell et al. [63] 6 6 4 - - 4 6 4
Romero-Tris et al. [64] 6 6 4 - - 4 4 4
Dissent [40] 6 6 4 - 4 6 4
PRAW [73] - - - W - - - 4
PDS [74] - - - W - - - 4
Viejo et al. [76] - - - SN - - - 4
GooPIR [45] - - - D - - - 4
TrackMeNot [46] - - - R - - - 4
Viejo et al. [79] - - - O - - - 4
Query Scrambler [86] - - - - 4 - - 4
In
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Dispa [89] - - - - 4 - - 4
2We precise the sources used to generate fake queries: W = Web Pages; SN = Social Networks; D
= Dictionary; R = RSS Feeds; and O = ODP Taxonomy / WordNet.
Table 2
Comparison between private
Web search solutions.
QS [86] and Dispa [89] give a partial protection to users. They let search en-
gines create user proﬁles but, in ﬁne, these proﬁles contain only generic infor-
mation about users. Such solutions hide very speciﬁc information (e.g., the
name of a disease) but still disclose some user private information (e.g., the
user has a disease). Therefore, the privacy protection obtained with these so-
lutions is relatively low. A similar protection is obtained with a Proxy [53]
and a VPN [54], as these solutions have to be trusted (i.e., they have access
to both the query content and the user identity). Indistinguishability solu-
tions (e.g., GooPIR [45], TrackMeNot [46]) present a better protection. Fake
queries mislead the adversary about real user interests. But, such protections
suﬀer from re-identiﬁcation attacks [48, 49]. Indeed, an adversary that has
previously-collected non-protected queries3 is able to identify fake queries
and retrieve user queries. A more advanced protection is ensured by unlink-
3Google, Bing, and Yahoo! collect user queries, especially the non-protected queries previously
sent by users.
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ability solutions. They prevent search engines from aggregating queries per
user and thus, creating their user proﬁle. Among these solutions, RAC [42],
Lindell et al. [63] and Dissent [40] ensure a more robust protection by de-
tecting free-riders. When such protocols detect misbehaving nodes, they are
excluded from the protocol. Nevertheless, the protection obtained with un-
linkability solutions is not optimal as they suﬀer from de-anonymization at-
tacks [47]. An adversary who had previously-collected queries about the users
is able to retrieve the requester of an anonymous query.
Furthermore, Table 2 indicates that the type of protection inﬂuences the
performance, especially the time waited by users to obtain their query re-
sults. Unlinkability techniques (e.g., Tor [39], UUP [61], Dissent [40]) send
queries to search engines through multiple nodes and thus, the multiple
query forwardings introduce a higher latency. In addition, these protocols
execute cryptographic primitives to secure communications. Ciphering and
deciphering messages engender extra computation time. Nevertheless, these
solutions have diﬀerent performance. Those which ensure sender and re-
ceiver anonymity or detects free-riders (i.e., RAC [42], Lindell et al. [63], Dis-
sent [40]) require much more computation. Others that exchange n queries
in a privacy-preserving way (e.g., UPP [61]) or ensure anonymous commu-
nication (e.g., Tor [39]) need fewer resources. Finally, the most eﬃcient un-
linkability solutions forward queries from users to users (e.g., Crowds [44])
or implement a Proxy [53] or a VPN [54]. Nevertheless, these protocols still
introduce more delay than indistinguishability solutions, as the latter inter-
acts with search engines directly. Indistinguishability solutions implement
diﬀerent methods to generate fake queries. We note that the fake query gen-
eration made by GooPIR [45] and TrackMeNot [46] is relatively straightfor-
ward (i.e, randomly selecting keywords in a dictionary, and extracting key-
words from titles of newspaper articles contained in RSS feeds). Others in-
distinguishability solutions use more advance techniques (e.g., crawling Web
pages [73, 74], using ODP taxonomies [89], exploiting social networks [76])
that engender extra computation.
In addition, private Web search solutions alter the quality of the results,
as they impact the personalization performed by search engines. Due to the
protection, search engines are not able to collect accurate information about
a speciﬁc user. As a result, they create inaccurate user proﬁles and therefore,
by personalizing the results with these inaccurate user proﬁles, they decrease
the quality of the results. Nevertheless, as search engines implement their
own personalization algorithms and do not make them publicly available,
it is hard to assess precisely the inﬂuence of this incorrect personalization.
Due to these reasons, we focus on the accuracy of the user proﬁles. Intu-
itively a more accurate user proﬁle will lead to a better personalization. We
distinguish three groups of solutions that disrupt the user proﬁles: (i) solu-
tions that hide the user identity [53, 39, 44, 62]; (ii) solutions that obfuscate
user queries [45, 46]; (iii) all other solutions [86, 89]. The accuracy obtained
with the ﬁrst type of solution is relatively low. Due to the unlinkability solu-
tions, search engines create user proﬁles from queries issued by multiple users.
Therefore, these proﬁles do not represent any users correctly. The second type
of solutions protects users with fake queries. These user proﬁles contain in-
formation about a single user and some fake queries. Therefore, compared to
the ﬁrst group of solutions, these proﬁles better represent users. Even though
the accuracy of these proﬁles depends on the quantity of fake queries gener-
ated by the private solution. Besides, for speciﬁc solutions like GooPIR [45],
the accuracy of the results is degraded by an obfuscation mechanism. It intro-
duces non-relevant results in the result list (i.e., results returned for the fake
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queries), but they can partially be removed by a ﬁltering algorithm. The last
type of solution modiﬁes the initial query. As Dispa [89] dispatches queries
among multiple proﬁles (according to their topic), user proﬁles do not con-
tain wrong information, and therefore the personalization is not impacted by
Dispa. QS [86] does not disturb the user proﬁles, but as it does not send the
initial query (only related queries are sent to the search engine), the results
obtained through this solution are not very accurate.
Several works [90, 91] focus on improving the personalization by sending
a lightweight user proﬁle with the user query. In that case, user proﬁles are
managed on the user side. To avoid any disclosure of information, they are
protected with several privacy-preserving techniques (e.g., generalization) be-
fore being sent to the search engine. Nevertheless, as all well-known search
engines (e.g., Google, Bing, Yahoo!) do not oﬀer the possibly to send a user
proﬁle with the query, these solutions are not suitable for our problem. Due
to this reason, it has been advised in [115] to perform a client-side person-
alization. For instance, UCAIR [116] learns user interests to improve user
queries (through query reformulation) and to enhance their results (through
a re-ranking).
2.1.5.5 Representative Private Web Search Solutions
Further in the thesis, we evaluate our own private Web search solution. This
evaluation should contain a comparison with the state of the art. As we have
seen, the literature contains two types of private Web search solutions: un-
linkability solutions and indistinguishability solutions. Regarding the ﬁrst
type of solutions, we do not need to focus on a speciﬁc solution, as unlink-
ability solutions consider an adversary that cannot link a query with its re-
quester. Therefore, we model unlinkability solutions by masking the query
requester. Regarding indistinguishability solutions, we discard solutions that
transforms the user query, as they do not provide a strong protection. More-
over, PRAW [73] and PDS [74] cannot be employed because they require
previous Web Pages consulted by the users (our dataset of real search queries
– see Section 3.3.1 – contains only URLs). Similarly, Viejo et al. [76] that
require user social networks cannot be used. Among the three remaining
solutions, we select TrackMeNot [46] and GooPIR [45], as they provide an
open-source implementation. Besides, such solutions employ fake queries
diﬀerently: TrackMeNot sends fake queries periodically while GooPIR in-
clude fake queries inside the user query. Therefore, these two solutions give
a good representation of indistinguishability solutions.
2.2 Sensitive Query Detection
In this section, we overview solutions to detect sensitive queries, as part of
this thesis focuses on adapting the protection provided by private Web search
solutions to query sensitivity. Firstly, we exhibit several deﬁnitions of sensi-
tive data mostly based on the notion of embarrassing topics (e.g., health, sex,
politics). Then, we present solutions to classify queries into categories. No
existing work has been proposed to detect sensitive queries. But, if we iden-
tify in a taxonomy tolerate (according to the deﬁnition that a user gives to
sensitive data), a query categorizer is able to identify sensitive queries (i.e.,
queries related to a sensitive category).
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2.2.1 Data Sensitivity
No formal deﬁnition about data sensitivity exists in the literature. Indeed, as
sensitivity is a subjective notion (i.e., people have their own judgements about
what is sensitive), it is not possible to create one generic deﬁnition about sensi-
tive content. Nevertheless, by sensitive content, people often refer to a similar
content. For instance, Google’s privacy policy [3] describes sensitive personal
information as “conﬁdential medical facts, racial or ethnic origins, political or
religious beliefs or sexuality”. Microsoft does not explicitly deﬁne sensitive
content but makes restrictions in its advertising platform for the following
categories: “adult content; controversial content; dating and relationships; drugs
and related paraphernalia; ﬁrearms and weapons; health care; political; religious
content and suﬀering; violence and exploitation gambling; surveillance equip-
ment” [117]. Similarly, the following categories are listed as unacceptable or
restricted products and services in Yahoo!’s ads platform [118]: adult sexual
products & services, questionable legality products & services (e.g., Fake IDs &
Diplomas), recreational drugs, tobacco products, alcohol products, credit repair
services, dating sites, family planning, ﬁnancial services, gambling, prescription
drugs & pharmacies, religious, weight loss products & services. Another point
of view comes from the Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA) that deﬁnes sen-
sitive data as “personal information [...] from children [...] under the age of
13” and “ﬁnancial account numbers, Social Security numbers, pharmaceutical
prescriptions or medical records about a speciﬁc individual” [119].
Administrative authorities or national laws also give a deﬁnition to sen-
sitive contents. For instance, in 1978, the French Republic published a law
stating that “It is prohibited to collect and store in databases [...] nominative
data that reveal, directly or indirectly, racial origins or politic, philosophical or
religious origins, or trade-union membership of people”4 [120]. The European
Union completed this law by a directive in 1995 [121] saying that “Member
States shall prohibit the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic ori-
gin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership,
and the processing of data concerning health or sex life”. The United Kingdom
transposes this directive in its national law [122] by adding criminal records
to the deﬁnition. More recently, the European Union mandated a working
group to reﬁne the notion of sensitive data given in the directive published in
1995. In an advice paper [123], they consider the terms “philosophical beliefs”
and “health data” as too broad, the term racial as unclear and suggest the ad-
dition of new categories such as “genetic data, biometric data, geo-location and
ﬁnancial situation”. The US makes several laws [124, 125, 126] in which they
consider “ﬁnancial data”, “health information” and “electronic communication
record” as non-disclosable data. The state of California deﬁnes in the Califor-
nia Civil Code [127], personal information, with a list of 27 data types such
as “height; weight; religion; occupation; education; political party aﬃliation;
medical condition; drugs and therapies; products purchased, leased, or rented; or
information pertaining to creditworthiness, assets, income, or liabilities”.
Researchers also tackle this problem of deﬁning sensitive data. They sug-
gest deﬁning sensitive data by studying users’ behaviors. A ﬁrst approach [128]
uses Quora to identify sensitive topics and words. Quora is a question-and-
answer website where users can post their messages anonymously. In [128],
the authors made the assumption that Quora anonymous messages are related
4Translation from the French act n°78-17 published on January 6, 1978: “Il est interdit de mettre ou
conserver en mémoire informatisée [...] des données nominatives qui, directement ou indirectement, font
apparaître les origines raciales ou les opinions politiques, philosophiques ou religieuses ou les appartenances
syndicales des personnes.”
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to at least one sensitive topic. As a consequence, by analyzing the distinction
between anonymous and non-anonymous messages posted on Quora, they
obtained a notion of data sensitivity. They found out that, in addition to the
general consensus (e.g., the deﬁnition given by Google), other types of data
might be sensitive. They take the example of criticisms against prestigious
institutions (e.g., Harvard College). Most Quora users criticize these insti-
tutions anonymously. Nevertheless, as search queries and public posts are
not the same type of texts, the deﬁnition of sensitive data found by Peddinti
et al. is not entirely valid in the context of Web search. For instance, send-
ing positive or negative queries about prestigious institutions does not reveal
any opinion about the requester: A supporter of a given institution could be
interested in consulting negative criticisms against it.
2.2.2 Query Categorization
We overview solutions to classify queries into a predeﬁned set of categories,
as we are interested to identify sensitive queries. By identifying sensitive cate-
gories in a taxonomy, a query categorizer is able to identify sensitive queries.
Query categorization has been studied for many years. Initially, query cate-
gorizers were designed to improve search engines. Indeed, by extracting the
categories of a query, search engines could remove the results that do not be-
long in those categories. Recent query categorizers [129, 87] are based on a
local search engine and an Open Directory Project (e.g., [81]). An ODP uses
a hierarchical ontology scheme under which webpages are categorized. The
classiﬁcation is performed manually by a community of users. Originally, an
ODP was used to ﬁnd webpages corresponding to a speciﬁc category. Nev-
ertheless, it is also possible to extract from an ODP a list of web pages cor-
responding to a given category. The query categorizer indexes all web pages
contained in an ODP such that, for a given query, it returns the most rele-
vant web pages. Then, using the ontology provided by the ODP, it maps the
list of web pages to a list of categories. The categories are ﬁnally ranked ac-
cording to their numbers of occurrences. Another solution [130] uses existing
search engines to categorize queries. For each category in a predeﬁned set of
categories, it sends to the search engine a new request composed of the initial
query and the category. Then, by comparing the number of results obtained
with each request, the solution is able to create a ranked list of categories.
In [131], Alemzadeh et al. propose a diﬀerent approach based on Wikipedia
articles. Their solution maps each keyword of a given query to a Wikipedia
page. Then, it extracts all categories associated with the Wikipedia pages and
using a density metric, the solution retrieves the most relevant categories. In
[132, 133, 134], the authors propose a query classiﬁer by combining a machine
learning approach (i.e., perceptron with margins algorithm) with a linguistic
model (to disambiguate and interpret semantic). These classiﬁers are trained
on a huge set of manually classiﬁed queries such that they are able to predict
a category for a given query.
In 2005, SIGKDD organized a competition entitled “Internet user search
query categorization” in which researchers were invited to propose a method
to classify queries into 67 given categories. The winner of the competition
suggested a solution [135] based on two classiﬁers: the ﬁrst classiﬁer is a Sup-
port Vector Machine classiﬁer to associate a category to a snippet (i.e., a result
in the search engine result list) and the second classiﬁer maps categories re-
turned by the search engine to the 67 predeﬁned categories. By applying
these two classiﬁers on the results returned by a search engine, this solution
obtains a ranked list of categories (ranked by relevance). Two other contribu-
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Ullegaddi et al. [129]
Juarez et al. [87]
Li et al. [130]
Alemzadeh et al. [131]
Beitzel et al. [134]
Shen et al. [135]
Kardkovacs et al. [136]
Vogel et al. [137]
Techniques employed
Local Search Engines 4 4 - - - - - -
Machine learning - - - - 4 4 - -
Other - - 4 - - - - -
Data used
Wikipedia - - - 4 - - - -
ODP 4 4 - - - - 4 4
Web Search Engines - - 4 - - 4 - -
Categorized queries - - - - 4 - - -
Table 3
Comparison between the
existing query classiﬁers
tors involved in this contest published their solutions. The ﬁrst one [136] uses
a neural network learning algorithm to classify queries into predeﬁned cate-
gories. The authors also combine the machine learning approach with two
search engines (LookSmart and Zeal) from which they obtain categories of a
given query. They developed an algorithm to map these categories to the ones
provided in the KDD contest. Finally, their solution retrieves the top ﬁve cat-
egories returned by the neural network or the mapping of categories obtained
with the two search engines. Other researchers that participate in the KDD
contest published their solution [137]. They propose a similar approach that
send queries to a web directory in order to obtain a list of categories. This
list is mapped to the predeﬁned KDD taxonomy and then, ranked to obtain
the ﬁnal categories. Furthermore, the second KDD contributors who make
public their solution.
2.2.3 Discussion
We summarized in Table 3 the aforementioned query classiﬁers. We detail
for each solution the type of techniques they employ and the data they use.
We note that most query categorizers are based on local search engines or
machine learning algorithms. These algorithms are computationally expen-
sive and thus not compatible with our requirements (i.e., personal computers
have limited resources). Moreover, query categorizers mainly use four types
of data: Wikipedia, ODP, online search engines, and manually categorized
queries. To obtain a good accuracy, query categorizers necessitate a large col-
lection of data. But large databases are too big to be stored on a personal
computer. To overcome these issues, query categorizers could rely on on-
line services, but the query sensitivity needs to be assessed before sending
queries to any distant servers (otherwise, it would disclose personal informa-
tion). Furthermore, data employed by query categorizers is based on a static
context. They cannot automatically adapt themselves to the evolution of the
Internet. Any update requires a human intervention on data. This represents
a non-negligible eﬀort, in particular if a large new set of queries need to be
manually categorized. Besides, each update either generates a new index (in
the case of a local search engine) or trains a new classiﬁer (in the case of a
machine learning algorithm) that engender heavy computations. Finally, the
recall achieved by the existing query categorizers is relatively low, indicating
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that classifying queries into a predeﬁned set of categories is a diﬃcult problem.
For instance, the recall obtained by the winner of the KDD competition [135]
is only 47.9; meaning that on a dataset of 800 queries, only 47.9 of queries
were correctly classiﬁed compared to a human-based classiﬁcation.
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SimAttack, an Eﬃcient and Scalable
Attack Against Private Web Search
Solutions
3.1 Objective
This chapter presents SimAttack, a generic attack against all types of private
Web search solutions. Compared to existing attacks [47, 48, 96, 49], we pro-
pose an approach that targets both unlinkability solutions (e.g., Tor [39]) and
indistinguishability solutions (e.g., TMN [46], GooPIR [45]). To the best of
our knowledge, no existing attacking has been published against GooPIR-
like solutions. Besides, as unlinkability solutions and indistinguishability
solutions are independent of each other, users can protect their queries by
running an indistinguishability solution on top of an unlinkability solution
(even though no solution in the literature considers this possibility). There-
fore, we designed SimAttack to target as well this type of private Web search
solutions.
Existing attacks require a lot of resources that limit their potentiality. Due
to this reason, previous studies limit their evaluation to 60 or 100 users. We
design SimAttack such that it processes a large number of queries from a large
number of users in a reasonable amount of time.
3.2 Design of the Attack
In this section, we present SimAttack, an attack against all types of private
Web search solutions. SimAttack is based on a similarity metric between
an incoming query and a user proﬁle (i.e., queries previously collected by
the adversary). Using this metric, SimAttack is able to break the diﬀerent
types of private Web search solutions. Indeed, the metric indicates if the
query is related or not to a given user proﬁle. As a consequence, SimAttack
is able to de-anonymize an anonymous query (by ﬁnding the user proﬁle
which maximizes the similarity metric) or diﬀerentiate the fake queries from
real ones (by ﬁnding the query which has the highest similarity with the user
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proﬁle). SimAttack is a user-centric attack which tries to compromise the
privacy of each user independently.
The next sections explain the computation of the similarity metric be-
tween a user proﬁle and a query, and detail how SimAttack takes advantage
of the similarity metric to break the targeted protection mechanisms: un-
linkability solutions, indistinguishability solutions, and indistinguishability
solutions over unlinkability solutions.
3.2.1 Similarity Metric Between a Query and a User Profile
We create a similarity metric sim(q; Pu) to characterize the proximity between
a query q and a user proﬁle Pu related to a user u. The query q is a short text
represented by a binary vector:
q = [va1 ; va2 ; :::; vak ];
where va1 ; va2 ; :::; vak are binary values to indicate if the terms a1; a2; :::; ak
are used or not in the query q. As mentioned in Section 1.2, the adversary was
able to collect non-protected queries issued by the users in the system. These
queries are aggregated for each user u in a user proﬁle Pu. We deﬁne a user
proﬁle Pu as a non-sorted sequence of queries:
Pu = fq1; q2; :::; qjg;
where q1; q2; :::; qj are the non-protected queries sent by the user u and col-
lected by the adversary. The similarity metric sim(q; Pu) returns a value be-
tween zero and one where greater values indicate that the query q is close to
the user proﬁle Pu. Algorithm 1 presents in detail the computation of the
similarity metric.
Algorithm 1: Similarity metric between a query and a user proﬁle.
input :q : a query,
Pu : proﬁle of user u (history of query issued by u),
 : a smoothing factor.
/* Compute a similarity between q and all queries
contained in Pu */
1 for qi 2 Pu do
2 ai  similarity(q; qi) ;
/* Sort the previous values in ascending order */
3 (x0; :::; xjPuj 1) sort(faigi2J0;jPuj 1K);
/* Compute the exponential smoothing */
4 s x0 ;
5 for i 2 J1; jPuj   1K do
6 s   xi + (1  )  s
7 return s ;
It ﬁrst computes the value ai corresponding to the similarity between two
vectors: the query q and the query qi stored inPu (line 2). Several well-known
metrics can be employed to compute the similarity between two vectors, e.g.,
Dice’s coeﬃcient [138], cosine similarity [139] and Jaccard index [140]. We
discuss its choice in Section 3.3.5. Then, Algorithm 1 ranks all the values
faigi2J0;jPuj 1K in ascending order (line 3). The similarity metric sim(q; Pu)
is ﬁnally computed as the exponential smoothing of these values (lines 4 to 6).
Indeed, the exponential smoothing corresponds to a weighted mean with a
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higher weight on the highest values. The highest values are the values that dis-
criminate a user. Indeed, a high value indicates that the user already issued
the query (or part of the query). The exponential smoothing uses a smooth-
ing factor  to establish the weight given to the values. This parameter 
varies between 0 and 1. In practice, the value of  does not strongly impact
the results of SimAttack as presented later in Section 3.3.6. Regarding the
complexity of this algorithm, computing the similarity between two vectors
isO(n), where n is the size of the two vectors (i.e., the size of the vector space).
Therefore, the overall complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(jPuj  [n+ log(jPuj)]).
3.2.2 Unlinkability Attack
The de-anonymization attack identiﬁes the requester of an anonymous query.
Algorithm 2 describes this attack. For each user proﬁlePu previously collected
by the adversary, it computes its similarity with the query q (line 5). Then, it
returns the identity id corresponding to the proﬁle with the highest similarity
(line 6). If the highest similarity equals zero, all similarities equal zero and
therefore the identity of the requester remains unknown and the attack is
unsuccessful (line 7). Otherwise, the algorithm considers the user id as the
initial requester of the query q.
The complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(jU j m  [n + log(m)]), where m is
the maximum number of queries in the user proﬁles fPugu2U , and n is the
size of the vector space.
Algorithm 2: De-anonymization Attack.
input :q : a query,
U : set of users.
/* Retrieve the user id which maximizes sim(q; Pid) */
1 (id; sim) (u0; sim(q; Pu0)) ;
2 for ui 2 U n fu0g do
3 simu  sim(q; Pui) ;
4 if simu > sim then
5 (id; sim) (ui; simu) ;
/* Check that sim is different from 0, otherwise the
attack is unsuccessful */
6 if sim > 0 then return id;
7 else return ; ;
3.2.3 Indistinguishability Attack
The attack against indistinguishability solutions aims to identify initial queries
among faked or obfuscated queries received by the search engine. Contrary
to the previous attack, the adversary knows the identity of the user and thus
tries to pinpoint fake queries by analyzing the similarity between queries and
the user proﬁle. The attack detailed in Algorithm 3 proceeds as follows. It
ﬁrst determines which obfuscation mechanism is being used. More precisely,
it checks if the obfuscated query q+ contains several fake queries separated
by the logical or operator (line 1) (i.e., behavior of GooPIR). It might appear
that the logical or operator was introduced by the user in her query (and not
by the obfuscation mechanism). Nevertheless, as the user query and all fake
queries have the same number of keywords, it is easy to detect if the logical
or was introduced by the user or the obfuscation mechanism.
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Algorithm 3: Indistinguishability Solutions Attack.
input :q+: a query,
Pu: a user proﬁle,
: a threshold,
PFQ: a proﬁle of fake queries.
1 if q+ = q0 or ::: or qk then /* q+ contains fake queries
separated by the logical or operator (i.e., GooPIR) */
/* q+ contains fake queries separated by the logical
or operator (i.e., GooPIR) */
2 (q; sim) (q0; sim(q0; Pu)) ;
3 for qi 2 q+ n fq0g do
4 simi  sim(qi; Pu) ;
5 if simi > sim then (q; sim) (qi; simi) ;
/* Check that sim is different from 0, otherwise the
attack is unsuccessful. */
6 if sim > 0 then return q;
7 else return ; ;
8 else
/* q+ is a fake query or a real query (i.e., TMN) */
9 if PFQ = ; then /* Do not exploit the RSS feeds */
10 if sim(q+; Pu) >  then return q+;
11 else /* Exploit the RSS feeds */
12 if sim(q+; Pu) > sim(q+; PFQ) then return q+ ;
13 return ; ; // q+ is considered to be a fake query
Let us consider the ﬁrst case in which the query q+ is composed of k + 1
queries (i.e., the initial query and k fake queries). The algorithm extracts each
aggregated query qi from q+ and computes the similarity metric between
these aggregated queries qi and the user proﬁle Pu (lines 3 and 5). Then it
stores the query with the highest similarity in the variable q. Finally, the
algorithm checks if the similarity sim(q; Pu) is diﬀerent from zero (line 6). If
not, it means that the (k + 1) queries are not similar to any user proﬁle and
thus the attack fails (line 7). Otherwise, the algorithm returns q as the initial
request (line 6).
In the second case (i.e., the query does not contain the logical or opera-
tor), it distinguishes two cases: if the adversary has a prior knowledge about
RSS feeds used by the user to generate the fake queries or not. If we consider
ﬁrst that the adversary does not have this external knowledge, it evaluates if
the similarity between the query q+ and the user proﬁle Pu is greater than a
given threshold . If so, then q+ is considered as a real query, and is there-
fore returned (line 10). Otherwise, the query is considered to be a fake query
(line 13).
Conversely, if we consider the situation where the adversary knows the
RSS feeds used by the user to generate fake queries, the adversary generates
fake queries using these predeﬁned RSS feeds. These fake queries are stored
in a proﬁle PFQ (same structure as a user proﬁle Pu). Then, the adversary uses
this external knowledge to distinguish fake queries (line 12). It ﬁrst compares
the similarity between the query q+ and the user proﬁle Pu (i.e., sim(q+; Pu))
against the similarity between the query q+ and the proﬁle of fake queries
PFQ (i.e., sim(q+; PFQ)). If sim(q+; Pu) is greater than sim(q+; PFQ), q+ is
closer to the user proﬁle than the proﬁle of fake queries. Consequently, q+
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is considered as a real query, and is then returned. Otherwise, the query is
considered to be a fake query (line 13).
The complexity of Algorithm 3 is O(k  jPuj  [n+ log(jPuj)]), where k is
the number of fake queries, and n the size of the vector space.
3.2.4 Indistinguishability Over an Unlinkability Solution Attack
To break solutions that uses an indistinguishability solution on top of an
unlinkability solution, the attack combines the two previous attacks. As de-
picted in Algorithm 4, its objective is to identify both the initial requester
and the initial query. Similarly to the attack presented in Algorithm 3, Al-
gorithm 4 ﬁrst determines which obfuscation mechanism is being used by
looking for logical or operators (line 1). If the protected query q+ contains
Algorithm 4: Indistinguishability over unlinkability Attack.
input :q+: a query,
U : set of users,
: a threshold,
PFQ: a proﬁle of fake queries.
1 if q+ = q0 or ::: or qk then
/* q+ contains fake queries separated by a logical or
operator (i.e., GooPIR) */
2 for qi 2 q+ do
/* Retrieve the most probable user for each
sub-query */
3 id[i] Algorithm_2(qi; U) ;
4 I  J0; kK;
5 for i 2 J0; kK do
6 if id[i] = ; then I  Infig ;
/* Retrieve the most probable sub-query qa */
7 if I = fag then
8 return (qa; id[a]);
9 else if jIj > 1 then
10 a index s.t. sim(qa; Pid[a]) is maximal over I;
11 b index s.t. sim(qb; Pid[b]) is maximal over Infag;
12 if sim(qa; Pid[a])  sim(qb; Pid[b]) > cf then
13 return (qa; id[a]);
14 return ; ; // The attack is unsuccessful
15 else
/* q+ is a fake query or a real query (i.e., TMN) */
16 id Algorithm_2(q+; U) ; // Retrieve the most probable
user
17 if id 6= ; then
18 if PFQ = ; then /* Do not exploit the RSS feeds */
19 if sim(q+; Pid) >  then return (q+; id);
20 else /* Exploit the RSS feeds */
21 if sim(q+; Pid) > sim(q+; PFQ) then return (q+; id) ;
22 return ; ; // q+ is a fake query
23 return ; ; // The attack is unsuccessful
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(k + 1) fake queries qi, it ﬁrst extracts them and then retrieves, for each of
them, its potential requester id[i] by invoking Algorithm 2 (lines 2 to 3). Then,
it removes queries which are not associated with a potential requester (lines 5
to 6), i.e., queries for which Algorithm 2 was unsuccessful. We denote the
set of indexes corresponding to the remaining queries by I. Finally, if I con-
tains one single element a (i.e., only one query is associated with a potential
requester), it returns the pair (qa; id[a]) such as the query qa is considered as
the initial query and the user id[a] as the initial requester (lines 7 to 8).
However, if I contains at least two elements (line 9), Algorithm 4 retrieves
the pairs (qa; id[a]) and (qb; id[b]) which have the highest similarity over I,
where a and b are their indexes in I, and evaluates the diﬀerence between
them (line 12):
sim(qa; Pid[a])  sim(qb; Pid[b]):
To ensure a certain conﬁdence in the results, if this diﬀerence is too small, the
attack is considered as unsuccessful (i.e., the pair (qa; id[a]) is not returned).
Indeed, from two pairs that have approximately the same similarity, it is not
possible to clearly identify the real one. If the diﬀerence is greater than a
threshold cf (initialized at 0:01 by default), the algorithm returns the pair
(qa; id[a]) such as the query qa is considered as the initial query and the user
id[a] as the initial requester (line 13). Otherwise, the attack is unsuccessful
(line 14).
When queries do not contain or operators, the algorithm ﬁrst retrieves
the potential requester id by calling the Algorithm 2 (line 16). If this id is
not empty (i.e., if the attack made by the Algorithm 2 is successful), it dis-
tinguishes two cases depending if the adversary has a prior knowledge about
RSS feeds used by the user. As mentioned in the previous section, if the ad-
versary is able to generate fake queries from the RSS feeds used by the user,
she creates a proﬁle PFQ (similar to a user proﬁle Pu) that contains a set of
fake queries. Let us consider the ﬁrst case in which the adversary does not
have this knowledge (lines 18 to 19). We then consider that the adversary
only knows prior queries sent by the user. Therefore, the adversary is able to
distinguish between fake queries and real ones by comparing the similarity
between the query q+ and the user proﬁle Pid, sim(q+; Pid), with the thresh-
old . If sim(q+; Pid) is greater than , the query is considered as a real query
sent by the user id and thus, the pair (q+; id) is returned (line 19). Indeed, a
similarity higher than  means that the query is close to the user proﬁle and
thus is likely to be a real user query. Otherwise, the query q+ is considered
as a fake query (line 22)
On the other hand, if we consider that the adversary is able to generate
a set of fake queries with the RSS feeds (lines 20 to 21), the algorithm deter-
mines if the similarity distance between the query q+ and the user proﬁle Pid,
sim(q+; Pid), is greater than the similarity metric between the query q+ and
the proﬁle of fake queries PFQ, sim(q+; PFQ). In that case, the pair (q+; id)
is respectively considered as the initial query and the initial requester and re-
turned by the algorithm (line 21). Otherwise, as no pair has been returned,
the query q+ is considered as a fake query (line 22).
The complexity of Algorithm 4 is O(k  jU j m  [n+ log(m)]), where k is
the number of fake queries, m the maximum number of queries in the user
proﬁles fPugu2U , and n the size of the vector space.
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3.3 Experimental Set-up
Our experiments are conducted on a commodity desktop workstation with
a 2.2 GHz quad-core processor with 8 GB of memory. In this section, we
present the dataset of real queries we used to evaluate SimAttack. We also
introduce the three state-of-art solutions against which we evaluate SimAt-
tack: unlinkability solutions, GooPIR, and TMN. Furthermore, we detail
the machine learning attack against which we compare the performance of
SimAttack. Then, we explain the metric we use to assess the eﬃciency of the
attacks: the recall, the precision and the F1-score. Finally, we precise how we
chose the similarity metric and the smoothing factor  used by SimAttack.
3.3.1 Datasets
In this section, we present the dataset of real queries used in all our evaluations.
This dataset is based on query logs released by the search engine AOL in 2006.
In the following section, we outline all steps we followed to build our dataset.
3.3.1.1 AOL Search Queries Logs
The AOL query log dataset was published in August 2006. It contains queries
issued by approximately 650,000 users over a three-month period (March,
April and May 2006). AOL published the dataset to give useful real world
data to help researchers in conducting their research. As users were not aware
that their queries would be publicly available, they could not modify their
queries accordingly or restrain themselves to send them (especially their sen-
sitive queries). Queries in the dataset are pseudo-anonymized meaning that
users are identiﬁed by a unique number and all other personal information
(e.g., name, email address) was removed. All queries in this dataset include
ﬁve attributes:
 AnonID — a number that identiﬁes a user uniquely.
 Query — the query issued by the user.
 QueryTime — a timestamp indicating at what time the query was is-
sued.
 ItemRank — if the user clicked on a page in the result list, the rank of
the page the user selected.
 ClickURL — if the user clicked on a page in the result list, the URL of
the page the user selected.
In the following we only use two of these attributes: AnonID and Query.
3.3.1.2 Pre-Processing
The attribute Query is not directly exploitable from the dataset as it is a short
text. We pre-process it with two Natural Language Processing (NLP) tech-
niques. First, the tokenization splits the short text into a set of words by
identifying whitespace or more complex regular expressions. Then, the stem-
ming replaces each word with its stem. A stem is a part of a word to which
preﬁxes or suﬃxes can be attached. For instance, the word “friendship” is
transformed into “friend” (the suﬃx -ship is removed). In our experiments,
we use the tokenizer provided by the Stanford CoreNLP library [141] to split
queries into a set of words. Then, we stem each word by eliminating or re-
placing the suﬃx using the Porter algorithm [142].
44 Chapter 3
We also ﬁlter irrelevant keywords by applying three other NLP techniques:
named-entity recognition, part-of-speech tagging and stop words removal.
The named-entity recognition identiﬁes the named entities (e.g., person, lo-
calisation), the numerical entities (e.g., money, percent), and the temporal
entities (e.g., date, duration) using speciﬁc rules and dictionaries. The part-
of-speech tagging is a process to identify the role of a word in a sentence (e.g.,
noun, verb, adjective). The stop word removal ﬁlters out speciﬁc keywords;
usually the most common words of a language (e.g., the, it, what, in English)
as they do not provide any meaningful information. In our experiments, we
remove all stop words from the set of stemmed words; the list of stop words
is accessible in the Appendix A. We also categorize each stemmed word with
the named-entity recognition provided by the Stanford CoreNLP library to
remove words identiﬁed as number, date, duration, pronouns, interrogative
words, money, and time. These words are not relevant in characterizing users.
Finally, we also use the part-of-speech tagging provided by Stanford CoreNLP
library as a library presented in Chapter 5 requires it.
3.3.1.3 Filtering Users
The AOL dataset contains a majority of users that issued few queries during
the three months. For instance, 56.1 of the users issued less than 15 queries
during the dataset period. However, non-active users are not suitable for
our evaluations as they issued too few queries. Indeed, as explained later in
this chapter, some of the queries are employed to create user proﬁles. These
proﬁles are used by the adversary to break private Web search solutions. A
proﬁle with too few queries does not reﬂect its user and thus is not useful to
break any protection mechanisms. For that reason, we are interested in the
most active users. These users are diﬃcult to protect as their huge number of
requests reveal a lot of personal information.
We consider that an active user is a user that sent queries during at least
two-thirds of the dataset period (i.e., 61 days) with a consecutive period of
half of the dataset period (i.e., 45 days). We ﬁlter the whole dataset to target
active users and thus reduce the dataset from approximately 650,000 users
to 18,164 users. A better overview of the selected users is given by Figure 3.
It presents the number of queries sent by each user. They issued between
62 queries and 3,156 queries over the dataset period. Besides, we note that
91.2 of users issued less than 500 queries.
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Figure 3
Distribution of the number of
queries issued per user in the
ﬁltered dataset.
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Distribution of the number of
queries issued per user for the
diﬀerent dataset.
3.3.1.4 Dataset Creation
We created ﬁve datasets containing diﬀerent number of active users (from
100 to 1,000 users): AOL100, AOL200, AOL300, AOL500, AOL1000. To do that,
we ordered the 18,164 users according to the number of queries they issued
and then selected the top 1,000 users to create the dataset AOL1000. We then
generated the four other datasets as a subset of AOL1000. To retain similar sta-
tistical properties and ensure that users issued a signiﬁcant number of queries,
we selected users according to the number of queries they issued. The selec-
tion was made randomly to obtain the desired number of users (e.g., 100
users for AOL100). Figure 4 depicts the Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) of the number of queries issued by the users in these ﬁve datasets. We
note that each of these ﬁve datasets follows approximately the same distribu-
tion. Besides, these CDF show that users in these datasets issued at least 500
queries.
In addition, we also created three extra datasets with a higher number of
users. They contain, respectively, the 5,000; 10,000; and 15,000 most active
users. We name these datasets AOL5000, AOL10000 and AOL15000. Figure 4
shows that these three datasets do not follow the previous distribution of
queries per user due to the lack of highly active users in the AOL dataset.
However, the results obtained with these datasets give a minimum value, as
considering an adversary has been collected more queries would likely in-
crease the eﬃciency of the privacy attacks.
Moreover, we note that evaluating our work with up to 15,000 users is by
far lower than the number of users that query current search engines. For
instance, our three-month dataset of 15,000 users contains 4,621,545 queries
while Google [3] receives every day more than 3 billion queries [143]. But,
due to the lack of available data, it is not possible to perform a more realistic
evaluation. Besides, performing an evaluation with a lower number of users
advantage an adversary, as having fewer users generates less traﬃc and thus
make a re-identiﬁcation attack easier.
As mentioned in Section 1.2, we considered that the adversary was able
to collect queries about her users (i.e., before they use any protection mecha-
nism). Consequently, we split each dataset in two parts: a training set used
to build user proﬁles (i.e., the previously-collected queries obtained by the
adversary), and a testing set used to assess the robustness of the considered
privacy-preserving mechanisms. In the literature, previous works [47, 48]
used the two thirds of user queries for the training set and the remaining
third of queries for the testing set. Therefore, we used the same proportion
for our experiments.
46 Chapter 3
Furthermore, TrackMeNot and GooPIR (i.e., two protection mechanisms
assessed in the evaluation section) require the generation of fake queries. The
number of users involved does not impact the user protection, as the ad-
versary knows the identity of the requester, and thus attacks each user sep-
arately. Therefore, for TMN and GooPIR, we only considered the dataset
of 100 users, AOL100. This dataset was chosen as it contains enough users
to perform our experiments; a larger number of users would require more
computational time. To generate the appropriate number of fake queries for
TrackMeNot, we considered that users used their computer 8 hours a day
and have set up TMN to send a maximum of 60 queries per hour (the default
value). As the testing set contains queries issued during 31 days, we gener-
ated 14,880 fake queries per users (i.e., 60 queries  8 hours  31 days). We
denote by TMN100, the AOL100 dataset with the 1,488,000 fake queries (i.e.,
100 users  14,880 fake queries per users). We also generated datasets with a
lower number of fake queries (corresponding to the TMN setting 30 queries
per hour, 10 queries per hour, 1 queries per hour). These datasets contained re-
spectively 7,440; 2,480; 248 fake queries per user. For GooPIR, we generate
fake queries using the algorithm described in Section 3.3.2.3. Each user query
is protected with up to seven fake queries.
Finally, in the case of TMN, we also generated a set of fake queries for the
adversary. As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, RSS feeds are publicly available on
the Internet, and as it is likely that some users do not modify the default TMN
RSS feeds, the adversary is able to generate fake queries similar to the ones
used by these users. Therefore, these fake queries might help the adversary
from distinguishing fake ones from real ones. These fake queries are stored
in a user proﬁle called PFQ. To generate a fair amount of queries for the
adversary, we considered in our evaluations that the adversary generates the
same number of fake queries as the users did. As a result, PFQ contains 14,880
fake queries.
3.3.2 Representative Private Web Search Solutions
As mentioned in Section 2.1.5.5, unlinkability solutions, TrackMeNot, and
GooPIR are three solutions that represent private Web search solutions. In
this section, we detail how we set up these solutions for our experiments.
3.3.2.1 Unlinkability Solutions
There are many private Web search solutions that enable the unlinkability be-
tween the query and the user behind it (see Section 2.1.1). In this dissertation,
we denote by unlinkability solutions all these solutions. In terms of privacy
protection, they all hide the identity of the requester and thus do not need to
be distinguished. We model these solutions by considering that the adversary
receives queries without knowing the identity of the requester.
3.3.2.2 TrackMeNot (TMN)
To ensure that the generated fake queries (built from RSS feeds captured in
2014) are compatible with terms that users cared to look for in 2006 (year of
capture of the AOL dataset), we compute the overlap between the words used
in fake queries and the words used in the whole AOL dataset. We found that
85.6 of words used in fake queries are also contained in the AOL dataset
(6,918 words out 8,082). In addition, the remaining 14.4 (i.e., words in fake
queries that are not used in the AOL dataset) is partly due to a speciﬁc vocab-
ulary employed in fake queries, as the titles of newspaper articles for which
SimAttack, an Eﬃcient and Scalable Attack Against Private Web Search Solutions 47
they are generated, often contained a very speciﬁc vocabulary. Consequently,
as the two diﬀerent dates of capture do not strongly inﬂuence the usage of
the terms, it justiﬁes the joint use of these two datasets.
3.3.2.3 GooPIR
To generate fake queries with GooPIR, we created a dictionary from the AOL
dataset. More precisely, we extracted all keywords and their usage frequency
from the 20 million AOL Web search queries. Then, based on this dictio-
nary, the GooPIR algorithm created up to seven fake queries for each original
query.
3.3.3 Concurrent Attacks
Similar attacks to SimAttack have been published in the literature [47, 48]. In
this section, we present our implementations of the two machine learning at-
tacks: one against unlinkability solutions (ML Attack against Unlinkability)
and another one against TrackMeNot (ML Attack against TMN). Neverthe-
less, to the best of our knowledge, no previous attack has been published
against GooPIR or indistinguishability solutions run on top of an unlinka-
bility protocol. For that reason and to establish a baseline, we extend the
existing attacks to target GooPIR and indistinguishability solutions run on
top of an unlinkability protocol.
The four attacks use Weka [144], a popular open-source machine learning
framework. Weka contains all well-known classiﬁers (e.g., SVM, Random
forests, Logistic regression). As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, our datasets are
split in two parts: The ﬁrst ⅔ of queries are used to train the classiﬁers while
the remaining ⅓ of queries composed the test set.
3.3.3.1 ML Attack Against Unlinkability
The implementation of the ﬁrst attack uses the Support Vector Machine
(SVM) classiﬁer. Two diﬀerent algorithms are available in Weka: SMO [145]
and LibSVM [146]. We selected LibSVM as it is more eﬃcient than SMO
to perform an SVM classiﬁcation [147]. The current attack is a multi-class
problem. It associates one class to one user. Several solutions expand the
original binary SVM algorithm to a multi-class SVM algorithm. LibSVM
implements the one-against-one method [101]. This method has been shown
to be the most suitable for practical use [100]. We reproduced the attack as it
was published in [47]: the same type of SVM (i.e., C-SVC), the same type of
kernel (i.e., linear), and the same tolerance of termination criterion Epsilon
(i.e., 0.001 that corresponds to its default value). However, for parameter
C, that controls the trade-oﬀ between minimizing the number of errors in
the training set and maximizing the margin between two classes, we optimize
its value to obtain the best performance. A small value will not tolerate er-
rors in the training set while a large value will maximize the margin between
classes. Weka oﬀers a speciﬁc option (CVParameterSelection) to ﬁnd the
parameter C that maximizes the performance of the classiﬁcation. Using this
option, we found out that the best value for C is 1.1 (the default value is 1).
The SVM classiﬁer is trained on previously-collected queries by the adversary
(i.e., queries previously sent without any protection).
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3.3.3.2 ML Attack Against TMN
The attack against TMN has been published by Peddinti et al. [48]. Distin-
guishing fake queries from real ones is a binary classiﬁcation problem: a ﬁrst
class contains fake queries and a second class real queries. The attack requires
the adversary to generate a set of fake queries using the same RSS feeds used
by the users. It is reasonable to consider this list known by the adversary, as
most of the users might not modify the default RSS feed list. Furthermore,
as TMN does not hide the identity of the requester, each user is processed
separately. Therefore, by considering a system with n diﬀerent users, the at-
tack consists in n distinct binary classiﬁcation problems. Each classiﬁer is
trained using real queries contained in the user proﬁle of the considered user,
and the set of fake queries generated by the adversary. As a result, the n clas-
siﬁers learn the diﬀerence between real queries and fake queries. Peddinti et
al. showed in their paper that logistic regression is the best classiﬁer to iden-
tify fake queries. Consequently, we implement the attack using Logistic,
the default logistic regression implementation available in Weka. This algo-
rithm builds a logistic regression model with a ridge estimator [148] and uses
the Quasi-Newton method [149] to ﬁt the model to the data. The Quasi-
Netwon method gives a good trade-oﬀ between ﬁtting accuracy and speed.
Logistic regression does not require the setting-up of any parameters.
Moreover, Peddinti et al. did not investigate the SVM classiﬁer in their
studies. They mentioned in [150] that they “neglect other better classiﬁers like
SVM, so as to estimate the lowest accuracies that can be achieved”. Consequently,
we also include in our experimentations an attack based on the SVM classiﬁer.
Similarly to the logistic regression attack, the SVM attack distinguishes fake
queries using k binary classiﬁcation problems (one classiﬁer per user). We
parametrize the SVM classiﬁer with the same settings we used for the attack
against unlinkability solutions.
3.3.3.3 ML Attack Against GooPIR
The previous attacks suppose an adversary with a prior knowledge on fake
queries (otherwise, the adversary is not able to train the SVM or the logistic
regression classiﬁer). Therefore, the previous attack cannot target GooPIR, as
the latter generates fake queries by randomly selecting words in a dictionary.
To obtain a fair competitor to compare the results of SimAttack, we modi-
ﬁed the attack against unlinkability techniques to create ML Attack against
Algorithm 5: ML Attack against GooPIR.
input :q+ : a protected query,
SVM: SVM model obtained after the training phase,
u: identity of the requester
1 q  null ; // Query identified as the initial one
2 pmax   1 ; // Probability that q belongs to the user u
3 for qi 2 q+ do
4 p^ = SVM(qi; u) ; // Probability that qi belongs to the
user u
5 if p^ > pmax then
6 q  qi ;
7 pmax  p^ ;
8 return q;
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GooPIR. GooPIR obfuscates a user query by generating a protected query
composed of k + 1 sub-queries: the original query and k fake queries; all
sub-queries are separated by the logical or operator. The attack aims to re-
trieve, from a protected query, the sub-query that appears to be the most
likely one. ML Attack against GooPIR is explained through Algorithm 5. It
ﬁrst retrieves each sub-query in the protected query by identifying logical or
operators. There is no issue if a sub-query contains a boolean operator, as the
user query and all fake queries have the same number of keywords. Conse-
quently, it is easy to distinguish the logical operator introduced by the user
from the ones introduced by GooPIR. Then, the algorithm reuses the SVM
classiﬁer trained for the unlinkability attack (as the training step is not spe-
ciﬁc to unlinkability solutions). The algorithm returns, for each sub-query
sent by the user u, the probability that the sub-query was issued by u (line 4).
Finally, the algorithm identiﬁes the query with the highest probability and
considers it as the initial query. Consequently, without any knowledge on
the generation of fake queries, Algorithm 5 distinguishes fake queries from
real ones.
The prediction complexity for the linear SVM is O(jU j  n), where jU j is
the number of users in the system andn is the number of features. Indeed, our
SVM classiﬁer uses jU j   1 binary classiﬁers that compute a linear equation
in a vector space of size n. Therefore, the overall complexity of Algorithm 5
is O(k  jU j  n), where k is the number of fake queries.
3.3.3.4 ML Attack Against Indistinguishability Solutions Over an
Unlinkability Solution
Users are able set-up on their computer an indistinguishability solution to-
gether with an unlinkability solution. Therefore, it corresponds to an indis-
tinguishability solution that runs on top of an unlinkability protocol. As a
result, the aforementioned machine learning attacks are not designed against
such protection mechanisms. Nevertheless, it is possible to adapt the de-
anonymization attack against them. We present the adaptation we made to
attack GooPIR and TrackMeNot over an unlinkability solution.
 GooPIR over an Unlinkability Solution — If we consider that queries
are protected by GooPIR run on top of an unlinkability solution, pro-
tected queries are obfuscated with k fake queries and then anonymized.
We adapt the machine learning attack against unlinkability solutions to
de-anonymize the query and identify the query requester. Algorithm 6
retrieves from a protected query (i.e., k + 1 anonymous queries), the
most probable pair (query, user) behind the protected query. In line 5,
we apply the SVM classiﬁer on each k + 1 sub-queries contained in
the protected query q+. For each sub-query, the SVM classiﬁer returns
the most likely requester u^ with a probability p^. Then, the algorithm re-
turns the pair (q; u) that obtained the highest probability pmax (line 6 to
line 9): q is considered as the initial query and u as the initial requester.
The complexity of Algorithm 6 is O(k  jU j n), where k is the number
of fake queries, jU j is the number of users, and n the number of features
in the SVM classiﬁer.
 TrackMeNot over an Unlinkability Solution — If we consider queries
protected by TMN over an unlinkability solution, the protection results
in sending anonymously user queries and periodically generated fake
queries. The goal of the attack is to correctly identify real queries and
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Algorithm 6: ML Attack against GooPIR over an unlinkability solution.
input :q+: a protected query,
SVM: SVM model obtained after the training phase.
1 q  null ; // Query identified as the initial one
2 u null ; // User identified as the initial one
3 pmax   1 ; // Probability that q belongs to the user u
4 for qi 2 q+ do
5 u^; p^ = SVM(qi);
6 if p^ > pmax then
7 q  qi;
8 u u^;
9 pmax  p^;
10 return (q; u);
their requester. For that purpose, we adapt the unlinkability attack by
adding an extra class for fake queries. As mentioned in Section 3.3.3, the
adversary might be able to generate a set of fake queries. This set of fake
queries is added to the training set to train the SVM classiﬁer. The SVM
classiﬁer is then able to identify if a given query qi belongs to a valid user
u^ or is a fake query. Therefore, the attack retrieves the most probable
class corresponding to the protected query. If the class corresponds to
a user u^, the query is considered as a user query sent by the user u^.
Otherwise, the query is considered as a fake query. We summarize the
attack with Algorithm 7. The complexity of this algorithm is O(n),
where n is the number of features in the SVM classiﬁer.
Algorithm 7: Machine learning attack against TMN over an unlinkabil-
ity solution.
input :q+: a protected query,
SVM: SVM model obtained after the training phase.
1 u^ = SVM(q+);
2 if u^ 6= CfakeQuery then
3 return u^;
4 else
5 return ; ; // q+ is a fake query
3.3.4 Evaluation Metrics
To measure the eﬃciency of the previous attacks, we consider the precision
and the recall. The precision is the fraction of retrieved instances that are
relevant, while the recall is the fraction of relevant instances that are actually
retrieved. For instance, considering the attack against anonymous solutions,
the precision is the fraction of de-anonymized queries that are correctly de-
anonymized by the attack while the recall is the fraction of queries correctly
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de-anonymized by the attack. In our context, they are deﬁned as follows:
precision =
1
jU j
X
u2U
TPu
TPu + FPu
;
recall =
1
jU j
X
u2U
TPu
TPu + FNu
;
where U is the set of users in the system, TPu is the number of true positives
for the user u (i.e., the number of queries issued and successfully retrieved by
the adversary), FPu is the number of false positives for the user u, and FNu
is the number of false negatives for the user u. The interpretation of FPu and
FNu is speciﬁc to each solution:
 for unlinkability solutions, FPu is the number of queries issued by a
user v but considered by the attack as sent by u 6= v and FNu is the
number of queries sent by u but considered by the attack as sent by the
user v 6= u.
 for TMN, FPu is the number of fake queries sent by u but identiﬁed
by the attack as real queries, and FNu is the number of real queries sent
by u but identiﬁed by the attack as fake queries.
 for GooPIR, FPu and FNu are the number of queries sent by u for
which the attack identiﬁes a fake query as a real one. In a unary classi-
ﬁcation problem, if a real query is identiﬁed as a fake one, necessarily a
fake one is identiﬁed as a real one. Therefore, FPu equals FNu.
 for TMN over an unlinkability solution, FPu is the number of fake
queries issued by the user u but identiﬁed by the attack as real queries
sent by u plus the number of queries issued by v 6= u but considered
by the attack as real queries sent by u, and FNu is the number of real
queries sent by u but identiﬁed by the attack as fake queries or as issued
by v 6= u.
 for GooPIR over an unlinkability solution,FPu is the number of queries
sent by u for which the attack identiﬁes a fake query as a real one plus
the number of queries issued by v 6= u but considered by the attack as
real queries sent by u, and FNu is the number of queries sent by u for
which the attack identiﬁes a real query as a fake query or as issued by
v 6= u.
Following the discussion about macro-averaging and micro-averaging made
in Section 2.1.4.1, we deﬁne the precision and the recall with the macro-
averaging version. In our context, it makes more sense to aggregate these
metrics per user and analyze the robustness per user (macro-averaging), than
consider all queries independently and obtain a result that gives more weight
on highly active users (micro-averaging). The precision and the recall can be
combined in a single metric, the F1-score, deﬁned as the harmonic mean of
the precision and the recall:
F1-score = 2  precision  recall
precision + recall
3.3.5 Query Similarity Metric Selection
As presented in Section 3.2.1 (see Algorithm 1), SimAttack computes the sim-
ilarity between two queries: a protected query and a query in the user proﬁle.
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Metric Recall Precision F1-score
Jaccard distance 31.4% 36.9% 33.9%
Dice’s coeﬃcient 36.7% 42.9% 39.6%
Cosine similarity 36.2% 42.4% 39.0%
Table 4
Dice’s coeﬃcient maximizes the
eﬃciency of the SimAttack on
the dataset AOL100.
A query is represented in a Vector Space Model. Therefore, computing the
similarity between two queries is computing the similarity between two vec-
tors. We denote by a the binary vector corresponding the protected query
and by b the binary vector corresponding to a query stored in the user pro-
ﬁle. We present three well-known metrics used in the literature to compute
similarity between two vectors:
 Jaccard index [140] — The botanist Jaccard introduced the Jaccard
index to compare species in the vegetation of the Alps (France, Ger-
many, Switzerland). This index, also known as Tanimoto similarity, is
expressed by:
J(a; b) =
a  b
jjajj2 + jjbjj2   a  b :
 Dice’s coeﬃcient [138] — Another botanist Dice introduced a coeﬃ-
cient to evaluate the degree to which two diﬀerent species are associated
in nature. To avoid a coeﬃcient that uses one of the two species as a
base, Dice deﬁned the following coeﬃcient:
D(a; b) = 2  a  bjjajj2 + jjbjj2 :
 Cosine similarity [139] — The cosine similarity measures the angle be-
tween the two vectors a and b. It is deﬁned as:
C(a; b) =
a  b
jjajj  jjbjj :
As we assume that users do not consider the word order in their queries, we
omit in our experiments other advanced metrics (e.g., the Hamming distance,
the Levenshtein distance).
We execute SimAttack to analyze which metric gives the best performance.
For the evaluation, we consider a smoothing factor  equal to 0.5 (in the next
section, we show that the smoothing factor does not strongly inﬂuence the re-
sults). We summarize in Table 4, the recall, the precision, and the F1-score for
queries contained in the dataset AOL100. We note that the maximum recall
and the maximum precision are obtained with the Dice’s coeﬃcient (respec-
tively, 36.7 and 42.9). Similar results have been obtained on the seven
other datasets (i.e., AOL200 to AOL15000). Therefore, we conﬁgure SimAt-
tack in the remaining evaluations with the Dice’s coeﬃcient.
3.3.6 Smoothing Factor 
SimAttack uses a smoothing factor to compute a similarity metric between
a query and a user proﬁle. We ﬁrst discuss the relevance of the exponen-
tial smoothing to compute this metric. Then, we analyze the impact of the
smoothing factor  on the similarity metric. Finally, we study the inﬂuence
of the smoothing factor  on the results of SimAttack.
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3.3.6.1 Relevance of the Exponential Smoothing
To break private Web search solutions, SimAttack computes a similarity met-
ric between a query and all queries contained in a user proﬁle. As established
in the previous section, the similarity metric is the Dice similarity. Therefore,
we obtained a Dice similarity for each query contained in the user proﬁle.
These Dice similarities are then aggregated in a single similarity value through
the exponential smoothing. This technique computes an average over all the
Dice similarities by giving to each of them a diﬀerent weight:
expSmooth = 
 t 1X
i=0
(1  )ixt i

+ (1  )tx0;
where fxigi2J0;tK are the similarity values and t the number of queries con-
tained in the user proﬁle. The weights are parametrized with the smoothing
factor .
To better understand the relevance of the exponential smoothing, we
depict in Figure 5 the Dice similarities before computing the exponential
smoothing (considering AOL100). More precisely, we depict the mean over
all queries in the testing set of the 30 highest Dice similarity obtained with
their user proﬁle Pu and with the other users proﬁles Pv 6= Pu. We repre-
sent the distribution of values obtained for the other user proﬁles through its
maximum, mean, and median. Figure 5 shows that few queries have a Dice
similarity diﬀerent from 0. They correspond to queries previously issued for
which at least one keyword is also used in a protected query. Compared to
queries that do not share any keywords with the protected query, these queries
are highly relevant as they convey information on the proximity between the
protected query and the user proﬁle. Therefore, to obtain a single relevant
similarity metric out of all Dice similarities, these queries should be weighted
diﬀerently in the average computation. For that reason, we employ the expo-
nential smoothing. It gives greater weights on higher similarity values than
lower ones. These weights are parametrized with the smoothing factor .
Furthermore, Figure 5 indicates that the requester proﬁle contains a greater
proportion of queries with a high Dice similarity than the other user proﬁles.
This gives the intuition why SimAttack is able to retrieve the correct user
proﬁles among all available user proﬁles. In particular, we note the clear dis-
tinction between the correct user proﬁle and the average over all other user
proﬁles.
From this ﬁgure, we also notice a huge disparity between user proﬁles. The
large diﬀerence between the median and the best of all other proﬁles points
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out this disparity. In addition, the median indicates that, for half of the user
proﬁles, almost no query has a keyword in common with the protected query.
It explains why the similarity metric with a user proﬁle is in general close to 0.
3.3.6.2 Impact of the Smoothing Factor  on the Similarity Metric
The exponential smoothing weighs the Dice similarity values diﬀerently ac-
cording to the smoothing factor . In this section, we study the impact of 
on the similarity metric computed by SimAttack. Figure 6 gives the cumula-
tive distribution of the number of queries according to the similarity metric
computed by SimAttack. We show the results for diﬀerent values of  (i.e.,
0.3, 0.5, and 0.7). We consider in our experiments the requester user proﬁle,
and the mean, the best and the median over all other user proﬁles. We note
that the smoothing factor  does not have a strong inﬂuence on the results.
Besides, for small and high similarities, the value of  has almost no inﬂuence
on the distribution (the curves are placed on top of each other).
Furthermore, as depicted by Figure 6, 14.8 of queries have a similar-
ity with their requester user proﬁle higher than 0.99. One can wonder how
it is possible for a query to have a similarity metric almost equal to 1. If
we look in detail at these queries, it appears that most of the time, they are
one-word queries with a term frequently used by the user (e.g., “google” or
“amazon.com”). To better understand how the value of the similarity metric
can almost equal 1, we imagine a ﬁctive user proﬁle with 400 queries and
consider a one-word protected query. Among the 400 queries, we assume
that the protected query appears 20 times. Consequently, if we compute the
Dice similarity between the protected query and all the queries in the user
proﬁle, we obtain a distribution with 20 times 1 and 380 times 0. Then, by
applying the exponential smoothing we end up with a similarity metric equal
to 0.99920207733 and 0.999999999965 for a smoothing factor  respectively
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equal to 0.3 and 0.7. As a consequence, even though the protected query
does not appear so frequently in the user proﬁle, the similarity between the
protected query and the user proﬁle can be close to 1.
3.3.6.3 Influence of the Smoothing Factor on the Results of SimAttack
Finally, we discuss the choice of the smoothing parameter  for our evalua-
tions. As detailed in the previous section,  does not strongly inﬂuence the
value of the similarity metric. We are interested to see if the value of the
parameter  has an impact on the attack. We report in Figure 7 the results
of SimAttack (F1-score) obtained for diﬀerent values of  on three datasets:
AOL100, AOL200, AOL300. We show that  has a limited impact on the perfor-
mance of SimAttack. For instance, for the dataset AOL100, the F1-score only
varies from 36.9 to 39.6 over the entire range of variation of . The same
result was obtained with the ﬁve other datasets (i.e., AOL500 to AOL15000).
Furthermore, as the best F1-score is observed on average for  equals 0.5, we
set the parameter  to 0.5 in the remaining evaluations.
3.4 Evaluation
In this section, we provide an evaluation of the robustness of the main state-
of-the-art solutions presented in Section 3.3.2: unlinkability solutions, Track-
MeNot, and GooPIR. To quantify the results of the attacks we use the recall,
the precision, and the F1-score as presented in Section 3.3.4. We ﬁrst present
the results regarding the privacy protection, and then compare the execution
time of SimAttack with its concurrent machine learning attack published in
the literature.
3.4.1 Privacy Protection
In this section, we evaluate the privacy protection obtained with SimAttack
for unlinkability solutions, TrackMeNot, and GooPIR. We compare these
results to the ones obtained with its corresponding machine learning attack.
In addition, as the three aforementioned solutions fail to properly protect user
queries (results presented in the ﬁrst three sections), we carry out two further
experiments which combine unlinkability and indistinguishability. We ﬁrst
study TrackMeNot over an unlinkability solution and then GooPIR over an
unlinkability solution.
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3.4.1.1 Unlinkability Solutions
We evaluate the capacity of SimAttack to de-anonymize queries (i.e., Algo-
rithm 2 presented in Section 3.2.2). Figure 8 depicts the recall and the pre-
cision of SimAttack for a diﬀerent number of users. For instance, the recall
of SimAttack is 36.7 (considering 100 users); this means that SimAttack
de-anonymizes 36.7 of user queries. Besides, the precision of SimAttack
is 42.9; this means that among the queries de-anonymized by SimAttack,
42.9 of queries are correctly de-anonymized. Furthermore, the results show
that the recall and the precision decrease when the number of users in the
system increases. For instance, SimAttack de-anonymizes 36.7 of queries
with a precision of 42.9 if we consider 100 users, while for 15,000 users, it
only de-anonymizes 11.9 of queries with a precision of 17.7. Nevertheless,
this decrease is not linear and tends to stabilize for a number of users equal
to 15,000.
We now compare the performance of both SimAttack and ML Attack
against unlinkability solutions. Figure 9 measures for the two attacks the
precision and the recall for diﬀerent numbers of users in the system. The
results show that both attacks have a comparable recall and precision but
overall SimAttack is slightly better. On average, the recall and the precision of
SimAttack are respectively 2.8 and 2.2 higher than the ones obtained with
the machine learning attack. Nevertheless, if we look in detail, the diﬀerence
between the two attacks increases according to the number of users. For
instance, if we consider 100 users in the system, the recall of SimAttack is
1.8 higher, while for 1,000 users the diﬀerence between the recall of the two
attacks is 4.3. For the precision, the diﬀerences are respectively 1.4 and
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4.1. Consequently, according to our experiments, SimAttack is better than
ML Attack especially for a high number of users.
Appendix B contains further experiments on SimAttack for unlinkability
solutions. We study diﬀerent parameters that also inﬂuence its results: the
size of the user proﬁles, the number of users retrieved for a given anonymized
query (top-p instead of top-1), and the number of user proﬁles owned by the
adversary.
3.4.1.2 TrackMeNot
In this section, we evaluate the capacity of SimAttack to distinguish fake
queries generated by TrackMeNot from real user queries (i.e., applying Al-
gorithm 3 presented in Section 3.2.3 on TMN). We conduct our experiment
with the dataset TMN100. As presented in Section 3.3.1.4, TMN100 contains
the 100 most active users protected by TMN that generates 60 queries per
hours (the default TMN setting). The number of users do not inﬂuence the
results of SimAttack, as knowing the identity of the requester, the adversary
performs the attack on each user separately. As described in Section 3.2.3, the
adversary might have a prior knowledge about the RSS feeds used by TMN
to generate the fake queries. Therefore, we design two versions of SimAttack:
one that have no information about the RSS feeds and one that exploit this
knowledge. The former considers queries close to their requester user proﬁle
as real queries (otherwise, they are considered as fake). The notion of proxim-
ity with the user proﬁle is deﬁned by the threshold : Queries with a similarity
metric greater than the threshold  are considered as real queries (otherwise,
they are considered as fake ones). Figure 10 presents the recall, the precision,
and the F1-score of SimAttack for several values of  (i.e., considering that the
adversary does not have any information about the RSS feeds used by TMN).
The results show that the value of  signiﬁcantly impacts the performance of
SimAttack. The best results in terms of F1-score are obtained for a  equal
to 0.5. For such a threshold, an adversary is able to identify 36.8 of initial
queries with a precision of 62.4. Nevertheless, while the value of  can be
adjusted to achieve a higher precision, it will be, however, at the cost of de-
creasing the recall. For instance, for a threshold  equals to 0.2, the precision
is 60.9 but the recall is only 10.6.
We now analyze the robustness of TMN considering an adversary that
knows the RSS feeds used by TMN. Under such a conﬁguration, SimAttack
does not need a threshold . It takes advantage of the RSS feeds to distinguish
fake queries from the user queries. As explained in Section 3.2.3,  is equal to
the similarity metric between the query and a user proﬁle composed of fake
 0
 25
 50
 75
 100
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
R
ec
al
l, 
Pr
ec
is
io
n,
 
an
d 
F1
-s
co
re
(in
 
%
)
Threshold  �
Recall
Precision
F1-score
Figure 10
The value of  signiﬁcantly
impacts the performance of
SimAttack.
58 Chapter 3
Attack Recall Precision F1-score
With RSS feeds 45.3% 87.1% 61.0%
Without RSS feeds ( = 0:5) 36.8% 62.4% 46.3%
Table 5
SimAttack performs better
considering an adversary with
prior knowledge about RSS feeds.
queries. Table 5 lists the performances of SimAttack in terms of precision,
recall, and F1-score in that case. The results show that SimAttack is able to
identify 45.3 of initial results with a precision of 87.1. Compared to the
results previously obtained when no RSS feeds were considered, having such a
knowledge on the RSS feeds signiﬁcantly increases the recall and the precision
(45.3 versus 36.8 for the recall, and 87.1 versus 62.4 for the precision).
Consequently, knowing the RSS feeds used by TMN to generate fake queries
is real advantage. As a consequence, users should not use the default RSS list
provided by TMN, as the list is publicly known and thus can be exploited by
an adversary.
In addition, we compare the eﬃciency of SimAttack with ML Attack
against TMN. As mentioned in Section 3.3.3.2, two machine learning algo-
rithms can be used: Support Vector Machine and Logistic Regression. Ta-
ble 6 lists the precision, the recall, and the F1-score for the two classiﬁers. The
results illustrate that compared to the logistic regression classiﬁer, the SVM
classiﬁer provides better performance in terms of precision while achieving
a slightly lower recall. Overall, the F1-score obtained by the SVM classi-
ﬁer (57.8) is much higher than the one obtained with the logistic regres-
sion (37.4). Interestingly, the machine learning attack published in the lit-
erature [48] did not consider the SVM classiﬁer, as its authors “neglect other
better classiﬁers like SVM, so as to estimate the lowest accuracies that can be
achieved” [150]. Looking for the lowest accuracies is surprising, and our study
eﬀectively shows that SVM performs better than logistic regression. More-
over, we are interesting to compare these results with SimAttack. As ML
Attack requires prior knowledge on the RSS feeds, we consider the version of
SimAttack that uses the same knowledge. Table 5 gives the results for SimAt-
tack. We note that SimAttack provides a lower recall compared to ML Attack
with both classiﬁers (45.3 versus 54.2 and 46.0 for logistic regression and
for SVM, respectively). But, in terms of precision, SimAttack outperforms
ML Attack (87.1 versus 29.8 and 77.8 for logistic regression and SVM,
respectively). Besides, analyzing the recall and the precision together, SimAt-
tack is much better than the two ML Attacks (its F1-score equals 61.0 versus
37.4 and 57.8 for the logistic regression and the SVM, respectively).
Finally, TMN allows users to set up the number of fake queries (as dis-
cussed in Section 3.3.2.2). By default, it sends “60 fake queries per hour”. To
analyze the impact of the number of fake queries, we assess the robustness of
TMN with varying numbers of fake queries sent per hour (i.e., 1, 10, 30, and
60 fake queries per hour). These diﬀerent settings add 248; 2,480; 7,440 and
14,880 fake queries per user, respectively. Figure 11 depicts the precision and
the recall provided by SimAttack both with and without using the RSS feeds.
The results show that the recall remains unchanged regardless of the num-
ber of fake queries (i.e., 36.8 and 45.3 with and without using the RSS
Classiﬁer Recall Precision F1-score
Logistic Regression 54.2% 29.8% 37.4%
Support Vector Machine 46.0% 77.8% 57.8%
Table 6
Performance of the machine
learning classiﬁers on queries
protected by TrackMeNot.
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feeds, respectively). Indeed, changing the number of fake queries sent per
hour does not aﬀect the user proﬁles, and thus the same proportion of initial
queries is retrieved. However, the results show that the precision decreases as
the number of fake queries increases (for 1 fake query per hour, the precision
is respectively 99.0 and 99.8 with and without exploiting the RSS feeds,
while for 60 fake queries per hour, the precision is 62.4 and 87.1). Indeed,
increasing the number of fake queries increases accordingly the number of
misclassiﬁed fake queries and therefore reduces the precision. Consequently,
sending too few fake queries allows the adversary to retrieve initial queries
with high precision (almost 100 of precision for one fake query per hour).
Therefore, to enforce the protection, users should send a high number of
fake queries. But, as shown by Figure 11, even though they selection 60 fake
queries per hour, the adversary is able to obtain a relatively high recall (62.4
and 87.1 with and without exploiting the RSS feeds).
Appendix B contains a complementary experiment on SimAttack for
TMN. We study the inﬂuence that the number of queries in the user pro-
ﬁles has on the eﬃciency of SimAttack. The results show that larger user
proﬁles produce better results.
3.4.1.3 GooPIR
GooPIR obfuscates a query by adding to the original query k fake queries;
all queries are separated by the logical or operator. SimAttack tries to iden-
tify which query among the (k + 1) sub-queries is the initial one. In this
section, we assess the capacity of SimAttack to retrieve the initial query. Our
experiments use the dataset AOL100 for which GooPIR generated up to seven
fake queries. The number of users do not inﬂuence the results, as the attack
is performed on each user separately. Figure 12 presents the performance of
SimAttack for varying numbers of fake queries (from one to seven). The
recall represents the proportion of obfuscated queries for which SimAttack
correctly retrieves the initial query. We do not display the precision, as an
attack against GooPIR is a unary classiﬁcation problem and thus, for that
speciﬁc case, the precision equals the recall. Besides, to better understand
the outcomes of the attack, we also categorize queries as Misclassiﬁed and
Unknown. Misclassiﬁed represents the proportion of obfuscated queries for
which SimAttack retrieves a fake query as initial query, and Unknown repre-
sents the proportion of obfuscated queries for which SimAttack is not able to
classify any query as initial query (i.e., the similarity of all (k+1) queries with
the user proﬁle equals zero. The results show that the number of fake queries
generated by GooPIR has a limited impact on the privacy protection of the
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user: SimAttack retrieves 60.2 of initial queries when only one fake query
is generated while 50.6 of initial queries are retrieved for seven fake queries
generated. Besides, regardless of the number of fake queries, the percentage
of initial queries retrieved by SimAttack remains relatively high (more than
half of initial queries are identiﬁed).
Furthermore, we study the reason why some queries are not identiﬁed
by SimAttack. These queries are classiﬁed as Misclassiﬁed and Unknown (see
Figure 12). The results show that the proportion of queries in these two cat-
egories changes according to the number of fake queries. For instance, for
one fake query, unknown queries represent 78.9 of non-identiﬁed queries
while misclassiﬁed queries represent 21.1. If we consider seven fake queries,
these percentages change to 40.8 and 59.2, respectively. From the high
proportion of unknown queries (20.1 for seven fake queries), we deduce
that a lot of initial queries have a similarity equal to 0 with their requester
user proﬁle. This means that 20.1 of user queries contained keywords that
had never been used by the user. The non-negligible proportion of unknown
queries (20.1) also indicates that the quality of the fake queries generated
by GooPIR is not satisfactory as they often have a similarity with the user
proﬁle equal to zero. Consequently, increasing the number of fake queries
maximizes the probability to have at least one fake query that is slightly re-
lated to the user proﬁle.
Finally, we compare the performance of SimAttack with ML Attack against
GooPIR. It is an extension of the previous machine learning attacks (see Sec-
tion 3.3.3.3) that we create to establish a baseline and compare the results
obtained with SimAttack. Figure 13 measures the recall of the two attacks
for a number of fake queries varying between one and seven. The results
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show that on average SimAttack retrieves 8.1 more queries that ML Attack.
Nevertheless, this diﬀerence is not homogenous: for one fake query, SimAt-
tack retrieves 9.1 more queries while for seven fake queries, the diﬀerence
between the two attacks concerns only 6.4 of queries. Overall, SimAttack
retrieves a higher proportion of initial queries.
We study in Appendix B the inﬂuence that the number of queries in the
user proﬁles has on the eﬃciency of SimAttack. We show that larger user
proﬁles make SimAttack retrieves a higher number of queries.
3.4.1.4 TMN Over an Unlinkability Solution
In this section, we evaluate the performance of SimAttack against Track-
MeNot over an unlinkability solution. In this hybrid solution, users send
their real queries and the TMN fake queries anonymously. An adversary has
to distinguish between user queries and fake ones, and then she has to iden-
tify the user that requested the real queries. We analyze with SimAttack the
robustness of TMN over an unlinkability solution considering that the ad-
versary has no information about the RSS feeds used by the users. Figure 14
presents the recall, the precision, and the F1-score for several values of  and
considering the TMN100 dataset. The results show that  signiﬁcantly impacts
the performance of SimAttack: the F1-score varies from 6.4 to 27.3 and
gives its best value for  equals 0.8. For this value, an adversary is able to
identify 20.5 of real queries with a precision of 40.7. Compared to the re-
sults obtained with TrackMeNot alone (see Table 5), adding the unlinkability
solution decreases the recall by 16.3 (20.5 versus 36.8) and the precision
by 21.7 (40.7 versus 62.4). Indeed, as the adversary does not know the
identity of the user, a lot of queries are now misclassiﬁed. In addition, com-
pared to an unlinkability solution alone (see Figure 8), combining TMN with
an unlinkability solution decreases the percentage of real user queries success-
fully de-anonymized by SimAttack from 36.7 to 20.5. Consequently, us-
ing TMN with an unlinkability solution protects 16.2 more queries than
an unlinkability used alone.
We next analyze the performance of SimAttack when the adversary lever-
ages prior knowledge on the RSS feeds used by the users. This knowledge
helps the adversary from distinguishing fake queries from real queries. Ta-
ble 7 lists the recall, the precision, and F1-score obtained by the attack. The
results show that SimAttack succeeds in identifying 35.4 of the user’s queries
with a precision of 14.7. Compared to the results of TrackMeNot alone (see
Table 5), adding the unlinkability solution improves the user protection, as
9.9 more real user queries are not identiﬁed by SimAttack. However, the
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Attack Recall Precision F1-score
SimAttack 35.4% 14.7% 20.7%
ML Attack 33.0% 11.4% 16.9%
Table 7
Performance of the privacy
attack considering TMN over
an unlinkability solution and
the exploitation of the RSS feeds.
precision has signiﬁcantly dropped: from 87.1 to 14.7 without and with
the unlinkability solution, respectively. The decrease of the precision is a di-
rect result of the high ratio of misclassiﬁed fake queries. Indeed, due to the
unlinkability solution, a lot of fake queries is not identiﬁed as such but is
considered as being issued by one of the users in the system. To better un-
derstand this ratio, we compare the precision obtained by SimAttack against
an unlinkability solution alone (see Figure 8). Introducing the TMN fake
queries decreases the precision from 42.9 to 14.7. This result illustrates
that the TMN fake queries strongly decrease the precision.
Furthermore, we compare the performance obtained with SimAttack de-
pending if the adversary knows the RSS feeds employed by TMN. We note
from Figure 14 and Table 7 that using the RSS feeds increases the recall by
14.9 (35.4 versus 20.5) but decreases the precision by 26.0 (14.7 versus
40.7). Overall, exploiting the RSS feeds gives lower results: the F1-scores
are respectively 20.7 and 27.3 with and without exploiting the RSS feeds.
Interestingly, this result diﬀers from TMN alone as for the latter, exploit-
ing the RSS feeds dramatically increases the performance of SimAttack (as
depicted on Figure 5, the F1-scores obtained for TMN alone are 61.0 and
46.3 with and without the RSS feeds, respectively). It is surprising that for
TMN over an unlinkability solution, the exploitation of more data produces
lower results. If we look in detail, we note the there is a huge diﬀerent in
terms of precision (14.7 when the RSS feeds are exploited, otherwise 40.7).
Therefore, we deduce that exploiting the RSS feeds results in misclassifying
more fake queries than the non-exploitation of the RSS feeds. Indeed, in the
non-exploitation of the RSS feeds, SimAttack identiﬁes fake queries with the
threshold  equals to 0.8. This high value prevent the adversary from misclas-
sifying a lot of fake queries (i.e., associating a fake query to a real user).
In addition, we compare the eﬃciency of SimAttack against ML Attack.
Table 7 exhibits the recall, the precision and the F1-score for the two attacks.
The results illustrate that SimAttack better identiﬁes real queries: the recall
and the precision of SimAttack are respectively 2.4 and 3.3 higher than ML
Attack. This is conﬁrmed by the F1-score which is 3.8 higher for SimAttack
than the one obtained for ML Attack (20.7 versus 16.9).
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Finally, we evaluate the protection oﬀered by TMN over an unlinkability
solution according to the number of fake queries periodically sent by TMN.
Figure 15 presents the recall and the precision for SimAttack with and with-
out prior knowledge on RSS feeds. The results show that the number of fake
queries does not change the recall (i.e., 35.4 and 20.5 with and without
using prior knowledge on RSS feeds, respectively). However, the precision
strongly depends on the quantity of fake queries sent per hour. Indeed, de-
creasing the number of fake queries from 60 to 1 fake query per hour, increases
the precision by 31.4 and 32.5 (for SimAttack without and with exploit-
ing the knowledge on the RSS feeds, respectively). Consequently, if the user
wants a proper protection, TMN has to send a high number of fake queries
per hour.
In Appendix B, we present an additional experiment on the size of the
user proﬁles. The results show that the number of queries contained in the
user proﬁles impact the results of SimAttack: more queries in the user proﬁles
result in identifying a higher proportion of queries.
3.4.1.5 GooPIR Over an Unlinkability Solution
We assess the eﬃciency of SimAttack against a solution that combines GooPIR
and an unlinkability solution. Such a protection mechanism obfuscates the
user query with k fake queries and sends the protected query anonymously.
Therefore, SimAttack aims at retrieving (i) the user query among the (k+ 1)
queries, and (ii) the identity of the user who issued the protected query
(among all the users in the system). Figure 16 shows the percentage of initial
queries retrieved by SimAttack for a varying number of fake queries (from one
to seven). The results show that the number of fake queries has a limited im-
pact on the user protection. Changing from one to seven fake queries protects
5.1 more queries (the recall drops from 32.7 to 27.6, respectively). In ad-
dition, compared to the results of GooPIR alone (see Figure 12), the current
percentage of initial queries identiﬁed by SimAttack is 23 lower for seven
fake queries. Initially GooPIR protects 50.6 of queries, while on top of an
unlinkability solution, it protects 27.6 of queries (for seven fake queries).
Therefore, adding the unlinkability solution on top of GooPIR helps to dra-
matically improve the user protection. But, the recall achieves for seven fake
queries (27.6) remains relatively high, especially because queries are pro-
tected by two independent private Web search solutions.
Furthermore, we compare the eﬃciency of SimAttack with ML Attack
(Algorithm 6 presented in Section 3.3.3.4). Figure 16 presents the results of
the two attacks for a diﬀerent number of fake queries (from zero to seven).
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On average, SimAttack retrieves 2.7 more queries than ML Attack. Never-
theless, the diﬀerence between the recall of the two attacks evolves with the
number of fake queries: For one fake query, SimAttack retrieves 1.1 more
queries than the machine learning attack while for seven fake queries the dif-
ference increases to 4.4. Consequently, besides a better identiﬁcation of
fake queries, SimAttack is more robust to an increase of the number of fake
queries.
Appendix B introduces two further experiments for SimAttack against
GooPIR over an unlinkability solution. The results show ﬁrst that the eﬃ-
ciency of SimAttack depends on the number of queries contained in the user
proﬁle (a higher number increases its performance). Then, we also study the
inﬂuence of the number of pair (query; user) returned by SimAttack. In this
section, we consider one pair (the most probable one), but to maximize the
results of the attack an adversary might be interested in increasing this num-
ber. We show empirically that the gain obtained by increasing the number
of pairs retrieved by SimAttack is relatively low.
3.4.2 Execution Time
In this section, we compare the execution time of SimAttack with its corre-
sponding machine learning attack. The comparison involves unlinkability
solutions, TrackMeNot, and GooPIR.
3.4.2.1 Unlinkability Solutions
We compare the execution time of SimAttack against the concurrent machine
learning approach. More precisely, we evaluate their execution time for a
varying number of users in the system. Figure 17 depict the execution times
from 100 users to 1,000 users using a logarithmic scale. The results show that
the execution time for SimAttack increases linearly with respect to the num-
ber of users while ML Attack evolves exponentially. In addition, SimAttack
is much faster than ML Attack, especially for a high number of users. For
1,000 users, the machine learning attack takes 434,322 seconds (including the
time to train models) while SimAttack takes 1,598 seconds, 271 times faster.
Without considering the time required to train the classiﬁer (as the adversary
might exploit the same classiﬁer for multiple attacks), SimAttack still remains
158 times faster than ML Attack. This huge diﬀerence is partially explained,
as SimAttack exploits the eight cores available on the tested architecture (con-
trary to ML Attack). Besides, ML Attack is implemented through Weka that
is not optimized for a large number of features and data.
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3.4.2.2 TrackMeNot
We compare the execution time of SimAttack on TMN with its concurrent
machine learning approach on the TMN100 dataset. As ML Attack requires the
RSS feeds to perform, it makes more sense to compare it with the version of
SimAttack that exploits the RSS feeds. But we also include in our comparison
the version of SimAttack that does not exploit the RSS feeds. The results are
reported in Figure 18 using a logarithmic scale to depict the execution time.
We show that SimAttack is faster than ML Attack, especially when ML Attack
is based on the logistic regression classiﬁer. For instance, SimAttack (with
RSS feeds) takes 914 seconds to execute while logistic regression and SVM
take respectively 91,727 seconds and 1,644 seconds (considering the training
and testing phases). But Figure 18 also indicates that the training phase is re-
sponsible for these large execution times. In consequence, if we only consider
the testing phase (considering that the adversary can reuse multiple times the
same classiﬁer), ML Attack is faster than SimAttack: SimAttack (with RSS
feeds) requires 914 seconds to execute while ML Attack takes 214 seconds
and 120 seconds considering respectively the testing phase obtained with the
logistic regression and SVM classiﬁers.
Nevertheless, we note that the execution time of SimAttack without con-
sidering the RSS feeds is 67 seconds. Consequently, not considering the RSS
feeds makes SimAttack 13.6 times faster (67 seconds versus 914 seconds). In-
deed, by considering the RSS feeds, SimAttack engenders extra computations,
as it determines the similarity metric between each query and the fake queries
generated by the adversary. Therefore, the overhead due to the fake query ex-
ploitation depends on the number of fake queries generated by the adversary.
Furthermore, we note that, by not exploiting the RSS feeds, SimAttack is
much faster than ML Attack: its execution time takes 67 seconds while for
ML Attack it takes 214 seconds and 120 seconds for respectively the testing
phases of the logistic regression and SVM classiﬁers.
3.4.2.3 GooPIR
We compare the execution time of SimAttack against queries protected by
GooPIR with its concurrent machine learning attack. We measure the exe-
cution time of the two attacks considering that GooPIR generates seven fake
queries. The results displayed in Figure 19 show that SimAttack is 45.7 times
faster than the SVM classiﬁer: it takes 37 seconds for SimAttack to identify
the initial queries while, for the SVM classiﬁer, it requires 1,691 seconds (con-
sidering the training and the testing phases). More precisely, if we focus on
the testing phase (considering that the adversary reuses the same trained clas-
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siﬁer for diﬀerent attacks), SimAttack is still faster as it performs 19.5 faster
than the testing phase of the SVM classiﬁer (37 seconds versus 720 seconds).
3.5 Conclusion
We introduced in this chapter SimAttack, a generic attack against diﬀerent
types of private Web search solutions (e.g., Tor, GooPIR, TMN). SimAttack
is able to break such protections by computing a similarity metric between
queries and user proﬁles. In the design of SimAttack, we had two initial objec-
tives: (i) retrieve a higher proportion of queries than the concurrent machine
learning attack, and (ii) require less computation time than the previous at-
tacks in the literature. We empirically showed using real search queries that
SimAttack fulﬁlls these two objectives. Considering unlinkability solutions
with 1,000 users, the recall of SimAttack is 4.3 higher than the one obtained
with the machine learning attack, while at the same time, SimAttack divides
the execution time by 158.
Furthermore, we used SimAttack to analyse the robustness of three repre-
sentative state-of-the-art solutions (i.e., unlinkability solutions, TrackMeNot,
and GooPIR). We established that none of these solutions are satisfactory to
protect the user privacy. For instance, considering GooPIR, an adversary
retrieved with SimAttack 50.6 of queries (case of seven fake queries).
Nevertheless, SimAttack (as the machine learning attacks) requires an ad-
versary with an external knowledge about users. This assumption is realis-
tic, as search engines collect user queries. Therefore, the external knowledge
owned by the adversary is collected before users switch to a private Web search
solution (i.e., when users were not using any protection mechanism). In our
evaluations, we used the queries issued right after the switch as testing set. As
the training set and the testing set contain queries issued in a relatively close
period, it could explain the good results we obtained. It is known that user
interests change over time [151] (also known as concept drift) and thus, the
attack might not be as eﬃcient if the previously-collected queries were issued
a long time before the protected user queries. Due to a lack of real data, we
were not able to analyze such a situation.
Queries employed in SimAttack are modeled with binary word vectors.
This model is a basic representation of queries. For instance, it considers
two synonyms as two diﬀerent concepts. A more advanced representation
could lead to a better identiﬁcation of user queries. Indeed, queries could be
enriched by WordNet [82] to take the keyword semantic into consideration.
Another method could use Word2Vec [152] to identify keywords that share a
common context and represent them under the same feature.
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Furthermore, SimAttack distinguishes fake queries from real ones using
previously-collected queries. Other criteria could have been investigated to
distinguish them. Indeed, automatically generated data is a diﬃcult task that
is often not perfect. For instance, GooPIR generates fake queries by aggre-
gating random keywords together. But, as these keywords might never occur
together in a reference corpus, such a query might be easily identiﬁed as fake.
In addition, all keywords employed in fake queries are contained in a dictio-
nary, but not necessarily the ones contained in real queries (e.g., slang words,
misspelled keywords). A more advanced attack could exploit these criteria to
identify fake queries.
Finally, SimAttack considers queries in a vector space model where each
dimension corresponds to a keyword. Consequently, a large number of key-
words implies a large dimensional space. This can be an issue, as a large
dimensional space increases the computational time of the similarity metric.
This can be overcome by a dimensional space reduction (for instance, using
Singular Value Decomposition [153]). The same technique could be employed
with the machine learning attacks to decrease the number of features.
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PEAS, a New Robust and Eﬃcient
private Web Search Solution
4.1 Objective
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the existing private Web search so-
lutions are not so satisfactory to protect the user privacy, as an adversary is
able to bypass the protection for many protected queries. Even though com-
bining an indistinguishability solution with an unlinkability solution gives
better results than the state-of-the-art solutions, an adversary is still able to
break a signiﬁcant proportion of protected queries. Consequently, we aim at
designing a new solution that is robust against an adversary that owns prior
knowledge about users. But, at the same time, our objective is to have a solu-
tion that does not introduce a large overhead in terms of computations and
latency. We also want to keep the best possible quality of results. These ob-
jectives are important, otherwise the solution will strongly degrade the user
experience and users will not see the beneﬁt of using it.
4.2 PEAS in a Nutshell
As already mentioned, unlinkability and indistinguishability solutions are
complementary. The former hides the identity of the requester (without mod-
ifying the initial query) while the latter only masks the initial query (without
faking the user identity). The results of the previous chapter show that to
eﬃciently protect users during their Web search, unlinkability and indistin-
guishability have to be combined. For that reason, as shown in Figure 20,
Filtering
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Q Obfuscation
Figure 20
PEAS combines an
unlinkability solution provided
by the privacy proxy and an
indistinguishability solution
performed by the client that
obfuscates the user queries.
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we design PEAS by combining a new eﬃcient unlinkability protocol (i.e.,
the privacy proxy) with a new accurate indistinguishability mechanism (i.e.,
obfuscation and ﬁltering).
The privacy proxy is composed of two non-colluding nodes: the receiver
and the issuer. The non-collusion assumption means that, except for a normal
execution of the protocol, the two nodes are not allowed to exchange extra
information with each other. We also consider these nodes as honest-but-
curious, meaning that they strictly follow the protocol but can monitor and
exploit information they receive. The privacy proxy works as follows: The
receiver gets ciphered queries directly from the clients and forwards them
to the issuer which deciphers the queries and forwards them to the search
engine. Upon receiving a response from the search engine, the issuer ciphers
the results and forwards them to the receiver which forwards these messages
to the client. Finally, the client deciphers the message and retrieves the results.
In the protocol, the receiver knows the identity of the requesting users (i.e.,
their IP address) but it is not able to analyze the content of their queries (as
they are ciphered by the clients). The issuer, in turn, knows the queries sent
by the users (as it is able to decipher the message) but it is not able to identify
the requesting users (as it receives the queries from the receiver).
The obfuscation mechanism of PEAS associates user queries with multiple
fake queries using the logical or operator. For instance, PEAS obfuscates the
user query q by sending instead the following query:
q or fq1 or : : : or fqk| {z }
k fake queries
;
where fqi is the ith fake query generated by PEAS for i 2 J1; kK. By doing so,
PEAS aims to mislead the adversary about the initial query. Nevertheless, this
approach can be ineﬃcient if fake queries are not generated appropriately. To
produce realistic fake queries, we identify two key requirements: Firstly, fake
queries shall have the same number of keywords, the same language as the
initial one, and a realistic usage frequency. Secondly, fake queries generated
for one speciﬁc user shall be built from real past queries from other users of
the system. Indeed, this makes a fake query more realistic and ensures that a
de-obfuscation attack will tend to identify other existing users for each fake
query and then mislead the attacker. For that reason, we create in our system
a group proﬁle. This structure contains an aggregation of past user queries.
The issuer of the privacy proxy is responsible for aggregating queries in this
structure and periodically releasing a new version (as shown in Figure 20).
The obfuscation mechanism uses this group proﬁle to generate fake queries.
Finally, obfuscating user queries alters the quality of the results received
by the users as they may contain answers related to the fake queries. To
overcome this issue, PEAS ﬁlters out the results to remove irrelevant answers
(i.e., answers corresponding to fake queries).
4.3 PEAS Detailed Description
PEAS combines an unlinkability and an indistinguishability mechanisms to
preserve the user privacy. To achieve that, PEAS relies on a piece of software
running on the user machine (called the PEAS client in the following) and
on a privacy proxy composed of two nodes the receiver and the issuer. In this
section, we give a detailed description of PEAS. More precisely, we describe
the privacy proxy (Section 4.3.1), the obfuscation mechanism using the group
proﬁle (Section 4.3.2), and the ﬁltering mechanism of PEAS (Section 4.3.3).
PEAS, a New Robust and Eﬃcient private Web Search Solution 71
  
CL
IE
NT
Qu
er
y a
gg
re
ga
tio
n
+
M
ax
im
al
 co
m
pl
et
e 
 
gr
ap
hs
 e
xt
ra
cti
on
q
Ci
ph
er
in
g
   
E(
q,
K q
)pk
I 
❶
X q
,E
(q
,K
q)p
k I 
❷
+
Qu
er
yI
D 
ex
tra
cti
on
q ❸ R
 
➍
Ci
ph
er
in
g
De
cip
he
rin
g
{R}
K q
{R
} K q
  
❻
do
ne
 o
nc
e 
of
fli
ne
R
RE
CE
IV
ER
ISS
UE
R
X q
,{R
} K q
 
➎
Fil
te
rin
g
Se
arc
h 
En
gin
e
pk
I
sk
I
De
cip
he
rin
g
Qu
er
yI
D 
co
m
pu
ta
tio
n
K q
+
Re
su
lts
 
R U
R U
q U
X q
K qq
Us
er
 re
tri
ev
al
{fq
1…
fq
k}
{fq
1…
fq
k}
K q
pk
I
     
     
Gro
up
 Pr
ofi
le
Fa
ke
 q
ue
rie
s 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n
q U
Sy
m
m
et
ric
 ke
y g
en
er
at
io
n
A
B
C
D E
F
G
H
I
K
Gr
ou
p 
pr
of
ile
 u
pd
at
e
J
X q
Qu
er
y 
q U
: R
SA
 e
nc
ry
pt
io
n 
wi
th
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic 
ke
y p
k 
: A
ES
 e
nc
ry
pt
io
n 
wi
th
 th
e 
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ke
y K
E(x
) pk
 
{x}
K
AE
S
AE
S
RS
A
RS
A
Figure 21
Sequence diagram of PEAS.
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4.3.1 Privacy Proxy
The privacy proxy aims to ensure unlinkability between the user and her
queries. To eﬃciently achieve this goal, the privacy proxy is split into two
separated nodes: the receiver which only knows the identity of the users (e.g.,
their IP address) and the issuer which only knows the content of their queries.
Figure 21 details the operations performed by the privacy proxy.
Firstly, when the user issues a query q, the client creates a new symmetric
cryptographic key Kq (block A in the ﬁgure). Then, using the RSA encryp-
tion algorithm and the issuer’s public key pkI 1, the client ciphers the aggrega-
tion of her query q and the key Kq (block B ). The cipher-text E(q;Kq)pkI
is then sent to the receiver (message ¶). As the receiver does not know the
issuer’s private key, it is not able to access the content of the initial query.
When the receiver gets the message, it maintains a routing table by assigning
a unique identiﬁerXq to the query with the identity of its requester (block C ).
The receiver then forwards the message along with the identiﬁer Xq to the is-
suer (message ·). As the issuer receives the cipher-text from the receiver, it
has no information about the user identity. Afterwards, the issuer uses its
private key to decipher the message (block D ) and to retrieve the concatena-
tion of the user’s query q and the user’s symmetric key Kq. Lastly, the issuer
submits the initial query q to the search engine (message ¸).
Upon receiving the results R from the search engine (message ¹), the is-
suer uses the user’s symmetric key Kq to encrypt the search engine’s answer
R with the AES encryption algorithm (block E ). The issuer then returns
the new cipher-text fRgKq along with the query’s identiﬁer Xq to the re-
ceiver (message º). The receiver then retrieves the requester identity from its
routing table using the associated identiﬁer Xq (block F ) and sends the en-
crypted results fRgKq to the initial client (message»). The client ﬁnally uses
the cryptographic key Kq to retrieve the results of the user’s query (block G ).
For privacy reasons, the client needs to generate a new cryptographic key
Kq every time the user issues a new query. If not, this key might be used
by the issuer as a quasi-identiﬁer to link a set of consecutive queries issued
by the same user and ultimately recover her identity (as shown in [17]). For
a better eﬃciency, our protocol does not contain a key establishment step
that sets up a symmetric key (like in Tor [39]) but it sends the symmetric key
with each new query. Moreover, a key assumption to ensure the preservation
of the user privacy, is that the receiver and the issuer are honest-but-curious.
This model means that they strictly follow the protocol, and cannot collude
or exchange extra information with each other. Nevertheless, they can locally
monitor information and exploit this knowledge together with all additional
public knowledge (typically, information available on the Internet).
4.3.2 Obfuscation Mechanism
The goal of the obfuscation mechanism in PEAS is to hide user queries among
multiple realistic fake queries in such a way that an adversary cannot distin-
guish the initial queries from the fake ones. To do that, the proposed ob-
fuscation mechanism aggregates the initial query by k fake queries separated
with logical or operators. We ensure that the k generated fake queries have
the same structural properties as the initial query. More precisely, these fake
queries must have the same number of keywords and the same language as
the initial query. Their keyword usage frequency must also be realistic. In
1Similarly to Tor [39], public key information are publicly available on a directory system (e.g.,
published on the institution website that manages the issuer).
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A partial view of the operations
performed by the issuer.
addition, to mislead the adversary about the requester identity, these fake
queries must not contain keywords that have already been used by the re-
quester. Conversely, they should contain keywords already used by other
users in the system. In other words, the generated fake queries should not be
related to previous queries issued by the requester but be similar to queries
issued by other users. To achieve that, each client locally stores a query his-
tory of its associated user. However, as a client has no direct access to the
past queries of other users, the proposed obfuscation mechanism relies on
the concept of group proﬁle.
4.3.2.1 Group Profile
Fake queries are generated from the group proﬁle as detailed in the next sec-
tion. A group proﬁle contains an aggregation of users’ past queries. These
queries are aggregated in k+1 co-occurrence matrices of disjoint users (mean-
ing that, for a given user, her initial queries are always aggregated in the same
co-occurrence matrix). The construction of the k+1 co-occurrence matrices
is performed by the issuer (as shown by Figure 22). To do so, the issuer ex-
tracts from the protected query the k + 1 sub-queries: the initial user query
and k fake ones (step ¸). Then, using their order in the protected query, it
aggregates them in their corresponding co-occurrence matrix: The ﬁrst sub-
query in the protected query belongs to the ﬁrst matrix, etc. (step ¹). There-
fore, to generate the protected query in the correct order, the PEAS client
needs to know which co-occurrence matrix its initial queries belong in. This
is done by sending a one-oﬀ special query to the receiver. When the receiver
gets this special query, it randomly assigns the client to one of the k + 1
co-occurrence matrices and returns this number to the client. Structuring
the group proﬁle through k + 1 co-occurrence matrices (and not one single
co-occurrence matrix) enables the creation of robuster fake queries. This is
explained in detail in Section 4.5.5.
Each co-occurrence matrix M is represented using the Vector Space
Model [154]: Each dimension of the vector space represents the vocabulary
(i.e., one dimension is a keyword used in a past query). Each elementM(a; b)
of the matrix represents the co-occurrence frequency of the keywords a and b.
As the co-occurrence matrices is an aggregation of bi-occurrence frequencies,
only an approximation of past queries can be retrieved from them. Figure 23
gives an example of such a co-occurrence matrix. The value corresponding
to the pair (“HIV”, “treatment”) is 1 and means that one query containing
the keywords “HIV” and “treatment” has been issued in the past.
The group proﬁle (containing the k+1 co-occurrence matrices) is periodi-
cally published by the issuer. Clients retrieve this group proﬁle by contacting
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HIV treatment depression test symptom26664
37775
HIV 0 1 0 10 11
treatment 1 0 5 0 4
depression 0 5 0 17 13
test 10 0 17 0 0
symptoms 11 4 13 0 0
Figure 23
Example of a co-occurrence
matrix included in a group
proﬁle.
the issuer through the receiver. For better performance, clients keep the last
version of the group proﬁle in cache and download it only when a new version
is published.
At the bootstrap of the system, the group proﬁle is empty. A solution to
deal with this issue creates a group proﬁle with dummy queries extracted from
external sources (e.g., AOL search logs [16], Google Trends [155]). By doing
so, the privacy risks for users would be similar to those of our competitors
(e.g., GooPIR), which rely on similar data to generate their fake queries.
4.3.2.2 Fake Queries Generation
To generate fake queries, the PEAS client transposes each co-occurrence ma-
trix in the group proﬁle to a co-occurrence graph, and computes all maximal
complete graphs, also called maximal cliques (block H in Figure 21). For-
mally, a maximal complete graph in an undirected graph G = (V;E) is the
vertex set C  V , such that (i) every two vertices in C are connected by an
edge and (ii) there is no vertex in V n C for which it exists edges connecting
all vertices in C. The associated completeness property is a necessary condi-
tion to retrieve already formulated queries (i.e., already formulated queries are
necessarily complete graphs of keywords). Furthermore, the associated max-
imality property, in turn, aims to maximize the probability of selecting past
queries and not a subset of past queries (see the evaluation in Section 4.7.1.3).
For instance, from the previous example, we obtain the graph displayed in
Figure 24. From this graph, it is possible to extract four maximal cliques:
1. “HIV”, “treatment”, “symptom”
2. “treatment”, “symptom”, “depression”
3. “test”, “depression”
4. “test”, “HIV”
These maximal cliques might correspond to previous queries. Nevertheless,
it might be the case that, instead of a single query composed by the keywords
“HIV”, “treatment” and “symptom”, two queries were issued: one containing
HIV
treatment
depression test
symptom
1
10
11
5
4
17
13
Figure 24
Example of a co-occurrence
graph extracted from a
co-occurrence matrix.
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“HIV”, “treatment” and another one containing “HIV”, “symptom” (assum-
ing that the second clique “treatment”, “symptom”, “depression” was also
issued as query).
PEAS computes the maximal cliques of an undirected graph by using the
Bron-Kerbosch algorithm [156]. This algorithm is a recursive backtracking al-
gorithm that investigates for all the given vertices at each recursive step if they
form a maximal complete graph with their direct neighbors. As investigating
all given vertices at each recursion step is ineﬃcient (the same subgraph is
checked multiple times), Bron and Kerbosch introduced a pivot vertex. At
each recursion step, a pivot vertex u is randomly chosen such that the sub-
graph that u forms with its direct neighbors is checked only once. To mini-
mize the computation cost associated with the Bron-Kerbosch algorithm, the
extraction of the maximal cliques is performed only once for each new ver-
sion of the group proﬁle. In addition, PEAS extracts the maximal cliques
in a background task (during that period, PEAS uses the maximal cliques
extracted from the previous group proﬁle to generate the fake queries). The
new version of the group proﬁle is used as soon as all the extraction of the
maximal cliques is ﬁnished.
Algorithm 8: Generation of the fake queries.
input :qu : initial query sent by u,
k : number of fake queries to create,
M : k + 1 co-occurrence matrices contained in the group
proﬁle,
Cu : k + 1 sets of maximal cliques extracted from the
co-occurrence matrices M ; each set of cliques is ﬁltered to remove
maximal cliques that contain keywords already used by the user u,
idu : the index of the co-occurrence matrix where the initial
queries sent by the user u are aggregated.
1 qp  ; ; // The protected query
2 isMaximal isMaximal Cu[idu]; qu ; // Test if the query qu
is a maximal clique
3 for i 2 J0; kK do
4 if i 6= idu then
// Sample a maximal clique
5 q  sample Cu[i]; jquj; isMaximal ;
6 if isMaximal and (jqj = jquj or jqj = jquj+ 1) then
7 q  removeKeyword q;
8 while jqj 6= jquj do
9 q  addKeyword q, M [i] ;
10 else
11 q  shuffle(qu) ; // Shuffle the initial query
// Aggregate the query q in the protected query qp
12 if jqpj = 0 then qp  q; else qp  qp + ‘‘or00 + q;
13 return qp;
The PEAS fake query generation (block I in Figure 21) is presented in
Algorithm 8. Input parameters include the initial query qu sent by the user u,
the number of fake queries k PEAS needs to create, the k + 1 co-occurrence
matrices M contained in the group proﬁle, the k+1 sets of maximal cliques
Cu extracted from the co-occurrence matricesM (each set of maximal cliques
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is ﬁltered to remove keywords already used by the user), and ﬁnally the index
of the co-occurrence matrix idu where the real queries issued by the user u
are aggregated.
The co-occurrence matrices M and their corresponding sets of maximal
cliques Cu are identiﬁed by an integer i bounded between 0 and k. For each
co-occurrence matrix (except the one which contains aggregated information
about initial queries of user u), Algorithm 8 generates a fake query q by ran-
domly choosing a maximal clique among the ﬁltered set of maximal cliques
Cu[i] (line 5). This step aims to select keywords already used in a previous
query. In addition, as fake queries are generated from a co-occurrence matrix
that diﬀers from the one used by the user u, the generated fake queries are
likely to be close to the proﬁle of another user. To be more realistic, we ran-
domly select maximal cliques according to their usage frequency. We deﬁne
the usage frequency of a maximal clique c by:
usageFreq = min
(a;b)2c2;a6=b
M(a; b)
where a and b are two keywords contained in the maximal clique c and
M(a; b) is the number of times the two keywords a and b co-occur. This
metric gives an approximation about how many time the clique c was previ-
ously used. Nevertheless, a mechanism that only creates fake queries from
maximal cliques is not secured. By looking if each sub-query is a maximal
clique, an adversary might be able to retrieve the initial one (the initial query
is not always a maximal clique). For that reason, we distinguish two cases:
(i) if the initial query qu is a maximal clique (line 2), the method sample() re-
turns a maximal clique of the same size as the initial query (line 5); (ii) if the
initial query qu is not a maximal clique, the same method sample() returns a
maximal clique of size jquj 1, jquj, or jquj+1. In this second case, to obtain
a fake query that is not a maximal clique, the method removeKeyword() ran-
domly removes one keyword of the fake query q if its size equals jquj or jquj+1
(line 7). Then, the method addKeyword() adds new keywords to obtain a fake
query with the same size as the initial one (line 9). This method initializes
a bag of words b with the keywords that co-occur with those in q, and their
co-occurrent keywords. The keywords added by the method addKeyword() are
chosen randomly among b. Moreover, it might be the case that the method
sample() does not return a maximal clique. For instance, if Cu[i] is empty.
Therefore, in that case, the method addKeyword() randomly selects one key-
word and applied the previous algorithm to generate a fake query q. Another
part of the algorithm shuﬄes the keyword order of the initial query (line 11).
Indeed, as the group proﬁle does not contain information about the word
order, it might exist inconsistencies in the word order of the fake queries
and thus reveal that they are fake. By mixing the keyword order in the ini-
tial query, we make sure that an adversary cannot exploit the word order to
distinguish fake queries (see discussion in Section 4.5.5). Finally, the k fake
queries and the initial query are aggregated to form the protected query qp.
The complexity of the generation of the fake queries is O(k + jquj).
4.3.3 Filtering Irrelevant Results
The ﬁltering step aims at removing the irrelevant results returned by the search
engine due to the fake queries (block K in Figure 21). Indeed, the results
returned by the search engine contain a mix of answers corresponding to
the (k + 1) queries (i.e., k fake queries and the initial one). This ﬁltering
step is performed by the client which is the only one that knows the initial
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query. In the literature, GooPIR proposed an algorithm to remove irrele-
vant results. It identiﬁes the results related to the initial query by checking
if their title, description and URL contain all keywords of the initial query.
In practice, as most results only contain a subset of keywords of the initial
query, GooPIR discards a lot of relevant results. In addition, as fake queries
and the initial one might have keywords in common, the ﬁltering step has to
take the fake queries into consideration. Due to these reasons, we propose
Algorithm 9. It checks for each results if the initial query contains the high-
est number of keywords in its title, description and URL. More precisely, for
each result r contained in the result set, the algorithm assigns a score to the
k + 1 queries sent by the user. The scores are equal to the number of occur-
rences the keywords of each query have in the title, description and URL of
the results r (lines 4 to 6). Algorithm 9 computes the score using the method
nbCommonWords(q; t). This method determines the number of words a query q
and a text t have in common. It is deﬁned as jq\tj+jq\HWtj, whereHWt is
the set of highlighted words in t (i.e., some search engines mark some words
in bold in the description of the result). A result r is considered as related to
the initial query if and only if the initial query has the largest score (lines 7
and 8). The complexity of such an algorithm is O(k  jRj  jquj).
Algorithm 9: Results ﬁltering.
input :qu : initial query,
FQ = ffq1; : : : ; fqkg : set of fake queries,
R : set of results for quorfq1or : : :orfqk.
1 R^ ; ; // the filtered results
2 for r 2 R do
3 for qi 2 fqug [ FQ do
4 score[qi] nbCommonWords(qi, title(r))
5 + nbCommonWords(qi, desc(r))
6 + nbCommonWords(qi, url(r)) ;
7 if score[qu] = maxqi2q+(score[qi]) then
8 R^ R^ [ frg ;
9 return R^ ;
4.4 PEAS Distributed Deployment
To support a larger number of users, PEAS can adopt a distributed deploy-
ment so as to distribute the load across multiple receivers and multiple is-
suers. Moreover, this distributed setting makes the non-collision assumption
between receivers and issuers more acceptable, as all nodes should collude to
break the user privacy.
Distributing PEAS across multiple receivers and issuers only introduces
two modiﬁcations in the protocol presented in Section 4.3. Firstly, a new
preliminary step is performed by the client to select one receiver and one
issuer among all available ones. Secondly, as shown in Figure 25, the group
proﬁle can be either (i) centralized and shared between all issuers (right side of
the ﬁgure), or (ii) split across multiple group proﬁles where each issuer has its
own group proﬁle (left side of the ﬁgure). Depending on the group proﬁle
management selected by the system designer, the client either retrieves the
centralized group proﬁle or the group proﬁle associated with its selected issuer.
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In the rest of this section, we detail both the receiver and issuer selection and
the group proﬁle management.
4.4.1 Receiver and Issuer Selection
The distributed deployment of PEAS is composed of multiple receivers and
issuers. Every time a user issues a query, the associated PEAS client ﬁrst ran-
domly selects one receiver and one issuer among all available ones2. As for the
non-distributed PEAS protocol, clients then need ﬁrstly to collect the group
proﬁle maintained by every issuer (if they do not have the last version stored
locally), and secondly to compute the maximal cliques.
4.4.2 Group Profile Management
To maintain one centralized group proﬁle in a distributed environment (right
side of Figure 25), PEAS relies on a new entity called the logger. The goal of
the logger is to receive the group proﬁles sent from all issuers and aggregate
them into a single group proﬁle. The aggregation of two group proﬁles GP1
andGP2 composed of k+1 co-occurrence matrices results in adding their cor-
responding co-occurrence matrices together (adding the ﬁrst matrix of GP1
with the ﬁrst matrix of GP2, etc.). In addition, the logger is also in charge
of publishing the group proﬁle. To reduce the cost due to the aggregation
process, it is performed only once before each update of the group proﬁle.
Clients contact the logger through the receiver to retrieve the last version of
the group proﬁle. Similarly to the non-distributed PEAS protocol, clients
cache the last version of the group proﬁle.
Regarding the decentralized group proﬁle architecture (left side of Fig-
ure 25), each issuer aggregates queries locally in its own group proﬁle. The
PEAS client randomly selects an issuer and a receiver every time the user is-
sues a query. Then, similarly to the original PEAS protocol, the client ﬁrst
contacts the selected issuer (through the receiver) to retrieve the last version
of its group proﬁle. As clients interact with multiple issuers, they stored lo-
cally multiple group proﬁles (one for each issuer). Furthermore, we note that
the fake queries generated by the client depend on the selected issuer. Two
diﬀerent issuers have two diﬀerent group proﬁles and thus produce diﬀerent
fake queries.
These two solutions present advantages and drawbacks. On the one hand,
the centralized group proﬁle solution needs to introduce a new entity, a log-
ger, which is responsible for aggregating all group proﬁles in a single group
2For better performance and security, this choice may take the load of the nodes and their repu-
tation into account. These two aspects remain outside the scope of this thesis.
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proﬁle. Therefore, the aggregation of the group proﬁles introduces periodi-
cally extra costs (i.e., sending group proﬁles to the logger and merging all the
group proﬁles). On the other hand, the decentralization of the group proﬁle
increases the traﬃc as clients have to collect a group proﬁle each time they
select a new issuer. It also requires PEAS clients to extract maximal cliques for
these multiple group proﬁles. But, as the distributed group proﬁles contain
fewer queries than the centralized group proﬁle (in the decentralized group
proﬁle architecture, queries are distributed among multiple group proﬁles)
and knowing that the maximal clique extraction step follows an exponential
running time (see Section 4.7.3.1), there is no real diﬀerence in terms of com-
putational costs.
4.5 Security Analysis
This section discusses the security guarantees oﬀered by PEAS. More pre-
cisely, we review the choice of the cryptographic algorithms used in the pri-
vacy proxy protocol and validate its unlinkability guarantee. We also discuss
the practicability of the non-collusion assumption between the receiver and
the issuer. Then, we focus on the possible issues due to the publication of the
group proﬁle and the distinguishability between fake queries and real ones.
Lastly, we evoke the choice of the number k of fake queries generated by
PEAS.
4.5.1 Cryptographic Algorithms Used by PEAS
As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, PEAS employs the RSA encryption algorithm
as asymmetric encryption (to cipher user queries) and the AES encryption
algorithm as symmetric encryption (to cipher the results provided by search
engines). These two ciphering techniques were chosen as they are popular
and widely used to encrypt data [157]. In addition, these algorithms have
been validated and advised by ANSSI (the French Network and Information
Security Agency) [158] and NIST (the National Institute of Standards and
Technology) [159], two expert institutions.
Moreover, regarding the size of the cryptographic keys used in PEAS, we
follow the suggestions provided by ANSSI and NIST. Both organisations
have stated that a robust RSA encryption is achieved by a cryptographic key
length higher than 2,048 bits. Due to this reason, issuers generate 2,048 bits
RSA cryptographic keys. Regarding the AES encryption, the two aforemen-
tioned institutions suggest symmetric keys with a length higher than 128 bits.
Therefore, PEAS’s clients generate a 128 bits symmetric key. To ensure a ro-
buster protection, higher lengths could have been chosen. But, as we want
PEAS to be eﬃcient, we limit the key lengths to their minimum acceptable
value and thus avoid extra cryptographic costs.
4.5.2 Unlinkability Guarantee of the Privacy Proxy
To formally prove the unlinkability property of the privacy proxy, we used
ProVerif [107]. ProVerif is a well-known tool to perform security analysis
of cryptographic protocols. Based on a formal model (e.g., -calculus), it
can verify several security properties. We model our protocol according to
the description given in Section 4.3. The four entities user, receiver, issuer and
search engine are deﬁned through subprocesses. We send all messages through
a public channel c to make the adversary able to eavesdrop on messages. Fur-
thermore, we set up an adversary that tries to link a query to its requester.
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Internally, ProVerif attempts to prove that a state in which the adversary links
the query with the user is unreachable. However, ProVerif does not natively
implement the notion of linkability. It can state that an adversary knows the
query q and the user identity u, but it cannot determine if they are related
with each other. In other words, if the query q was issued by the user u. To
overcome this limitation, we created a function LINK(x,y) symbolizing that
x and y are linked, and we made this function transitive with another func-
tion INFER, meaning that if an adversary knows LINK(x,y) and LINK(y,z),
she can deduce LINK(x,z). Consequently, under this model, the adversary
tries to obtain LINK(q,u). Our ProVerif model formalizing the privacy proxy
protocol is available in Appendix C. As indicated by the outcome of ProVerif,
no attack has been found to link the query q with its requester u.
If we pay more attention to the privacy proxy protocol, we note that an
adversary who monitors the network can obtain the same knowledge as a
curious receiver. Therefore, an adversary cannot learn new information from
the receiver. We then deduce that the critical entity in our protocol is the
issuer. If this entity colludes with an adversary, the unlinkability property
cannot be guaranteed.
4.5.3 Non-Collusion Assumption between the Receiver and the
Issuer
The privacy guarantees of PEAS rely on the assumption that the issuer and
the receiver do not collude. This assumption is also adopted by other well-
known anonymous or privacy-preserving protocols such as Tor or KOI [106].
In order to mitigate the risk of collusion, Tor enables users to use a higher
number of relays in the path forwarding chain (by default, three). In our
case, our design involves only two nodes: the receiver and the issuer. Our
choice was motivated by the performance, as we want to ensure with the pri-
vacy proxy a low overall latency. In the literature, KOI’s authors face the
same issue in their protocol (i.e., KOI also uses two nodes: the matcher and
the combiner). To reduce the risk of collusion, they advise a deployment by
trusted and privacy-aware institutions (e.g., Mozilla, academic institutions).
In our context, we can imagine that the receiver and the issuer are hosted
by two diﬀerent privacy-aware institutions. Furthermore, using diﬀerent re-
ceivers and issuers in the distributed deployment can reduce the risk of data
leakage in case of collusion.
4.5.4 Publication of the Group Profile
To reduce the risk of data leakage induced by the publication of the group
proﬁle, the issuer publishes the group proﬁle in the form of co-occurrence
matrices. Indeed, this structure aggregates queries about all the users and
thus gives no information about individual users. Besides, as the vectorial
space is a set of unigrams (and not n-grams), the co-occurrence matrix only
contains a sub-part of the initial information. For instance, if the adversary
knows that a co-occurs with b, b co-occurs with c and c co-occurs with a, it
cannot know whether the initial query was “a b c” or whether it was a set of
three independent queries “a b”, “b c” and “c a”.
Nevertheless, by extracting all maximal cliques, an adversary could retrieve
potential information about past user queries. However, as we consider the
search engine as a potential adversary (Section 1.2), the adversary already has
this knowledge. Indeed, by receiving queries from the issuer, the search en-
gine knows queries sent by the user. Consequently, an adversary cannot ex-
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tend her knowledge by performing such an extraction. In addition, choosing
a low frequency for refreshing the group proﬁle (e.g., every day) improves
the probability to mix the activity of a large number of users in one single
co-occurrence matrix.
4.5.5 Indistinguishability of the Initial Queries
Fake queries generated by PEAS have equivalent properties to the initial query
(e.g., the same number of keywords, the same language). Their keywords have
also a realistic usage frequency, and they are built using co-occurrence infor-
mation taken from aggregated user queries. Consequently, without using
background information on the user, an adversary cannot distinguish fake
queries from real ones. In addition, PEAS shuﬄes the keywords of the initial
queries. This operation prevents an adversary from identifying fake queries
due to inconsistencies in their keyword order. For instance, a fake query
“Floyd Pink” is not realistic as real users would have written “Pink Floyd”.
By shuﬄing the word order of the initial query, all queries have inconsisten-
cies in their word order and thus no distinction between fake queries and real
ones is possible. Nevertheless, modern search engines exploit the word order
to retrieve the results. Therefore, shuﬄing the keyword order of the initial
query increases the security of the protocol but impacts the accuracy of the
results. We assess its impact in Section 4.7.2.2.
Furthermore, we construct the k fake queries from k diﬀerent co-
occurrence matrices to increase their robustness.Indeed, fake queries gen-
erated for one speciﬁc user do not contain keywords already used by this
user. Consequently, in the obfuscated query, the initial query is the only
one to integrate keywords already used by the requester. As a consequence,
if two queries (in the obfuscated query) are close to the same user proﬁle,
they are necessarily fake. To avoid such an attack, the obfuscation mecha-
nism of PEAS ensures by design that each fake query refers to a diﬀerent
group of users. This is done by structuring the group proﬁle with multiple
co-occurrence matrices. Each co-occurrence matrix contains, in addition to
the fake queries, the initial queries issued by diﬀerent groups of users. More
precisely, the initial query of a given user is always aggregated in the same
co-occurrence matrix.
4.5.6 Number of Fake Queries k
As explained in the description of PEAS, the number of fake queries k gener-
ated by the clients has to be equal to the number of co-occurrence matrices
contained in the issuer’s group proﬁle. Therefore, the number of fake queries
generated by the PEAS client is decided by the issuer and not by the user. To
allow more ﬂexibility in the choice of the number of fake queries, we propose
two options: (i) the protocol could tolerate a lower number of fake queries.
For instance, a user could generate l fake queries (l < k) by replacing the
k   l missing fake queries by null. The issuer could identify the null fake
queries and correctly aggregate the l + 1 sub-queries in their corresponding
co-occurrence matrices. (ii) another option is to deploy multiple issuers with
a diﬀerent number of co-occurrence matrices in their group proﬁle. There-
fore, a user chooses the issuer according to her desired number of fake queries.
Nevertheless, the latter requires several users to use the same number of fake
queries. Otherwise, the obfuscation mechanism cannot work, as the group
proﬁle contains too few queries mostly issued by only one user.
82 Chapter 4
4.6 Experimental set-up
We exhaustively evaluated PEAS using a real dataset of search queries and a
real deployment on Grid5000 [160]. In this section, we provide the experi-
mental set-up of our evaluation. We present the dataset of search queries we
used to assess PEAS together with the applied methodology and metrics.
4.6.1 Dataset
We evaluated PEAS using queries issued by the most active users in the AOL
query logs presented in Section 3.3.1. The most active users of these datasets
represent the users for which the adversary has collected the most of prelimi-
nary data (i.e., users with the largest user proﬁle). As explained in the previous
chapters, privacy attacks leverage the pre-built user proﬁles to break privacy.
As a consequence, the largest proﬁles provide an upper-bound of the capacity
of the attack to achieve its goal. To focus our evaluation on this upper-bound,
we want to consider the 100 most active users contained in the AOL dataset.
Nevertheless, to avoid potential variabilities of the dataset, we do not consider
the dataset AOL100 (i.e., the dataset of 100 users used in the previous chapter).
Instead, we construct three datasets of 100 users. We randomly split queries
of the 300 most active users into three datasets of 100 users. The 300 most ac-
tive users issued during the collecting period 343,548 queries (i.e., on average
1,145 queries per user). Consequently, our experiments were performed three
times on three datasets of 100 users.
4.6.2 Methodology and Metrics
In this section, we present the methodology and the metrics used to evaluate
PEAS. More precisely, we focus on three evaluations: (i) measuring the pri-
vacy protection by running SimAttack and the machine learning attack on
the protected queries, (ii) measuring the inﬂuence of PEAS on the quality
of the results returned to users, and (iii) assessing the eﬃciency of PEAS in
terms of throughput and latency.
4.6.2.1 Privacy
The privacy evaluation measures the level of protection oﬀered by PEAS on
queries contained in the testing set. The level of protection is measured us-
ing two privacy attacks: (i) the machine learning attack (presented in Sec-
tion 3.3.3) and, (ii) SimAttack. To be executed, these two attacks required
external knowledge on users. As mentioned in Section 1.2, an adversary can
exploit previously-collected queries about users. She can also use all public
knowledge available on the Internet. Nevertheless, as we do not know useful
information from the Internet that can be used to bypass the PEAS protec-
tion, we limit our evaluation to the previously-collected queries. The measure
of the outcomes of the attacks are made with the recall and the precision as
introduced in Section 3.3.4.
To generate fake queries, PEAS requires a non-empty group proﬁle. As
mentioned in Section 4.3.2.1, several solutions exist to initialize the group
proﬁle. For our experiments, we used previous user queries to set up the
group proﬁle. These queries are contained in the training set (i.e., the same
queries used as external knowledge by the adversary). Our experiments vary
the number of fake queries from zero to seven. To avoid any inﬂuence due to
the assignment of the users to the k+1 co-occurence matrices (k is the number
of fake queries generated by the PEAS client) and to have a fair comparison
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between experiments conducted with diﬀerent numbers of fake queries (i.e.,
variations could come from a lower number of queries in the co-occurence
matrices, and not from an increase of the number of fake queries), we only
consider one co-occurence matrix per group proﬁle (and not k+1 as proposed
in the protocol). For the recall, we introduced the k+1 co-occurence matrices
to make fake queries and real ones indistinguishable; not because of the pri-
vacy attacks (see discussion in Section 4.5.5). Besides, we cover the inﬂuence
that the number of co-occurence matrices has on the privacy protection with
the experiments on the distributed deployment of PEAS (Section 4.7.1.4).
4.6.2.2 Accuracy
The obfuscation mechanism of PEAS (i.e., adding k fake queries to the initial
query) modiﬁes the results returned by a search engine. We evaluated the
capacity of PEAS to ﬁlter and remove all answers related to the fake queries
from the results returned by the search engine. Our experiment compares
the results obtained by sending a query directly to the search engine and by
sending it through PEAS (i.e., considering the obfuscation and the ﬁltering
steps). Each set of results contains 30 results.
Furthermore, to obtain the results of the initial query and the protected
query, we used Google [3]. However, as the or operator implemented by
Google only works with single-word queries, we simulated the execution of
an obfuscated query q+ = q0 or : : :or qk by submitting each sub-query qi
independently and by randomly merging the (k + 1) result sets. In reality,
most search engines do not necessarily return a balanced number of results
for sub-queries. Therefore, with our simulation, we measure the accuracy in
the optimal scenario. The worst scenario occurs if, due to an unbalanced
number of results, no answer is returned for the initial user query and thus
only irrelevant results are displayed to the user. We present the merging al-
gorithm in Algorithm 10. The algorithm takes as input the (k + 1) sets of
results S0; :::; Sk. Then, it randomly selects a result from one of the sets of
results and adds it in the result list R. The algorithm stops when all results
have been merged. The result list is then ﬁltered by PEAS and only the ﬁrst 30
results are considered. Due to the query limitations of Google (100 queries
per day), we ran the evaluation on a subset of the testing set composed by
1,000 queries.
Moreover, the obfuscation mechanism of PEAS also modiﬁes the key-
word order of the initial query (to prevent an adversary from identifying fake
queries due to illogical word orders). Consequently, we also evaluated the in-
ﬂuence of the query word order on the accuracy of the results. We compared
the results returned by the same 1,000 queries (from which we removed all
one-word queries, as they are not impacted by the word order) and one of
their shuﬄed version.
To measure the accuracy, we use the same metrics as presented in [45].
We consider as ﬁrst metric QM1 which expresses the percentage of results ob-
tained for the initial query (i.e., without any protection) that are also retrieved
by PEAS after ﬁltering the irrelevant results:
QM1 =
jR \ R^j
jRj ;
where R and R^ are the ﬁnite lists of results returned by Google and PEAS,
respectively. QM1 equals 1 when R and R^ contain the same elements. If R
and R^ do not share any common results, QM1 equals 0.
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Algorithm 10: Simulation of the execution of the or operator.
input :S0; :::; Sk : results obtained for each k + 1 query.
1 I  J0; kK ;
2 R ; ; // Results returned for q+ = q0 or : : : or qk
3 while jIj 6= 0 do
// Select randomly one set of results
4 i random(I);
// Retrieve the first result in the set Si
5 r  remove(Si);
// Add the result r in the set R
6 R R [ frg;
// If all results in Si has been merged in R, remove
its index i
7 if jSij = 0 then
8 I  I n fig ;
9 return R ;
The second metric we used is QM2. It computes the average of the abso-
lute ranking diﬀerences over the results that are in both R and R^. QM2 is
deﬁned as:
QM2 =
P
r2R\R^
jrankR(r)  rankR^(r)j
jR \ R^j ;
where rankL(e) denotes the rank of an element e in a list L. This metric
compares the rankings of the expected list of results R with another list of
results R^. QM2 equals 0 if the elements of (R \ R^) appear in the same
position in R and R^. The maximum value for QM2 varies with the number
of elements in (R \ R^):
max(QM2) =

n2/2 if n is an even number
(n2   1)/2 if n is an odd number ;
where n is the number of results in (R \ R^).
Furthermore, QM2 is dependent of QM1. For instance, if the two lists of
results R and R^ are equal (i.e., QM1 = 100), QM2 is necessarily equal to 0.
This is due to the merging algorithm used to simulate the or operator. The
algorithm preserves the order for each query. Meaning that, if we consider
the two results r1 and r2 retrieved for one of the sub-queries (r1 is retrieved
before r2), after the merging r1 is still ranked before r2 in the results list.
4.6.2.3 Performance
We assessed the performance of PEAS with a theoretical and a practical eval-
uation. The theoretical evaluation studies the number of costly operations
(e.g., ciphering, deciphering, messages exchanged) performed to send a query
while the practical evaluation analyzes the maximum load that PEAS can deal
with, the computation cost required for the client, and the eﬀect of the fake
queries on the latency and on the size of messages sent over the network.
We implemented PEAS in Java. We optimized our implementation by us-
ing non-blocking sockets (Java NIO) and an eﬃcient cryptographic library
(i.e., Bouncycastle [161]) to perform the encryption and decryption opera-
tions with native code. Our implementation also takes advantage of hardware
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multi-threading (e.g., it is able to perform multiple encryption and decryp-
tion operations simultaneously). Besides, in order to test our implementation
in a real environment, we deployed PEAS on Grid5000 [160]. This infrastruc-
ture provides an access to a large amount of resources. For our experiments,
we used up to 63 nodes to act as clients, receivers or issuers. For simplicity all
the considered nodes were part of a homogeneous cluster. Besides, running
receivers and issuers on the same architecture enables a straight-forward com-
parison between them. They were equipped with two quad-core Intel Xeon
E5520 clocked at 2.27 GHz and 24 GB of RAM. Finally, we assume that a
user waits for the result of her query before sending a new one. We also con-
sider that clients, receivers and issuers know all the necessary cryptographic
keys in advance3.
To perform the theoretical analysis of PEAS, we distinguish three costly
operations: (i) the number of symmetric encryption and decryption opera-
tions, (ii) the number of asymmetric encryption and decryption operations,
and (iii) the number of generated messages. This theoretical evaluation counts
the number of times the considered operations are performed in the whole
system for one query.
For the practical evaluation, we perform three experiments: analyze the
time required by the client to extract the maximal cliques, measure the impact
of the number of fake queries on the latency (i.e., the period of time during
which the client waits for the results of her query), and study the throughput
and the latency according to the number of users in the system. We deﬁne
the throughput as the number of queries the privacy proxy is able to answer
per second. This throughput can be measured either on the receiver or on
the issuer. Indeed, as a client waits for the results of her query before send-
ing a new one, the throughput remains identical in the whole privacy proxy.
To avoid perturbations in the measurement of the scalability of PEAS due to
network delay or search engine load, we do not query the search engine for
this last experiment but we consider that users send a message of 136 bytes
and we model the search engine’s answer by a message of 166 kilobytes. Con-
sequently, latencies reported in the scalability evaluation do not include the
latency between the issuer and the search engine, and the delay needed by the
search engine to prepare the results.
Finally, we compare the performance of the privacy proxy with unlinka-
bility solutions published in the state of the art. According to [58], Tor [39]
is the most widely used and eﬀective unlinkability solution. Therefore, we
compare the performance of the privacy proxy with Tor. To have a fair com-
parison, we consider only two onion routers (by default, Tor uses at least three
onion routers) and a regeneration of the symmetric keys for each query (by
default, Tor established a new symmetric key with each onion router every
ten minutes).
4.7 PEAS Experimental Evaluation
This section presents the experimental evaluations of PEAS in terms of privacy-
protection, accuracy and performance. Firstly, PEAS outperforms GooPIR
over an unlinkability solution by decreasing the number of queries linked by
an attacker to its originating user by up to 18.4. Secondly, the ﬁltering of
PEAS successfully removes a large proportion of irrelevant results. For 95.5
3Receivers and Issuers have to share their public keys only once with each client. Therefore,
considering that clients send multiple queries through the same receiver and issuer, the exchange of
the public keys is an insigniﬁcant step and thus is not addressed by our evaluations.
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of the protected queries, 80 of the expected results are correctly retrieved
by PEAS. This result is twelve times higher than one obtained with GooPIR.
Finally, the performance of the privacy proxy clearly outperforms the onion
routing baseline. It reduces the latency by 7.5 and the throughput by 3.1.
4.7.1 Privacy
In this section we focus on a privacy evaluation of PEAS. The evaluation an-
alyzes the robustness of PEAS regarding privacy attacks and compares PEAS
against its closest competitor GooPIR over an unlinkability solution. We
also assess the inﬂuence of the distributed deployment of PEAS on the user
privacy.
4.7.1.1 Robustness Against Privacy Attacks
We ﬁrst analyze the robustness of PEAS against the ML Attack and SimAttack.
Figure 26 depicts the recall and the precision achieved by both privacy attacks
on PEAS for an increasing number of fake queries. When no fake query is
used, the results represent the outcome of the attacks against an unlinkability
mechanism (no obfuscation). Adding one fake query divides the number of
queries retrieved by the attack (the recall) by 1.66 on average, from 39.3 to
23.5 for SimAttack and from 36.6 to 22.1 for ML Attack. Increasing the
number of fake queries up to seven decreases the outcome of both attacks by
more than 3 times, from 39.3 to 12.7 for SimAttack and from 36.6 to
8.6 for ML Attack. In addition, the precision also decreases according to
the number of fake queries. Without obfuscation, the attacks perform with
a precision of 43.2 and 41.3 respectively for SimAttack and ML Attack.
The precision drops to 9.7 and 7.5 for seven fake queries. Consequently,
increasing the number of fake queries dramatically improves the user protec-
tion. However, we note that PEAS is not able to protect all users queries.
The results show that an attacker is still able to retrieve around 10 of queries
(considering seven fake queries). It is diﬃcult to protect these queries, as
most of them have been already issued by the user. Indeed, most of them are
contained in the previous-collected queries owned by the adversary.
We also compare the robustness of PEAS and GooPIR over an unlinka-
bility solution against the ML Attack and SimAttack. Figure 27 depicts the
recall achieved by both attacks against PEAS and GooPIR over an unlinkabil-
ity solution for a varying number of fake queries. We show that PEAS clearly
outperforms GooPIR over an unlinkability solution regardless of the number
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The robustness of PEAS increases
according to the number of fake
queries.
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PEAS outperforms GooPIR
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of fake queries. Indeed, the PEAS recall is at least 11.7 and 17.0 lower
than the recall obtained by GooPIR over an unlinkability solution with one
and seven fake queries, respectively. On average, the recall obtained by PEAS
is 15.0 lower than the recall obtained by GooPIR over an unlinkability so-
lution. As we obtain a similar conclusion for the precision (the precision is
19.9 lower for PEAS than GooPIR over an unlinkability solution on aver-
age), we do not consider it in Figure 27.
We now mitigate these results by introducing the conﬁdence level that
the attacker has on these queries. The current attack considers the pair query
and user that gives the highest similarity value. However, if another pair
has a slightly lower similarity, the user and the query returned by the at-
tack might not be relevant. The two pairs would have approximately the
same probability of being the good one. Consequently, we deﬁne the conﬁ-
dence level as the diﬀerence between the two highest similarities. As shown
in Algorithm 4 (Section 3.2.4), the conﬁdence level corresponds to the thresh-
old cf . This conﬁdence value is ranged from zero to one. We consider that
the de-anonymization is successful if the correct user is identiﬁed and if the
conﬁdence level is higher than the considered value. Figure 28 shows the
recall and the precision for diﬀerent conﬁdence levels considering an obfus-
cation mechanism that generates three and seven fake queries. We omit to
report results for the ML Attack as this second attack gives similar results to
SimAttack. The results show that for a conﬁdence level of 0.2, the percent-
age of de-anonymized queries for PEAS drops from 16.4 and 12.7, to 2.6
and 0.3 with three and seven fake queries, respectively. For the same level of
conﬁdence, the percentage of de-anonymized queries for GooPIR over an un-
linkability solution only decreases from 33.5 and 31.1 to 22.4 and 18.9
with three and seven fake queries, respectively. As a consequence, if the ad-
versary slightly increases the conﬁdence level (by default, the value is deﬁned
at 0.01), she is able to retrieve only few queries protected by PEAS (0.3) but
for GooPIR she is still able to retrieve a signiﬁcant quantity (18.9). One
could object that if the conﬁdence level is deﬁned with a value larger than
0.5, the two private Web search solutions could perform similarly, as in both
cases the recall would be close to 0. Nevertheless, it is not interesting for the
adversary to deﬁne such a high threshold, as a high conﬁdence level does not
allow the adversary to de-anonymize any query. Consequently, a conﬁdence
level is only interesting for low values. More precisely, the conﬁdence level
is interesting for the adversary if it increases the precision. According to Fig-
ure 28, the precision of PEAS is constant for low conﬁdence levels (for three
fake queries, the precision equals approximately 13.5 for cf < 0:3, while for
seven queries, the precision is around 7.6 for cf < 0:2), and then increases
88 Chapter 4
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5
R
ec
al
l (
in
 
%
)
Conﬁdence level
PEAS
GooPIR + unlinkability sol.
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5
Pr
ec
is
io
n 
(in
 
%
)
Conﬁdence level
(a) In the case of three fake queries.
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5
R
ec
al
l (
in
 
%
)
Conﬁdence level
PEAS
GooPIR + unlinkability sol.
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5
Pr
ec
is
io
n 
(in
 
%
)
Conﬁdence level
(b) In the case of seven fake queries.
Figure 28
Taking the conﬁdence level into
consideration decreases the recall
of the privacy attacks but
increase the precision .
rapidly (to 58.6 and 97.0 for three and seven fake queries, respectively).
The constant part is explained by the fact that the conﬁdence level discards the
same quantity of queries correctly and incorrectly retrieved by the attack. But,
above a certain threshold, as the conﬁdence level discards more queries incor-
rectly retrieved by the attack, the precision of PEAS increases. Therefore, in
the case of PEAS, the conﬁdence level has no real interest. The adversary does
not have any gain in increasing its value. However, if we consider GooPIR
over an unlinkability mechanism, the conﬁdence level increases the precision
up to 60. Therefore, for this solution, the adversary can trade oﬀ recall for
precision. Depending on the goal of the adversary, she might be interesting
to retrieve a lower number of queries with a higher precision.
4.7.1.2 Relevance of Fake Queries
Fake queries generated for a given user u are designed to be (i) far from previ-
ous queries sent by the user u but (ii) close to queries sent by the user v 6= u.
The ﬁrst aspect is achieved by design, as fake queries generated by u do not
contain keywords already used by u. This ensures that no relation exists be-
tween previous queries sent by u and fake queries generated by u. To assess
the relevance of the second point (i.e., being close to queries sent by v 6= u),
we compute the similarity between fake queries generated by a user u and the
previously-collected queries sent by all users v 6= u. More precisely, we com-
pute the cosine similarity between a fake query and each previous query sent
by these users. Then, we extract, from this collection of cosine similarities,
the highest cosine similarity. A similarity value close to one indicates that the
fake query is similar to a previous real query while a value close to zero means
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PEAS fake queries are close to
previous queries sent by other
users in the system.
that the query is dissimilar to any previous real queries. Figure 29 gives the
cumulative distribution of this similarity for all generated fake queries. We
can see that PEAS fake queries are similar to previous real queries, as all fake
queries have a cosine similarity higher than 0.5. Moreover, almost a third of
the fake queries (31.5) were already issued by a user v 6= u. It corresponds
to the fake queries with a cosine similarity equal to one. These results show
that PEAS fake queries are eﬀectively close to queries sent by another user in
the system.
Nevertheless, this is not enough to satisfactory protect users. Privacy at-
tacks try to retrieve from an obfuscated query, the most probable query. To
ensure that the adversary cannot perform such attacks, we have to verify that
fake queries are closer to a user proﬁle v 6= u than the initial query with its
user proﬁle u. For that purpose, we compute the mean of the previous dis-
tribution, mfq. It gives the average similarity between fake queries and the
other user proﬁles. We compute a similar metricmq between real queries and
their requester user proﬁle. Therefore, to correctly protect users, the meanmq
(corresponding to initial queries) should be lower than the mean mfq (cor-
responding to fake queries). We computed these two values and we found
that mfq = 0:84 and mq = 0:49. Consequently, as mfq is higher than mq,
a privacy attack is more likely to retrieve a fake query with a wrong requester
than the correct query with the correct requester.
4.7.1.3 Impact of the Size of the Group Profile
PEAS leverages a group proﬁle to generate fake queries. As described in Sec-
tion 4.3.2.1, this group proﬁle contains an aggregation of user queries. In this
section, we evaluate the impact of the size of this group proﬁle on the quality
of the obfuscation. To achieve that, Figure 30 reports the recall provided by
SimAttack according to the size of the group proﬁle. The results show that
the size of the group proﬁle inﬂuences the outcome of the attack: Increasing
the considered size better protects users. SimAttack provides a recall of 15.8
when only 10 of the group proﬁle is considered, while this recall drops to
10.5 when the whole group proﬁle is considered (both results are obtained
when PEAS generates seven fake queries).
This result is counter-intuitive, as increasing the size of the group proﬁle
should decrease the quality of the generated fake queries. Fake queries are
generated by extracting cliques from the group proﬁle. A group proﬁle con-
tains co-occurrence matrices in which previous queries are aggregated. The
aggregation makes the retrieval of the original data diﬃcult due to a loss of
information. As the vectorial space is a set of unigram (and not n-grams),
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some relations between keywords are lost. For instance, let us consider q the
query “a b c”, where a, b, and c are three diﬀerent keywords. From the co-
occurrence matrix which contained only q, it is possible to deduce that a was
used with b, b was used with c, and c was used with a. But there is no infor-
mation that a, b, and c were used in the same query. Nevertheless, as a, b,
and c form a maximal clique, one can deduce that they might have been used
together in a single query. But, considering two more queries “d b c” and
“a d” (where d is a keyword diﬀerent from a, b, and c) in the co-occurrence
matrix, the maximal clique is now “a b c d”, even though such a query was
never sent. From this example, we deduce that it is easier to retrieve the orig-
inal data from a small group proﬁle than a larger one, as a small group proﬁle
might contain more queries with disjoint keywords than larger one and thus,
the maximal cliques extracted from a small group proﬁle might correspond
to real queries and not to the merge of multiple real queries. Due to this
reason, fake queries generated from a small group proﬁle should be closer to
real queries than fake queries generated from a large one. Consequently, in-
creasing the size of the group proﬁle should give a lower protection to users
(as increasing the size of the group proﬁle would produce fake queries that
are farther from real queries). The reason why generating fake queries from
a small group proﬁle gives a lower protection is that to generate fake queries
PEAS manipulates the maximal cliques extracted from the group proﬁle (e.g.,
removing and adding keywords). For a small group proﬁle, these operations
transform the extracted maximal cliques into fake queries that diﬀer from real
ones. But, for a larger group proﬁle, the manipulations produce fake queries
that are closer to real ones.
4.7.1.4 Distributed Deployment of PEAS
As presented in Section 4.4, two group proﬁle managements are available to
deploy PEAS through a distributed setting. The group proﬁle can be central-
ized (i.e., shared by all issuers), or decentralized (i.e., each issuer manages its
own group proﬁle). In terms of privacy, a centralized group proﬁle provides
the same guarantee as the original PEAS protocol (i.e., without a distributed
deployment), as the centralized group proﬁle is not impacted by the number
of issuers. Therefore, the outcomes of the attacks against PEAS deployed with
a centralized group proﬁle are equivalent to those presented in Section 4.7.1.1.
However, the decentralization of the group proﬁle between all issuers im-
pacts the privacy. Indeed, the number of issuers changes the composition
of their group proﬁle and therefore, the generated fake queries. Figure 31
PEAS, a New Robust and Eﬃcient private Web Search Solution 91
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
0 1 3 5 7
R
ec
al
l (
%
)
Number of fake queries
PEAS-c = PEAS-d-1
PEAS-d-3
PEAS-d-5
Figure 31
The distributed deployment does
not really impact the privacy
protection.
presents the recall achieved by SimAttack4 for the two group proﬁle manage-
ments according to the number of fake queries. The label “PEAS-c” corre-
sponds to a centralized group proﬁle while ‘PEAS-d-x” denotes a decentral-
ized group proﬁle between x issuers. The results show that increasing the
number of issuers and thus the number of group proﬁles, slightly aﬀects the
quality of the obfuscation. By increasing the number of issuers from 1 to 5,
the recall increase by 1.1 on average. These results conﬁrm the observations
made in Section 4.7.1.3: Smaller group proﬁles tend to slightly reduce the pri-
vacy protection oﬀered by PEAS. Indeed, increasing the number of issuers,
decrease the size of the group proﬁles (as queries are split between multiple
group proﬁles). Due to this reason, increasing the number of issuers slightly
decreases the privacy protection.
4.7.2 Accuracy
In this section we evaluate the accuracy of PEAS. Our evaluation is performed
in two steps: (i) we evaluate the ﬁltering algorithm (i.e., more precisely, the
capacity of PEAS to remove irrelevant results introduced by the fake queries),
and (ii) we assess the inﬂuence of shuﬄing the keywords of the initial user
query on the quality of the results. For the ﬁrst step, we consider that the
PEAS obfuscation mechanism does not shuﬄe the keywords of the initial
user query, while for the second step, we consider that the PEAS obfuscation
mechanism only shuﬄes keywords and does not introduce any fake query.
4.7.2.1 Impact of the Filtering Algorithm
In this section, we measure the quality of the ﬁltering algorithm by studying
the proportion of results obtained without any protection mechanisms that
are also retrieved by PEAS. Such a proportion corresponds to the metricQM1
introduced in Section 4.6.2.2. For this experiment, we consider that PEAS
does not shuﬄe the keywords of the initial user query. Figure 32(a) depicts
the inverse cumulative frequency distribution of theQM1 metric. The results
show that for more than 50 of the initial queries, PEAS returns all the ex-
pected results (i.e., QM1 = 100 for 54.6 of initial queries). Furthermore,
for 95.5 of the initial queries, PEAS returns more than 80 of the expected
results. This means that for 95.5 of the initial queries, more than 24 results
out of 30 are correct.
Secondly, we measure the diﬀerence in the rankings between the results
obtained for the initial query without obfuscation and the ones provided
4We omit to report the results for ML Attack which provides a similar recall.
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(a) PEAS ﬁltering outperforms GooPIR ﬁltering regardless of the
number of expected results retrieved.
25
50
75
100
0 20 40 60 80 100In
ve
rs
e
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
(in
%
)
QM1 (in %)
PEAS
GooPIR
0
25
50
75
100
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
C
um
ul
at
iv
e
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
(in
%
)
QM2
PEAS
GooPIR
(b) PEAS better preserves the rankings of the expected results.
Figure 32
Comparison between the
ﬁltering performed by PEAS
and the ﬁltering performed by
GooPIR.
by PEAS (i.e., through the QM2 metric as deﬁned in Section 4.6.2.2). Fig-
ure 32(b) presents the cumulative frequency distribution of the QM2 metric.
We show that the rankings of the results of PEAS are similar to the expected
results for more than 50 of the initial queries. Moreover, for 90 of the
initial queries, the ranking of the results after the ﬁltering process only diﬀers
from the expected results by two units (i.e., QM2 is less than or equal to two).
Lastly, we observe that the ﬁltering step of PEAS retrieves signiﬁcantly
more results than GooPIR (on average 95.3 for PEAS against 36.3 for
GooPIR). In addition, the results returned by PEAS are more accurate than
GooPIR as the ranking of the results only diﬀer on average by 0.6 units for
PEAS compared to 5.8 units for GooPIR. The main diﬀerence between the
two ﬁltering algorithms is that GooPIR consider a result relevant if it con-
tains all keywords used in the initial query, while PEAS identiﬁes a result as
relevant if the initial query contains the highest number of keywords in the
results (compared to the fake queries).
4.7.2.2 Impact of the Word Order
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2.2, PEAS shuﬄes the keywords of all initial
user queries to prevent an adversary from distinguishing fake queries from real
ones. Fake queries might have an irrelevant keyword order (e.g., “Floyd Pink”
instead of “Pink Floyd”). Therefore, by shuﬄing the keywords of the initial
user queries, both real and fake queries might have inconsistencies. Such an
operation reinforces the indistinguishability property between fake queries
and real ones but might degrade the accuracy of the results, as search engines
might exploit the keyword order to establish the result list. Consequently, we
evaluate the inﬂuence of shuﬄing the keywords of the initial queries on the
quality of the results. To do so, we compare the results returned by Google
if the keyword order of a query is shuﬄed or not. We measure the diﬀerence
between these two result list using QM1. In this experiment, we consider
that the PEAS obfuscation mechanism does not introduce any fake query.
Figure 33 depicts the QM1 metric for a varying number of results returned
by Google (from 5 results to 50). The results conﬁrm that Google takes into
consideration the word order. For instance, for ﬁve results, the QM1 metric
is on average equal to 78.8. Meaning that, on average 78.8 of the results
returned for the non-shuﬄed query are also returned for the shuﬄed query.
Therefore, due to the keyword shuﬄing, 21.2 of the results are not retrieved
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The word order of the query has
a non-negligible impact on the
results returned by the search
engine.
for the shuﬄed query. Considering ﬁfty results, QM1 drops on average to
64.8 and thus, 35.2 of the results are not retrieved for the shuﬄed query.
Moreover, as users generally do not consult results beyond the top-10, we
can consider that shuﬄing keywords in PEAS degrades the accuracy by ap-
proximately 20. This percentage is relatively high but, it can be partially mit-
igated by reconstructing the keyword order. For instance, by using Markov
chains [162] built on a large corpus, the issuer could reorder keywords to
obtain more logical queries (e.g., reorder “Floyd Pink” in “Pink Floyd”).
4.7.3 Performance
In this section, we evaluate the performance of PEAS on several aspects: ex-
ecution time required on the client side, inﬂuence of the number of fake
queries, comparison with the onion routing baseline (from both a theoretical
and a practical perspective).
4.7.3.1 PEAS Client Evaluation
The PEAS client is in charge of many operations in the generation of fake
queries. We focus the evaluation of the PEAS client on the most costly one,
the extraction of the maximal cliques. We leverage the Bron-Kerbosch algo-
rithm [156] to do this operation, the worst-case running time of this algorithm
is O(3n/3) [163] where n is the number of words in the co-occurrence matri-
ces. However, as these co-occurrence matrices are generally sparse, it can be
reduced to O(dn3d/3) [164], where d is the maximum number of times a
keyword co-occurs with other keywords. Figure 34 depicts the computation
time required by the Bron-Kerbosch algorithm to extract maximal cliques
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for an increasing number of queries aggregated in the co-occurrence matrix.
Queries were randomly selected in the training set. The results show that the
extraction follows an exponential running time. This could be an issue in
practice but, to minimize the cost of this operation on the client, the extrac-
tion is executed only once upon the reception of a new version of the group
proﬁle. In addition, this extraction is performed in a background execution
so that the performance of PEAS are not impacted by the clique extraction.
The new version of the group proﬁle is used when the extraction is completed.
4.7.3.2 Impact of the Number of Fake Queries
We want to measure the inﬂuence of the number of fake queries on the per-
formance of PEAS. We measure the latency for a diﬀerent number of fake
queries. In the computation of the latency, we omit the maximal clique ex-
traction step, as it is done only once for each new version of the group proﬁle.
The experiment was conducted on Google with 1,000 queries selected ran-
domly from the test dataset. To minimize the inﬂuence of the size of the
queries, we select only three-word queries. As previously mentioned, Google
does not support multi-keyword queries sent with the or operator. For that
reason, to make the protected queries compliant with Google, we use the
“Exact expression” feature. For instance, for a user query q sent with two fake
queries fq1 and fq2, we issue to Google “fq2” or “q” or “fq1”, where the
quotes indicate that the exact expression. Besides, we consider that the search
engine returns an equal number of results for each sub-query. Therefore, to re-
turn ten results related to the initial query, the total number of results evolves
linearly according to the number of fake queries. We explicitly ask the search
engine to return 10  (1 + nbfq) results, where nbfq is the number of fake
queries contained in the protected query. Figure 35 depicts how the latency
evolves according to the number of fake queries. We note that the latency
increases with the number of fake queries. For instance, sending the original
query without fake queries takes on average 602.0 ms while for seven fake
queries, it takes 1076.0 ms. More precisely, the operations performed by the
client and the privacy proxy are negligible compared to the network delay and
the time required by the search engine to retrieve the results. Furthermore,
the main reason behind the increase of the latency is that the search engine re-
quires more time to process larger queries. For zero fake query, Google takes
356.9 ms to process the query while for seven fake queries it takes 747.8 ms.
Therefore, adding seven fake queries increases the time taken by Google to
compute its results by 52.3. It is diﬃcult to explain this result, as Google’s
algorithms are not public. But two elements might explain this: (i) increas-
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ing the number of fake queries makes the search engine looking for more
documents, and (ii) in our evaluation, for a higher number of fake queries,
Google is asked to return more results.
Furthermore, we also study the eﬀect of the fake queries on the size of the
messages sent over the network. We measure both the size of the query sent
by the client and the response it receives from the search engine. Figure 36
relates the evolution of the size of these messages according to the number
of fake queries. The results show that the size increases with the number of
fake queries. If we consider a query sent without fake queries, the messages
represent 268.4 kB while, for seven fake queries sent together with the initial
query, the size increases to 400.2 kB. As a consequence, adding seven fake
queries increases by 1.5 the size of the messages sent over the network. This
increase can be explained by the experimental set up, as for a higher number
of fake queries, we ask Google for a higher number of results (i.e., 10 [1 +
nbfq], where nbfq is the number of fake queries). Consequently, if the answer
returned by Google contains more results, its size naturally increases.
4.7.3.3 Scalability of PEAS
To practically evaluate the performance of PEAS, we measure the scalability
of the components contained in the privacy proxy, namely the receiver and
the issuer. Figure 37 reports the latency of the receiver and the issuer to sepa-
rately process a query according to the load of the system (i.e., an increasing
throughput). The results show that both the receiver and the issuer are able to
deal with the increasing rate of queries up to a certain load where they become
saturated and are not able to answer clients straightaway (i.e., incoming mes-
sages are queued). As a consequence, the saturation dramatically increases
the latency.
In addition, the results show that the receiver supports a larger load than
the issuer. Their maximum throughputs are 6,892.2 queries per second and
6,669.3 queries per second, respectively. Besides, for a given throughput, the
latency of the receiver is 3.3 times lower than the latency observed on the
issuer (on average the latency on the receiver is 472.0 s against 1,542.7 s on
the issuer). Consequently, the receiver succeeds in processing more queries
per second than the issuer. The better performance of the receiver is explained
as, compared to the issuer, the receiver does not perform any cryptographic
operation.
Furthermore, as the scalability of the receiver is only slightly better than
the issuer, we deduce that the additional cryptographic operations performed
by the issuer, do not have a strong impact on its performance. In addition, the
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serve queries up to a certain load
where they become saturated
and are no longer able to answer
clients straightaway.
memory of the two nodes is not saturated, as 24 GB of RAM is large enough
to execute the protocol. Therefore, we deduce that the limiting factor of
PEAS comes from the network (and not from the cost of the protocol itself ).
The nodes used as receiver and issuer cannot deal with a higher number of
messages.
4.7.3.4 Comparison With Onion Routing
Firstly, we theoretically evaluate the number of costly operations performed
to send a query without protection mechanisms and protected by PEAS or
the onion routing baseline. Table 8 compares the number of cryptographic
operations and the number of messages for PEAS, for the onion routing base-
line, and for a direct access to the search engine without privacy protection.
We show that PEAS requires less cryptographic operations than onion rout-
ing baseline (half as much RSA encryption and decryption, and six times less
AES encryption and decryption operations). In terms of traﬃc, PEAS sends
38 fewer messages than the onion routing baseline. Indeed, to query a search
engine using PEAS requires 15 messages (9 for the TCP handshake and 6 for
the protocol messages), while using Onion Routing requires 39 messages (9
for the TCP handshake, 18 for the TLS handshake and 12 for the protocol
messages).
We also empirically compare the performance of PEAS against the onion
routing baseline. Figure 38 reports the latency of both solutions for an increas-
ing load. The results show that the latency of PEAS is 7.5 times lower than the
latency achieved by the onion routing baseline (2 ms for PEAS against 15 ms
for the onion routing baseline). As shown in Table 8, this diﬀerence is mainly
due to the additional number of cryptographic operations performed by the
onion routing baseline and to the associated renegotiation of the symmetric
keys for each query.
In terms of scalability, PEAS manages to process more queries per sec-
ond than the onion routing baseline. On average, the PEAS throughput is
3.1 times higher than the one obtained with the onion routing baseline. As
for the latency, the diﬀerence is explained by the number of cryptographic
Protocol RSA operations AES operations Messages
Direct Access 0 0 5
PEAS 2 2 15
Onion Routing 4 12 39
Table 8
Number of cryptographic
operations and traﬃc generated
in the whole system.
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operations performed and messages sent (see Table 8).
4.7.3.5 Scalability of PEAS Distributed Deployment
Finally, we evaluate the scalability improvement provided by the distributed
deployment of PEAS. As shown previously, both the receiver and the issuer
have approximately the same throughput. As a consequence, we consider
the same number of receivers and issuers in this distributed deployment. We
denote by PEAS x-x the deployment of the PEAS with x receivers and x
issuers. Figure 39 depicts the latency for diﬀerent deployments of PEAS (from
one to ten receivers and issuers) and an increasing throughput. The results
show that the latency slightly increases according to the throughput when the
receivers and the issuers are not saturated. For instance, with a deployment of
ten receivers and issuers, a throughput of 520.7 queries per second provides a
latency of 2 ms, while a throughput of 24,345.1 queries per second only rises
the latency to 4.7 ms. The increase of the latency is relatively important (more
than two time) but, due to the order of magnitude, it is imperceptible to the
users. Consequently, we can consider that the latency is stable as long as the
receivers and the issuers are not saturated. Indeed, from a certain load, the
system becomes saturated and the latency drastically increases (i.e., the system
is no longer able to serve clients properly). Obviously, the more receivers and
issuers in the system, the more the system can serve clients. Regarding the
throughput, a distributed deployment of PEAS with one, two, ﬁve, and ten
receivers and issuers provides a maximum throughput of 6,669, 13,284, 19,562,
and 31,823 queries per second, respectively. Consequently, distributing the
privacy proxy of PEAS with two, ﬁve and ten receivers and issuers increases
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the throughput of the system by 2.0, 2.9, and 4.8 respectively (compared to
a non-distributed deployment). We note that the scalability is not linear. It
is due to the socket management between receivers and issuers that requires
synchronizations and therefore reduces the throughput of each issuer.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter presented PEAS, a new privacy-preserving solution to query
search engines. PEAS combines a new eﬃcient unlinkability protocol with a
new accurate indistinguishability solution. While the former hides the iden-
tity of a requester, the latter obfuscates user queries with k fake queries to
ensure that an adversary will not be able to identify user queries.
We exhaustively evaluated PEAS using real search queries and showed that
PEAS meets the expectations: it improves the privacy protection by reduc-
ing the number of de-anonymized queries compared to (i) an onion routing
baseline and (ii) GooPIR over an unlinkability solution. The de-anonymized
queries decrease respectively by 26.6 and 18.4. Furthermore, PEAS re-
duces the overhead in terms of latency and throughput compared to the
onion routing baseline (the latency of PEAS is 7.5 lower and its throughput 3.1
higher). Regarding the quality of the results, PEAS is better than GooPIR,
as PEAS retrieves on average 95.3 of the initial results while GooPIR re-
trieves only 36.3. Finally, the distributed deployment of PEAS provides a
better scalability of the system (the throughput increases by 4.8 for ten issuers)
without signiﬁcantly reducing the privacy protection (the recall of SimAttack
increases by 1.1).
The obfuscation of PEAS strongly relies on the group proﬁle. We did not
investigate in our work how the system designer should conﬁgure the system
to obtain the optimal obfuscation. Two factors should be studied for a de-
ployment: how often the group proﬁle is updated and how many queries
the group proﬁle should contain. Moreover, PEAS obfuscates user queries
by adding k fake queries. Nevertheless, as mentioned in Section 4.6.2.2, the
current search engines (i.e., Google, Yahoo!, and Bing) do not process cor-
rectly boolean queries. Therefore, PEAS should ﬁnd another mechanism to
protect queries with fake queries. A possible solution is to send queries and
fake queries successively (as it is done in TMN). Besides, such a solution im-
proves the accuracy (the results of each query are returned independently)
but decreases the performance (more traﬃc generated).
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SAM and LAM, Identifying Sensitive
Queries to Improve the Eﬃciency of
Private Web Search Solutions
5.1 Objective
Private Web search solutions allow users to protect their privacy against a
curious search engine. But these mechanisms require (i) more computation
than sending non-protected queries to search engines, and (ii) more data sent
over the network. They also degrade the accuracy of the results (e.g., intro-
ducing irrelevant results due to the fake queries). These drawbacks can be
reduced by protecting queries that only require a protection. For instance,
if banal queries do not reveal personal information, they do not need to be
protected. Therefore, many resources (e.g., CPU, network traﬃc) could be
saved by adapting the protection to each query. This chapter studies the
trade-oﬀ between protecting the lowest number of queries (i.e., the sensitive
queries) and preserving the user privacy. Ultimately, we want to adapt cur-
rent privacy-preserving Web search solutions to only protect sensitive queries,
but without decreasing the user protection.
In this work, we denote a sensitive query as a query related to an embar-
rassing topic (e.g., sexual behavior or health condition) and a linkable query
as a query that can be linked back to its originating user. As illustrated in Sec-
tion 2.2.1, deﬁning embarrassing topics is not easy, as there is no consensus
on such a deﬁnition. Consequently, we consider in our work a user-centric
model. Users are invited to personalize their own list of sensitive topics. We
further detail how it is done in practice. Furthermore, linkable queries are
deﬁned by one of the privacy attacks presented in this thesis (e.g., SimAttack
or the machine learning attack). More precisely, a linkable query is an anony-
mous query for which the adversary successfully retrieves the identity of its
requester.
In the ﬁrst section, we analyze the overhead produced in protecting all
queries similarly. Then, we introduce two modules to identify sensitive queries
and discuss their deployment on existing private Web search solutions. Fi-
nally, we evaluate the accuracy of these modules and their inﬂuence on the
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query protection.
5.2 Overhead Made by Private Web Search Solutions
In this section, we assess the proportion of sensitive queries sent by users
and deduce the proportion of queries that should not be protected by the
current privacy preserving solutions. We perform an empirical evaluation
using the dataset of 18,164 users presented in Section 3.3.1 (i.e., a subset of
the AOL dataset containing the most active users). The evaluation requires
queries to be annotated according to their sensitivity. Nevertheless, as the
dataset contains too many queries to manually annotate their sensitivity, it is
not suitable for our evaluation. For that reason, we select 198 users among
the most active users who sent at least one semantically sensitive query. We
identiﬁed these users manually from the most active to the least active and
stopped when we could extract a test set of 10,000 queries. Moreover, we
consider an adversary with prior knowledge on users. Therefore, similarly
to the previous chapters, we created a training set and a test set by splitting
queries sent by the 198 users in ⅔, ⅓. The training set contains the ﬁrst
⅔ of queries sent by the 198 users, while the test set contains 10,000 queries
extracted from the remaining ⅓. These 10,000 queries represent for each user
her ﬁrst 44.6 of queries in the remaining ⅓, considering queries ordered
by time. As a result, our training dataset and test dataset are composed of
respectively 96,548 queries (487.6 queries per user on average) and 10,000
queries (50.5 queries per user on average).
In the following sections, we show that private Web search solutions pro-
duce an unnecessary overhead by protecting semantically non-sensitive queries
(i.e., queries not related to an embarrassing topic) and non-linkable queries
(i.e., queries that cannot be linked back to their requester user proﬁle). We
focus our analysis on Tor (unlinkability solutions), GooPIR, and PEAS.
5.2.1 Overhead Due to the Protection of Semantically
Non-sensitive Queries
We ﬁrst analyze the proportion of semantically sensitive queries sent by a
user. Then, we illustrate the overhead produced by the three aforementioned
private Web search solutions.
5.2.1.1 Proportion of Semantically Sensitive Queries
To analyze the proportion of semantically sensitive queries sent by a user, we
conducted a crowd-sourcing study in which we asked workers to annotate
a set of queries. The study consisted in annotating the 10,000 queries con-
tained in the test dataset according to their sensitivity. In the instructions
we gave to the workers (see Appendix D), we deﬁned a semantically sensi-
tive query as a “query that they do not want to make public (e.g., relating to
an embarrassing topic, revealing personal behavior/information)”. After reading
the instructions, the workers did the questionnaire that contained between six
and eight queries for a reward of €0.05. Each query was annotated by ﬁve dif-
ferent annotators to obtain multiple opinions. The crowd-sourcing campaign
was conducted using Crowdﬂower1. We obtained a total of 1,456 workers who
participated in our study. Some of them participated more than once, mean-
ing that they answered multiple times the questionnaire with diﬀerent queries.
1Accessible at: http://www.crowdflower.com
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Nevertheless, we limited to two the number of questionnaires a single user
could complete. Thus, a user annotated a maximum of between 12 and 16
queries. We also conﬁgured golden questions to avoid free-riders. They corre-
spond to queries we annotated ourselves so that Crowdﬂower can compare
users’ results and detect misbehaving users. These queries were randomly in-
troduced among the 10,000 queries annotated by workers. Furthermore, to
validate the quality of the annotations made by the workers, we use Fleiss’
kappa [165]. This metric assesses the reliability of agreement between anno-
tators. We obtained a score of 0.44, which according to Landis and Koch’s
scale [166], can be considered as a moderate agreement. We found two rea-
sons to explain this level of agreement: (i) annotators do not always agree on
what is semantically sensitive, e.g. for the query treatment marijuana addic-
tion, three annotators said that it is sensitive whereas two other annotators
said it is non-sensitive, and (ii) some queries can have two diﬀerent mean-
ings: one semantically sensitive and another one semantically non-sensitive,
e.g. the query young Russian girl can either refer to teenagers in Russia or be
interpreted as a pornographic query. To create the ﬁnal dataset of annotated
queries, we needed to aggregate the ﬁve annotations into a single one. Sev-
eral aggregation techniques have been published in the literature: Majority
Vote [167], EM [168], GLAD [169]. For our study, to limit the impact of
the outliers, we assigned to each query the annotation chosen by a majority
of workers. Of the 10,000 queries annotated, we found that 1,574 queries
are semantically sensitive while the remaining 8,426 queries are not semanti-
cally sensitive. If we analyze the proportion of semantically sensitive queries
per user, we note that on average users send 18.9 of semantically sensitive
queries (with a standard deviation of 18.1). These results were obtained with
diﬀerent users than the ones that originally issued the queries. For that reason,
our results would have been diﬀerent with the original users. Therefore, we
can conclude from this study that a priori semantically non-sensitive queries
represent a majority of users’ queries.
5.2.1.2 Impact on Protecting Semantically Non-sensitive Queries
If we consider the results of the previous section, there are 1,574 semantically
sensitive queries in the annotated dataset. Consequently, instead of protect-
ing the 10,000 queries, protection mechanisms could only protect the 1,574
sensitive queries. Therefore, the diﬀerent parties (i.e., users, relays, the search
engine, and the network) could save resources. Indeed, if we consider Tor,
GooPIR, and PEAS, the cost on the user-side due to the fake queries or the
cryptographic operations could decrease by 84.3. More precisely, the num-
ber of fake queries generated by GooPIR or PEAS decreases from 70,000 to
11,018 and the number of cryptographic operations performed by Tor would
decrease from 150,000 to 23,610. In addition, in the speciﬁc case of Tor, the
number of messages processed by users would drop by 73.7 (from 80,000
messages to 21,018 messages). Furthermore, for the relays (involved in Tor
or PEAS), adapting the protection mechanism could reduce cryptographic
operations and exchanged messages by 84.3. In practice, such a decrease
could allow relays to process queries faster and thus reduce the latency. Re-
garding the search engine, the beneﬁt due to a lower number of fake queries
would save its resources by 73.7. This gain is very proﬁtable in particular
for widely used search engines like Google, as they receive approximately 3.5
billion search queries per day. Finally, the adaptation proﬁts to the network
as a lower number of smaller messages would be sent.
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5.2.2 Overhead Due to the Protection of Non-Linkable Queries
Linkable queries are anonymous queries that can be linked back to their orig-
inal users. In practice, we consider that linkable queries are queries correctly
de-anonymized by at least one of the privacy attacks: SimAttack (see Chap-
ter 3) or ML Attack (see Section 3.3.3). These attacks consider an adversary
who previously collected queries of the users in the system. The results pre-
sented in this section give a lower bound on the proportion of linkable queries,
as an adversary might ﬁnd a better attack to de-anonymize queries.
In the next section, we analyze the proportion of linkable queries in the an-
notated dataset. Then, based on this value, we quantify the cost of protecting
non-linkable queries for PEAS. Indeed, only PEAS is concerned by adapt-
ing its protection mechanism to linkable queries, as the notion of linkability
requires the use of an unlinkability solution and the notion of adaptation re-
quires the use of an extra protection mechanism. As a result, adapting protec-
tion mechanisms to linkable queries concerns indistinguishability solutions
that runs on top of an unlinkability protocol. To the best of our knowledge,
only PEAS corresponds to such a solution in the literature.
5.2.2.1 Proportion of Linkable Queries
We assess the proportion of linkable queries contained in the annotated dataset.
Our experiment considers linkable queries as anonymous queries correctly re-
trieved by at least SimAttack or ML Attack. These privacy attacks require an
adversary with prior knowledge on the users. Therefore, we consider queries
in the training dataset as the previous queries collected by the adversary. Our
experiment anonymizes the 10,000 queries contained in the test dataset (such
that the adversary has no information about the identity of their requesters)
and executes the two privacy attacks to de-anonymize them. In Figure 40,
we present the proportion of linkable queries for each of the 198 users. These
users are ranked by their proportion of linkable queries. We note that the pro-
portion of linkable queries signiﬁcantly varies from user to user (from 3.0
to 87.6). On average, 35.3 of user queries are linkable. Furthermore, we
study the overlap between the results of the two privacy attacks. We found
that 65.1 of linkable queries were retrieved by the two privacy attacks. It
shows that a large proportion of linkable queries can be easily de-anonymized.
Nevertheless, these results are established on a small dataset where the 198
users do not represent the billions of users using search engines. Therefore,
in a real context, the proportion of linkable queries might be lower.
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5.2.2.2 Impact on Protecting Non-Linkable Queries
Non-linkable queries are well protected by an unlinkability protocol (e.g., an
anonymous network protocol), as they cannot be de-anonymized by the ex-
isting linkability attacks. As we have seen in the previous section, linkable
queries represent 35.3 of users’ queries in the annotated dataset. Hence,
non-linkable queries represent a large majority of users’ queries (i.e., on aver-
age, 64.7 of their queries are non-linkable). This large proportion suggests
that PEAS wastes many resources by obfuscating these queries. By protect-
ing non-linkable queries with fake queries, PEAS engenders extra computa-
tions for the client and for the search engine (i.e., more queries need to be
processed). In addition, the network is also impacted: more fake queries in-
creases the size of the exchanged packets. Adapting PEAS to linkable queries
consists in obfuscating linkable queries only. Such enhancement of PEAS
decreases up to 64.7 the cost due to the obfuscation of queries.
5.3 Sensitivity Assessment
To reduce the cost of protecting queries, we design two assessment modules
to identify sensitive queries: (i) the Semantic Assessment Module (SAM) de-
tects semantically sensitive queries, and (ii) the Linkability Assessment Mod-
ule (LAM) identiﬁes linkable queries. We ﬁrst give an overview of the two
assessment modules and formalize the notion of sensitivity (considering a
user-centric model). Then, we present the two assessment modules in detail:
ﬁrst the Semantic Assessment Module and then the Linkability Assessment
Module.
5.3.1 Overview
Our work aims to identify if a given query is sensitive. By sensitive, we target
both semantically sensitive queries and linkable queries. For that reason, we
design two independent modules: the Semantic Assessment Module (SAM)
and the Linkability Assessment Module (LAM). These modules need to re-
spect two requirements: (i) they cannot rely on external services, as we do
not want to trust any distant server, and (ii) they cannot rely on costly algo-
rithms or heavy databases, as they have to run on a personal computer or a
smartphone. For that reason, SAM identiﬁes semantically sensitive queries
by detecting queries related to an embarrassing topic. The identiﬁcation is
performed using a local copy of WordNet [82] (a lexical database) and a map-
ping in a pre-deﬁned set of categories. Concerning LAM, it detects linkable
queries by computing a similarity metric with all queries already sent by the
user.
5.3.2 User Centric Sensitivity Modeling
The sensitivity of a query depends on two aspects: if the query is related to
an embarrassing topic or if the query is linkable to its requester’s proﬁle. As
we have seen in Section 5.2, these two concepts have a diﬀerent meaning
from user to user. Therefore, we need to personalize the deﬁnition of link-
able queries for each user. For embarrassing topics, we consider that users
can select in a pre-established list of categories, the ones that they ﬁnd em-
barrassing. To establish the list of categories, we consider the ones provided
by eXtended WordNet Domains (XWND) [170], as our implementation of
SAM use this library. Using the same categories to model users avoids the
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problem of mapping a pre-deﬁned set of categories to another one. XWND
provides 170 categories (all available categories are listed in Appendix E). The
relatively high number of categories gives users the possibility to carefully
personalize their embarrassing topics.
Regarding the notion of linkability, we personalize its deﬁnition for each
user by considering her previous queries. Indeed, to de-anonymize a query,
the adversary uses a set of previously-collected queries she has about the user
(i.e., when the user did not protect her queries). Therefore, the linkability
of the query is assessed by measuring its similarity with the set of queries
previously sent by the user. Depending on the value of the metric, the query
is considered either linkable or non-linkable. Nevertheless, the notion of
linkability depends on the popularity of a query. If a query has been sent by
many users, it might be diﬃcult for privacy attacks to retrieve her original
requester precisely. But, as a given user has in general no information about
the other users in the system, LAM cannot assess the popularity of a query.
Consequently, LAM might over-detect linkable queries.
5.3.3 Semantic Assessment Module (SAM)
As mentioned in Section 5.3.1, assessment modules cannot rely on external
services, costly algorithms or heavy databases. For that reason, existing query
categorizers [135, 129, 87] cannot be used to detect sensitive queries, as they
exploit DBpedia or require to set up a local search engine. Consequently, we
propose a new module to identify queries related to an embarrassing topic.
We base our module on two libraries: (i) WordNet [82], a lexical database,
and (ii) eXtended WordNet Domains (XWND) [170], an extension of Word-
Net to add categories. WordNet groups words into sets of synonyms called
synsets and provides the relations between those synsets (e.g., hypernym, hy-
ponym) while XWND enriches WordNet by mapping those synsets to a
set of categories. The storage required by the two libraries is compatible
with our requirements: the former takes 37.4 MB while the latter requires
5.8 MB. For instance, they can easily be stored on smartphones, as the current
minimum storage capacity is approximately 8 GB. Regarding the computa-
tion constraints, exploiting these libraries does not suppose heavy computa-
tions. WordNet can be seen as an index between words and synsets (i.e., we
only exploit hypernym/hyponym relationships to disambiguate synsets) and
XWND is an index between synsets and categories.
SAM as presented in Algorithm 11 takes as input a query q, a set of sen-
sitive categories SC (categories classiﬁed as embarrassing by the user), a dic-
tionary D (that pairs categories with a set of speciﬁc terms), the maximum
number of synsets per word s and the maximum number of categories per
synset c. Algorithm 11 calls the function getMostProbSynsets(q; s) (line 2)
to identify for each keyword w in the query q all possible synsets in WordNet
(i.e., all possible meanings of the keyword in WordNet). This function returns
for each keyword w the s most probable synsets (using a graph-based disam-
biguation method [171] with the Wu and Palmer metric [172]). However, it
appears that keywords from speciﬁc domains cannot be found in WordNet
(e.g., slang words contained in porn-related queries or speciﬁc diseases con-
tained in health queries). Therefore, we introduce a dictionary D that pairs
categories k with a set of speciﬁc terms v. If the keyword w is contained in
one of the sets of terms v, the category k (corresponding to the set of terms v)
is aggregated in the set C (lines 3 to 5). Otherwise, in the general case, the
algorithm maps each synset retrieved by WordNet to multiple categories by
calling getCategories() (line 7). This function uses XWND to return the c
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Algorithm 11: Semantic Assessment Module.
input :q: query,
SC: set of sensitive categories,
D: dictionary that pairs categories with a set of terms,
s: maximum number of synsets per word,
c: maximum number of categories per synset.
1 C  ; ; // Categories related to the query q
2 for (w; S) 2 getMostProbableSynsets(q; s) do
3 if jSj = 0 then
// Identify terms that are not in WordNet
4 for (k; v) 2 D do
5 if w 2 v then C  C [ fkg ;
// Map synset to categories
6 for synset 2 S do
7 C  C [ getCategories(synset, c) ;
// Look if C contains sensitive categories
8 if jC \ SCj > 0 then
9 return sensitive ;
10 return nonSensitive ;
most probable categories associated to a synset. The categories retrieved for
the s synsets associated to the keyword w are aggregated in the set C. Finally,
SAM identiﬁes sensitive queries by looking if the set C contains a sensitive
category. If it is the case, SAM considers the query q as sensitive (line 9).
Otherwise, the query q is considered as non-sensitive (line 10). The complex-
ity of this algorithm is O(jqj3). In Section 5.6.1, we discuss the choice of the
number of synsets s, the number of categories c, and the dictionary D.
5.3.4 Linkability Assessment Module (LAM)
The goal of the Linkability Assessment Module (LAM) is to determine if
knowing a set of previous queries sent by the user, an adversary is able to
de-anonymize a protected query. We identify two possibilities to obtain a
successful attack: (i) the user has already issued the query (i.e., the query is
already in the user proﬁle) or (ii) the query is close to a previous query sent
by the user (e.g., a subset of its keywords was already used in a past query
which is stored in the user proﬁle). Therefore, we design LAM to detect if
a query is in one of these two cases. Nevertheless, the decision regarding
the linkability needs to exploit the number of common keywords the query
has with the previous ones and the frequency of these previous queries. For
instance, if the query was already issued 20 times, it is more likely to suﬀer
from a re-identiﬁcation attack than if it was issued only once. Similarly, if a
query has ﬁve words in common with a previous query, it is more likely to be
retrieved than if it has only one.
To implement LAM, we use the similarity metric designed for SimAttack.
This metric takes the two previous aspects into consideration (i.e., the fre-
quency and the number of common keywords). The algorithm to compute
the similarity metric was presented in Section 3.2.1 with Algorithm 1. It re-
turns a similarity value between a query and a user proﬁle. We consider as user
proﬁle the collection of queries previously sent by the user. Then, we deﬁne
a threshold  above which the query is considered as linkable. This threshold
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varies between 0 and 1. Therefore, we consider that a query with a similarity
value above  is similar enough to its requester’s proﬁle and thus can poten-
tially be de-anonymized by a privacy attack. We present in Section 5.6.2 how
we empirically chose the smoothing factor  (used in Algorithm 1) and the
linkability threshold .
5.4 Deployment
In this section, we detail the deployment of the two assessment modules for
three existing private Web search solutions: Tor, GooPIR, and PEAS. We
summarize this deployment in Figure 41 . The adaptation of Tor sends queries
through the Tor network only if they are assessed as sensitive by SAM. Oth-
erwise, they are sent directly to the search engine. We denote this protection
mechanism by Tor+SAM. The adaptation of GooPIR is similar to Tor: if the
query is sensitive according to SAM, it is protected with fake queries. Other-
wise, it is sent without any fake query. This adapted protection is called in the
following sections GooPIR+SAM. The adaptation of PEAS uses both SAM
and LAM. It works as follows: (i) if the query is identiﬁed as non-sensitive
by SAM, the query is not protected; (ii) if the query is determined as sen-
sitive (by SAM) and non-linkable (by LAM), the query is protected by the
unlinkability protocol of PEAS (i.e., queries are only sent through the privacy
proxy); and (iii), if the query is identiﬁed as sensitive (by SAM) and linkable
(by LAM), the query is protected by the full PEAS solution (the unlinkabil-
ity protocol and the fake queries). One can wonder why in (ii) queries are
protected with the unlinkability protocol and not by generating fake queries.
As these queries are non-linkable, an adversary is not able to de-anonymize
them (if they are protected by the unlinkability protocol) whereas, if they
were protected with the obfuscation mechanism, there is no guarantee that
an adversary could not de-obfuscate them. We refer to this solution later on
the manuscript by PEAS+SAM+LAM.
5.5 Experimental Set-up
In this section, we provide the experimental set-up for our evaluation. We
present the datasets of real search queries we used to evaluate the two as-
sessment modules separately and their deployment on existing private Web
search solutions. We formalize the deﬁnition of sensitive queries we followed
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in the evaluation section. Finally, we present the metrics we used to evaluate
the assessment modules and discuss the selection of the four parameters they
used.
5.5.1 Datasets
To properly evaluate our assessment modules, queries from the AOL dataset
need two types of annotations: if they are linkable and if they are semantically
sensitive. The annotation of sensitive queries requires a manual annotation.
Consequently, we constructed two diﬀerent datasets, a small one due to the
manual annotation, and a bigger one to only evaluate LAM. Regarding the
linkability annotation, we use the datasets introduced in Section 3.3.1.4. It
consists of ﬁve datasets with the most active users in the AOL search log
dataset [45]. They contain respectively the 100, 200, 300, 500, and 1,000
most active users.
Regarding the creation of the sensitivity annotated dataset, we conducted
a crowd-sourcing campaign to annotate queries according to their sensitivity
(semantically). However, the annotations made in the crowd-sourcing cam-
paign presented in Section 5.2 cannot be used in our evaluation section, as
we do not know the categories – among the 170 available categories – the
annotators considered as embarrassing. Consequently, we cannot conﬁgure
correctly SAM and thus validate its eﬃciency. To overcome this problem,
we selected ﬁrst the categories we consider as embarrassing and then, with
a new crowd-sourcing campaign, we asked annotators to identify queries re-
lated to such categories. To deﬁne which categories we found sensitive, we
used the deﬁnition provided by Google. It is written in Google’s privacy
policy [3] that sensitive personal information concerns “conﬁdential medical
facts, racial or ethnic origins, political or religious beliefs or sexuality”. Con-
sequently, we consider only queries which refer to “Health/Medical facts”,
“Politics”, “Porn/Sexuality”, and “Religion” as semantically sensitive. In the
new crowd-sourcing campaign we conducted, we asked annotators to classify
queries according to these pre-deﬁned sensitive categories. For this campaign,
we selected the same queries as we selected for the ﬁrst campaign presented
in Section 5.2 (i.e., 10,000 queries issued by 198 users). To validate the qual-
ity of the annotations, we used Fleiss kappa [165] and obtained a score of
0.73. This score corresponds to a substantial agreement (according to Lan-
dis and Kochs scale [166]). In this dataset, queries are distributed as follows:
16.4 for “Health/Medical facts”, 2.2 for “Politics”, 12.3 for “Porn/Sexual-
ity”, 3.9 for “Religion” and 65.3 for “Other”. Consequently, we obtained
a dataset of 3,473 sensitive queries and 6,527 non-sensitive queries (seman-
tically). Compared to the ﬁrst annotated dataset obtained in Section 5.2,
this new dataset contained two times more sensitive queries (3,473 sensitive
queries versus 1,574). This means that a priori the users involved in the crowd-
sourcing campaign do not consider that all queries related to health, politics,
porn, and religion are sensitive. Furthermore, to evaluate the deployment
of the assessment modules on real solutions, we also annotated these queries
in terms of linkability. As a result, we obtained a dataset of 10,000 queries
annotated according to their sensitivity (semantically) and their linkability.
5.5.2 Embarrassing Categories
To set up SAM, users have to indicate a list of categories they consider as sen-
sitive. For our evaluation, we deﬁne semantically sensitive queries as queries
that refer to “Health/Medical facts”, “Politics”, “Porn/Sexuality”, “Religion”.
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anatomy medicine psychiatry radiology sexuality
dentistry pharmacy psychology religion surgery
health politics psychoanalysis roman catholic theology
Table 9
Categories considered as
embarrassing categories.
In order to have a compliant deﬁnition with the Semantic Assessment Mod-
ule, we need to map these four categories to the 170 categories available in
SAM (see Appendix E). Therefore, we manually identiﬁed 15 categories cor-
responding to our deﬁnition of sensitive queries (see Table 9).
5.5.3 Evaluation Metrics
Our evaluation section contains two types of experiments. We ﬁrst evalu-
ate the assessment modules, and then we analyze their deployment on real
solutions. To evaluate the assessment modules, we deﬁne two metrics: the
recall and the fall-out. The recall is computed as the percentage of sensitive
queries correctly identiﬁed as sensitive while the fall-out is the percentage of
non-sensitive queries identiﬁed as sensitive. More formally, the recall and the
fall-out are deﬁned as follows:
recall =
TP
TP + FN
;
fall-out =
FP
FP + TN
;
where TP is the number of true positives (i.e., semantically sensitive queries
identiﬁed as semantically sensitive), FN is the number of false negatives (i.e.,
semantically sensitive queries identiﬁed as semantically non-sensitive), FP
is the number of false positive (i.e., semantically non-sensitive queries iden-
tiﬁed as semantically sensitive) and TN is the number of true negative (i.e.,
semantically non-sensitive queries identiﬁed as non-sensitive). The recall pro-
vides an insight about the privacy protection (i.e., the percentage of sensitive
query that will be protected), while the fall-out gives an indication of the per-
formance (i.e., the percentage of non-sensitive queries that will be protected).
A perfect module has a recall of 100 and a fall-out of 0.
The recall and the fall-out can be combined in a single metric with the
harmonic mean H between recall and (1  fall-out):
H = 2 (1  fall-out) recall
1  fall-out+ recall :
The best value for the fall-out is 0. Therefore, to have a value compatible with
the recall (which have 1 as best value), we operate the fall-out as (1 fall-out).
This metric put the same weight on the recall and the fall-out. Nevertheless,
as our objective is to improve the performance without impacting the user
privacy, it might be interesting to deﬁne a metric that puts more weight on
the recall than the fall-out. Similarly to the F score, we deﬁne the J score:
J = (1 + 
2) (1  fall-out) recall
2  (1  fall-out) + recall :
This measure gives  times more importance to the recall than the fall-out.
5.5.4 Creating the dictionary D used by SAM
Even though WordNet contains a reference to a large number of words (i.e.,
147,278 unique words for the version 3.0), it does not contain all possible
SAM and LAM, Identifying Sensitive Queries to Improve the Eﬃciency of Private Web Search Solutions 109
words. Therefore, if a query q contains some keywords that are not in Word-
Net, its correct categories cannot be found. To solve this issue, SAM uses a
dictionary D that contains external sets of terms. These terms are grouped by
categories such that if a keyword in the query q is included in a set of terms
associated with the category c, SAM deduces that the query q is related to
the category c. For the experimentation, we use two diﬀerent sets of terms:
a set of medical terms2 and a set of pornographic terms2. These two sets of
terms allow SAM to identify slang words contained in porn-related queries
or speciﬁc diseases contained in health queries.
5.6 Evaluation
We ﬁrst evaluate how SAM and LAM identiﬁes semantically sensitive queries
and linkable queries. Then, we analyze the impact of deploying these two
modules on existing private Web search solutions: Tor, GooPIR, and PEAS.
The evaluation employs the machine learning attack to (i) deﬁne the notion
of linkable queries and (ii) test the robustness of private Web search solutions.
We note that SimAttack could have been used but, as LAM and SimAttack
identify linkable queries with the same similarity metric, using SimAttack
could have led to a bias. In addition, Chapter 3 showed that SimAttack and
ML Attack have similar results (even though SimAttack is slightly better).
Therefore, it makes sense to limit our evaluation to ML Attack.
5.6.1 Evaluation of the Semantic Assessment Module
The evaluation of SAM is conducted with the dataset of sensitive queries an-
notated with the crowd-sourcing campaign. For each query in the dataset,
SAM identiﬁes if it belongs to an embarrassing category. Then, by compar-
ing the results of SAM with the ones obtained through the crowd-sourcing
campaign, we compute the recall and the fall-out (metrics presented in Sec-
tion 5.5.3). Nevertheless, to identify semantically sensitive queries, SAM re-
quires to set up two parameters: the maximum number of synsets per key-
word s and the maximum number of categories per synsets c. Figure 42
presents the recall and the fall-out for diﬀerent pairs (s,c), where s and c
varies from 1 to 4. We note the large inﬂuence that the two parameters s
and c have on the performance of SAM: the recall evolves between 68.9
and 91.0 while the fall-out evolves between 18.6 and 59.0. As we can
2Accessible at: https://framabin.org/?8ba726c0801b4c84#
RprFwEJ9jHmcS05rGbpGnAGVyG7roaX1nZ3nwGFzwGI=
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
(1,1)
(2,1)
(3,1)
(4,1)
(1,2)
(2,2)
(3,2)
(4,2)
(1,3)
(2,3)
(3,3)
(4,3)
(1,4)
(2,4)
(3,4)
(4,4)
R
ec
al
l a
nd
 
Fa
ll-
ou
t 
(in
 
%
)
Pairs (#synsets,#categories)
Recall
Fall-out
Figure 42
The recall and the fall-out
obtained with SAM according
to the maximum number of
synsets per keyword s and the
maximum number of categories
per synsets c.
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Number of categories c
1 2 3 4
Number of
synsets s
1 70.0 78.0 80.9 82.2
2 75.7 82.1 83.0 82.9
3 77.5 82.3 82.4 81.8
4 78.3 82.5 82.0 81.1
Table 10
Impact of the number of synsets
and categories on the J3 score
(in ) obtained with SAM.
notice, it is hard to decide which pair of parameters s and c gives the best
trade-oﬀ between recall and fall-out. Our objective is to ﬁnd the pair that
maximizes the recall (which provides an insight about the user protection)
and minimizes the fall-out (which gives an insight about the performance).
To simplify the decision, we can combine the recall and the fall-out in a single
metric through the J score. As our objective is to improve the performance
of private Web search solutions without impacting the user privacy, we chose
the J3 score3. We depict in Table 10 the J3 score for diﬀerent values of s and c.
We chose s and c such as they maximize the J3 score. We note that the best
value (83.0) is obtained for s equals two and c equals three. Therefore, we
chose these values in our experiments. Nevertheless, as these two parame-
ters might be dataset dependent, they might not maximize the J3 score on a
diﬀerent dataset. To solve this issue in practice, users can personalize these
two parameters for their own queries. For a short period of time, they can
annotate the sensitivity of their own queries, and then SAM can set-up s and
c that maximize the J3 score on their own queries.
With s equals two and c equals three, we obtain a recall of 87.9 and a
fall-out of 44.7. Consequently, SAM identiﬁes a large number of seman-
tically sensitive queries (87.9) and misclassiﬁes a reasonable number of se-
mantically non-sensitive queries (44.7). In practice, this means that SAM
divides by two the number of semantically non-sensitive queries protected
without signiﬁcantly degrading the level of protection (only 12.1 of seman-
tically sensitive queries are not identiﬁed by SAM). Nevertheless, depending
on users, 12.1 of semantically sensitive queries not identiﬁed by SAM can
be too much. A better protection can be achieved by giving more weight on
the recall than the fall-out (using for instance the J4 score or the J5 score).
But a better protection is obtained at the cost of the performance. Therefore,
choosing s and c that maximize a J score with a higher  will increase the
recall but also the fall-out. In addition, Figure 42 indicates that for s and c
varying between 1 and 4, the best recall achieved by SAM is 91.0 (for s = 4
and c = 4). As a result, the SAM cannot identify all semantically sensitive
queries.
5.6.2 Evaluation of the Linkability Assessment Module
LAM relies on two parameters: the smoothing factor  (used in the compu-
tation of the similarity metric between the query and the user proﬁle of the
user) and the threshold  (to decide whether a query is linkable). Figure 43
depicts the recall and the fall-out for diﬀerent number of pairs (,) consid-
ering 100 users in the system. We used as ground truth the machine learning
attack (as SimAttack and LAM identify linkable queries with the same simi-
larity metric that could lead to a bias). We note that the recall and the fall-out
3Depending on the trade-oﬀ between privacy and performance desired by users, the importance
of the recall on the fall-out can be adjusted. The J3 score gives three times more importance to the
recall than the fall-out.
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The recall and the fall-out
obtained with LAM according
to the smoothing factor  and
the threshold  (considering 100
users in the system).
vary respectively between 70.2 and 97.7, and between 10.0 and 44.8.
Similarly to SAM, it is not easy to determine which pair (,) gives the best
trade-oﬀ between recall and fall-out. Therefore, we study the J3 score to de-
termine the best parameters  and . Table 11 presents the J3 score for several
values of  and . We can see that multiple pairs imply a J3 score close to
its maximum value (92.6). For instance, LAM obtains a J3 score of 92.6,
92.4, 92.4, and 92.5, for  equal 0.3 and  respectively equal 0.4, 0.5,
0.6, and 0.7. Consequently, for a value of  varying between 0.4 and 0.7
and a  equal 0.3, the J3 score is relatively stable. We note that the J3 score
is maximal for  = 0:4 and  = 0:3. It corresponds to a recall of 96.2
and a fall-out of 30.8. These two metrics indicate that (i) linkable queries
are correctly identiﬁed by LAM and (ii) the fraction of non-linkable queries
misclassiﬁed by LAM is rather small. We compute the J3 score for datasets
that contain diﬀerent numbers of users (i.e., 200, 300, 500 and 1,000 users).
We ﬁnd that  = 0:4 and  = 0:3 is the pair of values that also maximizes
the J3 score on these datasets. For that reason, we use these two parameters
in our experiments.
We purse the evaluation of LAM by studying the recall and the fall-out
for diﬀerent numbers of users (from 100 to 1,000 users), as the linkability of a
query depends on the number of users in the system. If we consider more user
proﬁles, it is harder for an adversary to retrieve the right user proﬁle. Figure 44
shows the performance of LAM for diﬀerent numbers of users. The results
show that the recall and the fall-out increase with the number of users in the
system. This can be explained by the fact that increasing the number of users
in the system decreases the number of linkable queries. For 100 users, LAM
correctly identiﬁes 94.9 of linkable queries while for 1,000 users, the recall
Threshold 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Smoothing
Factor 
0.2 88.5 84.8 74.6 63.7 54.5
0.3 92.3 92.0 84.7 71.8 61.8
0.4 92.0 92.6 89.1 75.7 67.6
0.5 91.5 92.4 90.2 77.5 71.4
0.6 91.2 92.4 90.2 82.1 73.3
0.7 90.7 92.5 91.0 83.0 77.8
0.8 90.6 92.1 91.3 83.9 78.6
Table 11
Impact of the thresholds  and 
on the J3 score (in ) obtained
with LAM (considering 100
users in the system).
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Impact of the number of users
on the recall and the fall-out
obtained using the Linkability
Assessment Module.
increases up to 98.2. Consequently, LAM identiﬁes very well the linkable
queries. Nevertheless, the recall needs to be appreciated with the fall-out.
We note that the fall-out is relatively high. For 100 users, LAM achieves a
fall-out of 30.8 that increases to 39.6 considering 1,000 users. In practice,
this means that LAM misclassiﬁes a signiﬁcant proportion of non-linkable
queries (more than one third). Therefore, the gain in terms of performance
is not optimal, but at least the user protection is well preserved.
5.6.3 Impact of Using SAM and LAM on Existing Private Web
Search Solutions
In this section, we evaluate the deployment of SAM and LAM on three exist-
ing solutions: Tor, GooPIR and PEAS. Our evaluation assesses two criteria:
the privacy protection and the eﬃciency of the adaptation.
5.6.3.1 Tor
The adaptation of Tor with SAM detects semantically sensitive queries to
only protecting these queries. Therefore, semantically non-sensitive queries
are no longer protected. We depict in Table 12 the impact on the privacy
protection of adapting Tor with SAM. The results show that the adaptation
slightly decreases the user protection, as the adversary is able to de-anonymize
8.7 more queries. But, if we compute the relative loss, it corresponds to a
loss of 28.5. This increase corresponds to semantically sensitive queries that
are no longer protected by Tor due to SAM (i.e., sensitive queries identify
as semantically non-sensitive by SAM). Furthermore, if ML Attack correctly
de-anonymizes a larger proportion of queries, it necessarily misclassiﬁes less
queries. Therefore, adapting PEAS with SAM increases the precision. As
shown by Table 12, the precision increases by 10 (or 30.3, if we focus on
the relative loss). Moreover, adapting Tor improves its performance: Instead
Recall Precision
Tor 30.5% 33.0%
Tor+SAM 39.2% 43.0%
Absolute loss 8.7% 10.0%
Relative loss 28.5% 30.3%
Table 12
Comparison between the privacy
protection oﬀered by Tor and
Tor+SAM.
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Number of fake queries k
1 3 5 7 Average
GooPIR 72.1% 62.5% 59.0% 56.1% 62.4%
GooPIR+SAM 77.9% 69.2% 65.9% 63.1% 69.0%
Absolute loss 5.7% 6.7% 7.0% 7.1% 6.6%
Relative loss 8.0% 10.7% 11.7% 12.5% 10.6%
Table 13
Comparison between the
protection oﬀered by GooPIR
and GooPIR+SAM.
of protecting 10,000 queries, TOR+SAM only protects 5,971 queries. Its per-
formance is thus improved by 40.3. Such a gain has a positive impact on
users and relays, as the latter performs less cryptographic operations, and ex-
changes less messages.
5.6.3.2 GooPIR
The adaptation of GooPIR is similar to Tor. If SAM identiﬁes a query as
semantically sensitive, GooPIR obfuscates this query with fake queries; oth-
erwise, the query is no longer protected. We measure the impact of adapting
GooPIR with SAM. As shown in Table 13, the adapted version of GooPIR
decreases the user protection by 6.6 on average. This means that the ad-
versary succeeds in retrieving more semantically sensitive queries with the
adapted version: the recall of the attack increases from 62.4 for GooPIR to
69.0 for GooPIR+SAM. Nevertheless, this loss is relatively low compared
to the recall obtained with the attack. On average, the adversary retrieves
62.4 of user queries and thus an increase of 6.6 does not change the order
of magnitude for the recall (there is a relative loss of 10.6 on average). Be-
sides, we note that the loss increases with the number of fake queries. For one
fake query, there is a loss of 5.7 that increases to 7.1 for seven fake queries.
Indeed, semantically sensitive queries identiﬁed as non-sensitive (and thus
non-protected by GooPIR+SAM) do not necessarily modify the recall of the
attack, as they would have been retrieved by the attack anyway. But, in-
creasing the number of fake queries, gives a better protection to queries, and
therefore less semantically sensitive queries are retrieved by the attack.
Regarding the impact in terms of performance, the use of SAM signiﬁ-
cantly increases the performance of GooPIR. GooPIR+SAM protects 5,971
queries (instead of 10,000 queries originally). Therefore, the number of fake
queries generated by GooPIR+SAM decreases by 40.3. As a result, the
adaptation of GooPIR produces less computation on the user-side. It also
decreases the number of queries processed by the search engine.
5.6.3.3 PEAS
The adaptation of PEAS uses SAM and LAM to decrease the number of pro-
tected queries. We conduct experiments to evaluate the impact that the adap-
tation has on PEAS. Table 14 compares the privacy protection obtained with
PEAS and its adaptation with SAM and LAM. We observe that, the adapta-
tion of PEAS makes the adversary able to retrieve more semantically sensitive
queries (on average, there is an absolute loss of 11.4). In comparison with the
percentage of queries originally retrieved by the adversary (on average 11.9),
obtaining 11.4 more queries doubles the number of queries retrieved by the
adversary. In addition, we note that the privacy loss increases with the num-
ber of fake queries: for one fake query, there is an absolute loss of 10.7
while, for seven fake queries, the absolute loss increases to 11.8. As already
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Number of fake queries k
1 3 5 7 Average
Recall
PEAS4 18.9% 12.1% 9.2% 7.6% 11.9%
PEAS+SAM+LAM 29.6% 23.5% 20.9% 19.4% 23.5%
Absolute loss 10.7% 11.4% 11.7% 11.8% 11.6%
Relative loss 56.6% 94.2% 127,2% 155.3% 97.5%
Precision
PEAS4 17.4% 11.1% 7.8% 8.0% 11.1%
PEAS+SAM+LAM 29.1% 23.6% 21.2% 20.3% 23.5%
Absolute loss 11.7% 12.5% 13.4% 12.3% 12.4%
Relative loss 67.2% 112.6% 171.8% 153.8% 111.7%
4We note that these results for PEAS are lower than the ones obtained in Figure 26. The diﬀerence
is due to diﬀerent datasets. On Chapter 4, we consider the mean over three datasets; each of them
contains 100 users. These 300 users represent the 300 most active users in the AOL dataset. On this
chapter, we consider a dataset of 198 manually selected users that issued at least one sensitive query.
Therefore, as explained in Chapter 3, considering more users and considering less active users decrease
the eﬃciency of the attack.
Table 14
Comparison between the
protection oﬀered by PEAS and
PEAS+SAM+LAM.
explained in the previous section, the proportion of semantically sensitive
queries retrieved by the attack decreases with the number of fake queries and
therefore, this lead to a rise of the loss. Furthermore, we observe that the adap-
tation of PEAS increases the precision of the attack. On average, the precision
is 12.4 higher for PEAS+SAM+LAM than PEAS (or 111.7 higher consid-
ering the relative loss). Overall, we deduce that the adaptation of PEAS with
SAM and LAM noticeably impacts the user protection.
Nevertheless, in terms of performance, the adaptation has a positive im-
pact. Instead of sending 10,000 queries through the privacy proxy, the adap-
tation of PEAS protections only 5,971 queries (gain of 40.3). In addition, in-
stead of obfuscating 10,000 queries, PEAS+SAM+LAM generates fake queries
for only 3,348 queries (gain of 66.5). As a result, the adaptation of PEAS
dramatically decreases the cost of protecting queries: the users and the relays
execute less cryptographic operations, the users generate less fake queries and
therefore, the search engine processes less queries.
5.7 Discussion
This section discusses several aspects regarding the use of SAM and LAM
with private Web search solutions. Firstly, we analyze a potential issue that
could lead to a re-identiﬁcation of users. Then, we discuss the advantages of
an automatic detection of sensitive queries (compared to a manual identiﬁ-
cation). Lastly, we propose an improvement of LAM for indistinguishability
solutions that generate fake queries.
5.7.1 On the Identification of Users’ Identity
One may advocate that to preserve the user anonymity, unlinkability mecha-
nisms have to be used in all user communications. Indeed, it might be argued
that switching an unlinkability mechanism on and oﬀ (due to the adaptation
of the protection) could lead to an identiﬁcation of the user. For instance, the
adversary could track users with ﬁngerprinting methods (e.g., cookies, plug-
ins installed). Nevertheless, as stated in Section 1.3, we consider that our users
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remove all quasi-identiﬁers5. If there is no identiﬁer that allows an adversary
to link anonymous queries to non-anonymous queries, the previous attack is
not feasible. Therefore, under our considerations, switching on and oﬀ the
unlinkability mechanism does not put users in danger.
Furthermore, removing all quasi-identiﬁers prevents an adversary from
grouping queries issued by an identical user. As shown by the AOL scandal,
being able to group queries issued by a single user tends to compromise her
privacy. Indeed, exploiting personal information spreads in her queries might
give enough details to retrieve her identify. As a result, the adaptation of the
unlinkability solution does not compromise the unlinkability property.
5.7.2 On the Advantages of the Assessment Modules
As we have seen in the evaluation section, assessment modules do not cor-
rectly classify sensitive queries. Indeed, such a classiﬁcation is intuitive for
humans (at least for their own queries) but extremely complex for a com-
puter. For that reason, one might argue that users should classify queries
themselves. For instance, we can imagine that users indicate their sensitive
queries through a dedicated button. But a manual identiﬁcation presents
huge drawbacks: (i) users will sometimes choose the wrong classiﬁcation by
accident (sensitive instead of non-sensitive, and vice versa), and (ii) identify-
ing sensitive queries is a restrictive task, so much that users might get tired
of doing it, and therefore always indicate that their queries are sensitive (as
such, users keep a high protection with low interaction). For these two rea-
sons, a manual identiﬁcation of sensitive queries might not necessarily lead
to a better judgment than automatic modules.
5.7.3 On the Adaptation of the Number of Fake Queries
As presented in Section 5.3.4, LAM computes the similarity between the
query and its requester user proﬁle and then decide if the query is linkable
according to a threshold . Nevertheless, this binary decision is not the op-
timal decision to adapt private Web search solutions, especially the ones that
generate fake queries. The current adaptation protects queries by generating
either zero or k fake queries. This speciﬁc type of solution could proﬁt from
a more advanced adaptation; the number of fake queries could evolve accord-
ing to the similarity metric. Such an adaptation would give a better trade-oﬀ
between eﬃciency and privacy protection.
5This thesis does not address countermeasures against ﬁngerprinting methods. Readers who may
be interested in such a question are referred to the literature (e.g., [36]).
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To have a better understanding of the adaptation, we assess, for all queries
in our dataset, the number of fake queries PEAS needs to generate to resist
against ML Attack, and their corresponding similarity value. In Figure 45,
we present the average number of fake queries generated by PEAS according
to the similarity metric between the query and its requester user proﬁle. We
bounded the number of fake queries to seven. The results conﬁrm that the
binary option is not optimal. For instance, queries with a similarity metric
over 0.3 are protected with seven fake queries while, Figure 45 shows that
the number of fake queries can evolve linearly to seven fake queries. Conse-
quently, instead of a binary decision, LAM could return the number of fake
queries that PEAS should generate. To do so, we introduce in LAM a map-
ping between the similarity metric and the number of fake queries. We base
the mapping on the previous empirical results obtained with PEAS. It follows
the function f :
f(S) =
8><>:
kmin if S < 0:3
kmax if S > 0:8
Round

kmin(S Smax)+kmax(Smin S)
Smin Smax

otherwise
We display in Figure 45 the mapping function f . Between 0 and 0.3, we
design LAM to generate kmin fake queries. Then, between 0.3 and 0.8, LAM
computes the number of fake queries with a linear function (evolving from
kmin to kmax) rounded to the nearest integer. Finally, between 0.8 and 1,
LAM returns kmax fake queries. This last range of values does not follow
the empirical results but we assume that above a similarity of 0.8, queries
are likely to be retrieved by an attack and thus, we protect them with kmax
fake queries. Furthermore, we set up by default kmin and kmax to zero and
seven respectively, as these numbers give a good trade-oﬀ between privacy
and performance. Nevertheless, users are able to modify them according to
their requirements (i.e., focusing more on performance or privacy).
We evaluate the adaptation of PEAS with the new version of LAM. Ta-
ble 15 shows the results in terms of privacy protection. We note that the
adaptation of PEAS increases the recall by 15.1. Compared to the previous
version of LAM (see Table 14), the adversary is able to retrieve 3.3 more
queries (22.7 instead of 19.4). Nevertheless, the performance of PEAS in-
creases, as the number of fake queries generated by PEAS is divided by 2.1
(i.e., 23,436 fake queries are generated with the ﬁrst LAM version, while with
the new version, this number drops to 11,075 fake queries). Therefore, the
ﬁrst version of LAM increases the performance of PEAS by 66.5, but the
second version increases its performance by 84.2. As a result, for a small loss
in privacy protection (3.3), the new LAM version increases dramatically the
performance (17.7).
Recall Precision
PEAS 7.6% 8.0%
PEAS+SAM+LAM 22.7% 23.0%
Absolute loss 15.1% 15.0%
Relative loss 198.7% 187.5%
Table 15
Impact on the robustness of
PEAS considering the new
version of LAM that adapts the
number of fake queries.
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5.8 Conclusion
We have seen in this chapter that existing private Web search solutions over-
protect a majority of queries, as most of them are either semantically non-
sensitive or non-linkable. For that reason, we proposed two modules to iden-
tify these two types of sensitivity: the Semantic Assessment Module and the
Linkability Assessment Module. We showed that these modules correctly
identify sensitive queries even though the identiﬁcation of semantically sen-
sitive queries is less accurate than the identiﬁcation of linkable queries (SAM
obtains a recall of 87.9, while LAM obtains a recall of 96.2, for 100 users).
We aimed with these modules to adapt the protection of existing private Web
search solutions. We presented the adaptation of three representative pri-
vate Web search solutions (i.e., Tor, GooPIR, and PEAS) and evaluated their
impact in terms of privacy protection and performance. We showed that
adapting private Web search solutions practically halved the cost of protect-
ing queries while the user protection is, in the worst case, divided by two.
These assessments modules dramatically improve the performance of the
current private Web search solutions. Nevertheless, they also degrade the user
privacy protection. A ﬁrst reason is that our experiments were performed on
198 users; a higher number of users (like in practice) would have less impact
on the privacy protection, as privacy attacks retrieve less queries for a higher
number of users. In addition, the decrease in the privacy protection is also
due to SAM. This module does not identify all semantically sensitive queries.
Improving SAM is not easy because of the constraints on the running envi-
ronment (i.e., no distant services, and limited resources). But, as the current
implementation is relatively simple, there is room for improvement. For in-
stance, the set of categories on which SAM bases its decision contains a lot of
noise (i.e., many retrieved categories are not relevant for the query). Conse-
quently, a future work should focus on improving the relevance of these cate-
gories. In addition, misspelled words in queries prevent SAM from correctly
identifying categories. One could introduce another pre-processing step to
solve those misspelled words. Finally, queries often contain slang words or
speciﬁc words that are not covered by WordNet. We use a dictionary of medi-
cal terms and pornographic terms to identities such words. Nevertheless, this
approach does not cover all possible words and a more advanced techniques
should be considered.
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Conclusion and Perspectives
6.1 Conclusion
Controlling her personal data is becoming increasingly important in today’s
world. The technological progress has made the processing of data easily acces-
sible for all online providers. These providers collect and analyze data from
billions of users. They mainly use it for targeted advertising, but one can
imagine worst scenarios like selling sensitive data to insurance companies.
This issue with Web providers concerns in particular search engines that re-
ceive billions of search queries every day. The processing of this data reveals
many personal information about their users. Several solutions have been
published in the literature allowing users to control the usage of their per-
sonal data. In this thesis, we studied such a type of solutions. More precisely,
we focused on solutions that do not require any modiﬁcations on existing
search engines. Therefore, we excluded from the scope of this thesis private
information retrieval (PIR) protocols, as they require search engines from
implementing speciﬁc recommendation algorithms based on homomorphic
encryption. Furthermore, our study considered an adversary interested in col-
lecting user queries. We assumed that this adversary was able to previously
collect non-protected user queries, i.e., before the users employ a privacy-
protection mechanism.
6.1.1 Robustness of Existing Private Web Search Solutions
In the ﬁrst part of the thesis, we aimed to assess the robustness of the existing
private Web search solutions. For this purpose, we developed SimAttack, an
attack that breaks the protection oﬀered by all types of private Web search
solutions: unlinkability solutions, indistinguishability solutions, and indis-
tinguishability solutions run on top of unlinkability solutions. SimAttack
relies on a similarity metric between a query and a user proﬁle (i.e., set of
queries previously collected by the adversary). To ﬁnd the identity of the re-
quester that issued an anonymous query (case of an unlinkability solution),
it identiﬁes among all available user proﬁles the most likely one, while for
queries protected with fake queries (case of an indistinguishability solution),
it retrieves the initial query by ﬁnding the query that is the most related to
the user proﬁle. We showed that SimAttack outperforms similar attacks pub-
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lished in the literature. It succeeds in breaking a larger proportion of queries
in a much lower amount of time. For instance, considering unlinkability
solutions with 1,000 users, the recall of SimAttack is 4.3 higher than the
one obtained with the machine learning attack (competitor from the litera-
ture), while SimAttack divides the execution time by 158. In addition, SimAt-
tack targets protection mechanisms that had never been attacked so far (e.g.,
GooPIR).
Furthermore, we conducted an analysis of the robustness of state-of-the-
art solutions using SimAttack. We established that none of the existing pri-
vate Web search solutions are satisfactory to protect users. We empirically
proved that for each tested solution (i.e., unlinkability solutions, TrackMeNot,
and GooPIR) an adversary that has previously-collected queries is able to
break these protections and retrieve a large proportion of user queries. For in-
stance, considering GooPIR, an adversary retrieved with SimAttack 50.6 of
queries (case of seven fake queries). Moreover, we investigated the combina-
tion of two types of private Web search solutions and thus, analyzed the pro-
tection oﬀered by TrackMeNot over an unlinkability solution and GooPIR
over an unlinkability solution. We conﬁrmed an intuitive thought that com-
bining two independent solutions gives a better protection to users. For in-
stance, by using GooPIR over an unlinkability solution, the recall dropped
from 50.6 to 27.6. As we can notice, SimAttack was still able to retrieve a
non-negligible number of protected queries. We can therefore conclude that
none of these solutions protects users in a satisfactory manner.
6.1.2 A New Efficient Private Web Search Solution
As no solution successfully protects users, we designed PEAS, a new private
Web search solution to overcome this problem. The novelty of our approach
consists in combining an indistinguishability solution on top of an unlinka-
bility protocol. This enables a better protection by integrating the two types
of solution together. The indistinguishability part relies on the generation of
fake queries, while the unlinkability part is composed of two nodes: a receiver
and an issuer. To mislead the adversary about the identity of the requester,
the indistinguishability part aims at generating, in a privacy-preserving way,
fake queries already issued by other users in the system. For the unlinkability
solutions, our new protocol aims at being eﬃcient as well as robust.
We empirically assess PEAS using a dataset of real queries released by AOL
in 2006. The privacy evaluation of PEAS was conducted using SimAttack
(i.e., the ﬁrst contribution of this thesis) and a machine learning attack. We
showed that PEAS outperforms all existing solutions in terms of privacy; for
instance, it reduces the number of de-anonymized queries by 26.6 (com-
pared to an onion routing baseline) and by 18.4 (compared to GooPIR over
an unlinkability solution). Moreover, we established that the indistinguisha-
bility part of PEAS does not strongly impact the quality of the results. Due
to an eﬃcient ﬁltering mechanism, PEAS removes most of the irrelevant re-
sults (i.e., results related to the fake queries). On average, only 4.7 of the
results displayed by PEAS are irrelevant. Finally, regarding the performance
of PEAS, we determined that PEAS is more eﬃcient than other protections
mechanisms: Compared to onion routing, it has a maximum throughput 3.1
times higher. Overall, PEAS achieves an excellent user protection (i.e., only
few queries are still sensitive to the privacy attacks) without signiﬁcantly de-
grading the user experience (i.e., the quality of the results and the latency are
not strongly impacted).
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6.1.3 Adapting the Protection to the Query Sensitivity
Existing private Web search solutions do not adapt their protection mech-
anism according to the query. All queries are protected in a similar way:
Queries related to a sensitive topic receive the same protection than non-
sensitive queries. Therefore many resources are wasted to protect queries that
should not be protected. Due to this reason, we investigated the possibility to
adapt all private Web search solutions according to the query sensitivity. By
sensitive queries, we identify two types of sensitivity: queries related to an em-
barrassing topic (e.g., sex, diseases) and linkable queries (i.e., queries that suf-
fer from privacy attacks). Consequently, we design two modules to identify
these two types of sensitivity: SAM and LAM. SAM uses WordNet to catego-
rize queries and determines if they belong to a sensitive category, while LAM
exploits previous queries sent by the user to decide if the query is linkable
(i.e., close to the previous queries). As we consider the privacy protection as
more important than the performance, we conﬁgured these modules to better
identify sensitive queries than non-sensitive queries (i.e., some queries could
be overprotected). We showed that these modules correctly identify sensitive
queries even though the identiﬁcation of semantically sensitive queries is less
accurate (SAM obtains a recall of 87.9) than the identiﬁcation of linkable
queries (LAM obtains a recall of 96.2, for 100 users).
We deployed the two modules on existing private Web search solutions.
Their deployment does not require a great eﬀort. For most private Web search
solutions, it introduces a preliminary step to assess the sensitivity of the query
and, according to the results, either protect the query or send it directly to
the search engine. The empirical evaluation of their deployment exhibits the
huge gain in terms of performance. In particular PEAS, which combines
an indistinguishability mechanism on top of an unlinkability protocol, dra-
matically improve its performance (up to 66.5). Nevertheless, the adapta-
tion mechanism decreases the user protection, as some sensitive queries are
not correctly detected by SAM and LAM. Therefore, as such queries are no
longer protected, the user protection decreases. On average, the recall ob-
tained with ML Attack against PEAS increases from 11.9 to 23.5. Conse-
quently, SAM and LAM are aimed mainly at people that agree to trade part
of their privacy for better performance. Privacy-protection mechanisms in-
crease the time waited by users to obtain their results, therefore with these
modules this time is closer to the one obtained when no protection is used,
i.e. almost instantaneously.
6.2 Perspectives
We present several perspectives for future work. First, we discuss the settings
of this thesis (our evaluation and our adversary model). Then, we give some
perspectives regarding the three contributions presented in this thesis.
6.2.1 Dataset Employed and Adversary Model
The evaluations conducted in this thesis used the AOL dataset. This dataset
was created in 2006. Nevertheless, the Web is constantly changing: new
technologies (e.g., html5, css3, jQuery), new services (e.g., social networks),
and new content. These evolutions impact users’ behavior as they have to
continuously adapt themselves to these changes. Consequently, there will
deﬁnitely be a diﬀerence between a dataset of queries from 2006 and one
from 2017. Therefore, we might wonder about the inﬂuence of the time on
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the user protection. Moreover, the dataset published by AOL does not reﬂect
the large quantity of data collected by current search engines. First, it only
contains three months of search queries while search engines have a larger
query history. Next, the AOL dataset contains few active users (users that
issued a signiﬁcant number of queries). Lastly, millions of users are querying
search engines every day while we could only extract from the AOL dataset a
maximum of 15,000 active users. Due to the lack of other available data, we
used the AOL dataset for our evaluation. Similar solutions in the literature
have done the same (e.g., in [47], 60 AOL users were used in the evaluation,
while [49] uses 100 AOL users). Search engines have larger datasets (used for
internal purposes) but they do not publish them. Further experiments should
be conducted with the help of the search engines to beneﬁt from these larger
datasets.
We consider in this work an adversary that previously-collected queries
about all users employing a privacy-preserving mechanism. Therefore, we
assume in our attacks that the adversary has prior queries for each user at-
tacked. Nevertheless, for the unlinkability solutions, the adversary has no
information about the current requesters and thus, it might be hard for an
adversary to use the correct user proﬁles in the attack. This is even harder if we
consider a more realistic scenario where search engines receive queries from
millions of users every day. Such a hypothesis supposes that the adversary
is able to identify among this large number of users, the few that are using
the unlinkability solution. A future work should focus on the feasibility of
the hypothesis. For instance, it might be possible to retrieve these users by
identifying the ones that stop querying the search engines. Besides, it is likely
that these users might have issued queries related to privacy protection.
Furthermore, we consider an adversary who focuses her eﬀort on the ex-
ploitation of previously collected queries. Nevertheless, such attacks do not
consider speciﬁc ﬂaws in the protection mechanisms. For instance, regard-
ing indistinguishability solutions, there is a question of distinguishing fake
queries from real ones. SimAttack solves this problem from a semantical
point of view: comparing keywords from fake queries and real ones. Never-
theless, we can imagine an attack that exploits other criteria: keyword order,
co-occurrence between keywords. Identifying precisely these criteria and ex-
ploiting them might enhance SimAttack.
6.2.2 Privacy Attacks
We have seen in this thesis that privacy attacks suﬀer from a high execution
time. This is mainly due to the number of features exploited by the attacks.
Queries are represented in a vector space model and thus a large number of
keywords implies a large number of features. This can be overcome by a di-
mensional space reduction (e.g., using Singular Value Decomposition [153]).
Consequently, in terms of execution time, introducing a preliminary step to
decrease the number of features will speed up the attacks. But the dimen-
sional reduction will also aﬀect the results of the attack. From the dimen-
sional reduction, we can expect a better identiﬁcation of users, as the singular
values often removes noise and linearly dependent elements [173, 174].
Similarly, one could investigate the use of word embeddings to represent
keywords [175]. Most word embedding techniques rely on a neural network
architecture (e.g., Word2Vec [152]). Word embeddings map in a continuous
vector space semantically similar words to nearby points. Therefore, such rep-
resentation contains more information than a basic dictionary of words used
in the current representation of queries in SimAttack. Due to this reason, rep-
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resenting queries with word embeddings would likely improve the eﬃciency
of SimAttack.
Another limitation with privacy attacks is that they only exploit keywords.
They do not consider external information (e.g., the semantic relation be-
tween keywords) or exploit timing information (e.g., workers do not use
their home computer during working hours). A more advanced feature se-
lection could lead to better distinction between users. In addition, queries
are often issued in search sessions. They correspond to a short period of
time where users reﬁne their queries to obtain a more relevant answer to their
problems. Existing works (e.g., [176, 177]) have shown that it is possible to
identify search sessions as these queries share common keywords. Neverthe-
less, current attacks do not exploit such a technique and consider all queries
independently. By identifying search sessions, current attacks could increase
their performance: (i) a necessary condition for these queries is that they have
been issued by the same user, and (ii) identifying such search sessions will re-
veal more information about the initial requester than processing each query
independently.
Last but not least, current attacks only exploit a query history of users.
As we have seen in Chapter 3, SimAttack was not able to identify some fake
queries or some requesters because the keywords of the targeted queries were
never used in the query history. Viejo et al. [75, 76] designed a privacy pro-
tection based on user proﬁles extracted from social networks. Therefore, we
can imagine that SimAttack could similarly take advantage of social networks.
The data public available on social networks could enrich the query history
collected on users. For instance, the terms used in tweets or Facebook status
could be taken into consideration in the computation of the similarity metric.
A more advanced metric could improve the eﬃciency of SimAttack.
6.2.3 Private Web Search Solutions
The unlinkability protocol suggested in PEAS requires the nodes to be honest.
This means that they cannot deviate from the protocol. It has been shown,
through the Tor project, that in practice it is not the case [178, 179]. For in-
stance, some exit nodes modify the search engine answer returned to the users.
To overcome this issue, the unlinkability protocol should be enhanced with
accountability techniques (e.g., [180, 181]) such that nodes could record all
transactions they send and receive to periodically audit each other and verify
that the transactions made by the nodes were correct. In particular, during
the audition, they can check the integrity of the search engine answer previ-
ously processed by the audited node. To do so, they re-issue the user query
and compare the two versions. If there is a diﬀerence, they have to check if it
is due to the search engine (its answer might not be deterministic) or to the au-
dited node (if it introduces or modiﬁes intentionally the answer). Therefore,
misbehaving nodes could be detected and removed from the system.
Furthermore, in this thesis, we established that the combination of an un-
linkability solution with an indistinguishability solution improves the user
protection. Nevertheless, the weakness of such a protection is the fake queries.
If they are not realistic, users are not well protected. But, generating realis-
tic fake data is a diﬃcult task. In this thesis, we suggested that fake queries
should be generated from previous user queries. But, as we have seen in the
evaluation section of PEAS, the clique extraction step is computationally ex-
pensive. Therefore, works should be conducted to improve the generation of
fake queries at a lower cost. As explained in Chapter 4, we want to gener-
ate fake queries that (i) are plausible and that (ii) refer to real users. Social
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networks (e.g., Twitter [182]) can be an alternative source to generate fake
queries. They contain real data produced by real users. Therefore, as the data
is publicly available, it is easily extractable. Such a source would decrease the
cost, as it avoids the extraction of the maximal cliques. Nevertheless, as mes-
sages on social networks diﬀer from user queries, further experiments should
investigate if such a data can replace the PEAS group proﬁle.
6.2.4 Adaptation of Existing Solutions
The identiﬁcation of semantically sensitive queries is a diﬃcult task as many
factors inﬂuence the meaning of a query, in particular its context. Never-
theless, the results obtained with SAM are relatively good, especially if we
compare them to the recall achieved by query categorizers (e.g., the winner
of the KDD competition [135] has a recall of 47.9). But, in terms of se-
curity, SAM divides by two the user protection in the worst case. A future
work could improve the detection of sensitive queries to reinforce the pri-
vacy protection. Instead of relying on WordNet [82] and XWND [170], one
could use machine learning techniques to automatically learn what the users
consider as sensitive. Therefore, such algorithms do not require users to spec-
ify categories they found sensitive, but instead they have to annotate queries.
Then, by training a binary classiﬁer on these annotated queries, we obtain a
classiﬁer that distinguishes sensitive queries from non-sensitive ones. As an-
notating queries is less subjective than choosing categories, machine learning
could improve the detection of sensitive queries.
Regarding the notion of sensitivity, we consider in this thesis semanti-
cally sensitive queries and linkable queries. Nevertheless, it is also possible to
consider a third type of queries: A query itself might not contain sensitive in-
formation, but linked with other queries, it might disclose new information
about the user. For instance, it has been shown in [22] that the age of a user
or her gender can be inferred from her queries even though they do not con-
tain such information explicitly. Consequently, a future work should focus
on inferring straight-forward information (e.g., age, gender, location, wealth,
health, politics) to validate the feasibility of such an attack. Besides, detecting
such a piece of information could help in the user protection. For instance,
fake queries should be generated to fake the values retrieved by the inference
attack (e.g., modify the age). A naive solution is to design fake queries with
contrary information, e.g., a fake query about a very expensive product for
a young man and another fake query about an unexpressive product for an
old lady. The inference attack could be used to monitor the noise introduced
with the fake queries and adapt it according to the user requirements.
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Stopwords
We display below the stopwords we removed from queries used in our evalu-
ation.
’s below ho others underneath
I beneath how otherwise unless
a beside however our unlike
aboard besides i ours until
about between if ourselves unto
above bewteen in out up
across beyond inside outside upon
after bi insofar outta uppon
afterwards both instead over us
against but into per via
agin by it rather vis-a-vis
ago ca. its regardless vis-‡-vis
agreed-upon can itself round we
ah de la se well
alas des le she what
albeit despite les should whatever
all do lest since whatsoever
all-over down lieu so when
almost due like some whenever
along durin me someone where
alongside during minus something whereas
altho each moreover than wherefore
although eh my that whereupon
amid either myself the whether
amidst en near their which
among every near-by them whichever
amongst ever nearer themselves while
an everyone nearest then who
and everything neither there whoever
another except nevertheless therefore whom
any far next these whose
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anyone fer no they why
anything for nor thine with
around from not this withal
as go nothing those within
aside goddamn notwithstanding thou without
astride goody o though ye
at gosh o’er through yea
atop half of throughout yeah
avec have oﬀ thru yes
away he on till yet
back hell once to yonder
be her one together you
because herself oneself toward your
before hey only towardes yours
beforehand him onto towards yourself
behind himself or uh yourselves
behynde his other under
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Complementary Experiments on
SimAttack
In this appendix, we present further experiments we performed with SimAt-
tack. These experiments target unlinkability solutions, TMN, GooPIR, TMN
over an unlinkability solution and GooPIR over an unlinkability solution.
We ﬁrst present an analysis about how the number of previously-collected
queries impacts the results of SimAttack. Then, we depict speciﬁc experi-
ments we run for unlinkability solutions and GooPIR over an unlinkability
solution.
B.1 Impact of the Size of the User Profiles
As current search engines collect all user queries, we assume in this thesis an
adversary that has been collecting user queries, in particular to de-anonymize
queries or retrieve (among fake queries) the initial one. In this section, we
evaluate how the number of previously-collected queries inﬂuences the re-
sults of SimAttack. We could use diﬀerent datasets that contain users who
issued diﬀerent quantities of queries. Nevertheless, comparing datasets with
diﬀerent users is not easy as many statistical properties (e.g., term frequency,
topics) might inﬂuence the results. For that reason, we consider only one
dataset AOL100, and vary the size of training set by considering diﬀerent pro-
portions of queries. We select successively the ﬁrst 0, 5, 10, 20, 40,
60, 80, 100 of queries contained in the training set.
B.1.1 Unlinkability Solutions
We measure the inﬂuence of the number of previously-collected queries on
the results of SimAttack. Figure 46 depicts the precision and the recall of
SimAttack considering the dataset AOL100. The results show that the eﬃ-
ciency of the attack decreases according to the proportion of queries consid-
ered in user proﬁles. Considering the full training set provides a recall of
36.7 while considering only 5 of queries drops this value to 16.9. Simi-
lar results are obtained for the precision: a drop from 42.9 to 25.5. These
results illustrate that exploiting less accurate user proﬁles (i.e., preliminary
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The eﬃciency of the attack
decreases according to the
proportion of queries considered
in user proﬁles.
information about users) makes it harder for the adversary to de-anonymize
queries. Nevertheless, we note that, when the proportion of queries in user
proﬁles drops from 100 to 20, the number of de-anonymized queries de-
creases by 8.7. Therefore, removing 80 of queries does not signiﬁcantly
impact the results. Furthermore, we note that no query in the training set
makes SimAttack unable to de-anonymize any queries. Indeed, SimAttack
bases its re-identiﬁcation on previously-collected queries. Therefore, without
past queries, SimAttack cannot de-anonymize any queries.
B.1.2 TrackMeNot
We mesure the impact that the number of queries owned by the adversary
has on the TMN protection. We depict in Figure 47 the precision and the
recall of SimAttack for the dataset TMN100 considering its training set vary-
ing from 0 to 100. The results show that exploiting smaller user proﬁles
makes it harder for SimAttack to identify user queries. For instance, if we
consider the full user proﬁles, SimAttack identiﬁes 36.8 or 45.3 of queries
(with and without exploiting the RSS feeds, respectively) while this number
drops to 12.6 or 15.3 if we consider only 5 of the query history in the
user proﬁles. However, considering smaller user proﬁle makes the precision
increases: decreasing the training set from 100 to 5 increases the preci-
sion from 21.7 to 92. Indeed, with less accurate user proﬁles, SimAttack
does not have enough information to correctly identify user queries. Conse-
quently, increasing the size of user proﬁles increases the recall of SimAttack,
but also decreases the precision as more queries get misclassiﬁed.
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Exploiting smaller user proﬁles
makes it harder for SimAttack
to identify user queries.
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GooPIR ensures a better
protection if the adversary has
only a smaller and less accurate
user proﬁle.
B.1.3 GooPIR
To measure the inﬂuence of the number of previously-collected queries on
the eﬃciency of SimAttack against GooPIR, we assess the performance of
SimAttack for a varying number of queries in the training set (from 0 to
100). Figure 48 depicts for AOL100 dataset, the percentage of identiﬁed
queries according to the ratio of the query history considered in the user pro-
ﬁle. The results show that GooPIR ensures a better protection if the adversary
has only a smaller and less accurate user proﬁle. For instance, when 7 fake
queries are generated by GooPIR and only 5 of the query history is consid-
ered in the user proﬁles, SimAttack retrieves 19.3 of the initial query while
this percentage increases to 50.6 if 100 of the query history is considered
in the user proﬁles. Consequently, if this proﬁle is less accurate, fewer user
queries can be identiﬁed.
Furthermore, changing the number of fake queries generated by GooPIR
impacts the percentage of identiﬁed queries, only if the adversary has collected
a signiﬁcant number of queries to create accurate user proﬁles. For instance,
adding six fake queries decreases by 9.6 the percentage of query identiﬁed
when the full query history is taken into account. This percentage drops to
3.4 when only 10 of the query history is considered.
Lastly, as SimAttack bases its identiﬁcation exclusively on the user proﬁle,
if there is no query in the user proﬁles, the recall obtains by SimAttack is 0.
B.1.4 TMN Over an Unlinkability Solution
We evaluate the inﬂuence that the size of the user proﬁles owned by the adver-
sary has on SimAttack when TrackMeNot is combined with an unlinkability
solution. Figure 49 depicts the recall and the precision of SimAttack with
and without using the RSS feeds. From the results, we deduce that smaller
user proﬁles decrease the performance. For instance, decreasing the size of
the user proﬁles from 100 to 5 makes SimAttack able to identify 13.8
and 21.7 fewer queries without and with prior knowledge on RSS feeds,
respectively. In addition, the results show that the precision decreases accord-
ing to the size of the user proﬁle: considering from 100 to 5 of the user
proﬁles, the precision loses 51.2 and 15.0, respectively, for SimAttack with
and without prior knowledge on RSS feeds of users. Furthermore, compared
to the results obtained with TrackMeNot alone, the recall is slightly lower due
to the unlinkability solution (e.g., for 5 of the user proﬁles, the recalls are
respectively 6.7 and 12.6 considering no RSS feeds). A similar result is ob-
tained for the precision when the RSS feeds are used (e.g., for 5 of the user
proﬁles, the precisions are respectively 91.9 and 84.1). But, surprisingly,
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Exploiting smaller user proﬁles
makes it harder for SimAttack
to identify user queries.
the precision obtained when the RSS feeds are exploited is very diﬀerent than
TMN alone: for 5 of the user proﬁles, the precision drops receptively from
96.3 to 14.7. As explained Section 3.4.1.4, this is due to a high number of
fake queries misclassiﬁed.
B.1.5 GooPIR Over an Unlinkability Solution
We ﬁnally evaluate the inﬂuence of the size of the user proﬁles on the perfor-
mance of SimAttack when GooPIR is combined with an unlinkability solu-
tion. Figure 50 presents the recall of SimAttack for diﬀerent proportions of
queries in the user proﬁle (from 0 to 100). The results show that GooPIR
over an unlinkability solution protects users’ queries more strongly if the ad-
versary has smaller user proﬁles: for one fake query generated by GooPIR,
SimAttack identiﬁes 16.1 of queries when 5 of the user proﬁle is consid-
ered, while 32.7 of the queries are identiﬁed when 100 of the proﬁle is
considered. Therefore, the more information is owned by the adversary, the
more queries she is able to retrieve.
B.2 Unlinkability Solutions
We introduce two further experiments on SimAttack considering an unlink-
ability solution. First, we study the inﬂuence of considering more user pro-
ﬁles than the users protected by the unlinkability solution. Then, we analyse
the eﬃciency of SimAttack if, instead of considering the most probable user,
SimAttack considers a query correctly de-anonymized if its correct requester
is retrieved among the p most probable users.
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Increasing the number of user
proﬁles, with respect to the
number of users in the system,
decreases the precision while
slightly reducing the recall.
B.2.1 Impact of the Number of User Profiles
In previous evaluations, we considered that the adversary has pre-built as
many user proﬁles as the number of users in the system. However, in prac-
tice, the adversary might consider more user proﬁles than the number of users
in the system. Consequently, we present in Figure 51 the precision and the
recall of SimAttack when the system gathers 100 users while the adversary
considers from 100 to 1,000 user proﬁles. The results show that increasing
the number of user proﬁles owned by the adversary decreases the recall (i.e.,
adding 900 extra user proﬁles decreases the recall by 11.3). A higher num-
ber of user proﬁles increase for SimAttack the number of potential requesters.
Therefore, a given query correctly de-anonymized for 100 users might not
be for 1,000 user proﬁles, as SimAttack retrieves a more probable user. On
the contrary, the precision signiﬁcantly increases according to the number
of user proﬁles considered by the adversary. For instance, introducing 900
extra user proﬁles increases the precision by 32.0. Indeed, taking extra user
proﬁles into account splits the misclassiﬁed queries between a larger number
of user proﬁles. Consequently, for a given user proﬁle, the number of queries
incorrectly mapped by SimAttack decreases (i.e., queries issued by a diﬀerent
user than the one retrieved by SimAttack) and thus the precision computed
for this proﬁle increases. So, if all precisions related to user proﬁles increase,
the precision of SimAttack also increases.
B.2.2 Impact of Targeting p Users With the Highest Similarity
Instead of the Highest One
Depending on the intentions of the adversary, she might consider that the at-
tack succeeds if the initial user is retrieved among the 3, 5 or 10 most probable
users. Her goal might be to associate a query with her potential requesters.
Consequently, we adapt SimAttack to link a query to the p most probable
users. Figure 52 illustrates the results of this experiment for diﬀerent numbers
of users in the system. Obviously, the number of de-anonymized queries in-
creases according to the number of users considered by the adversary. How-
ever, this increase is rather small: The adversary de-anonymizes on average
12.9 more queries if the 10 most probable users are targeted compared to
targeting the most probable one (i.e., p = 10 versus p = 1). In addition, if
the adversary considers the 10 most probable users while the systems gather
100 users, the recall only reaches 52.8. This result is counter-intuitive, as
the 10 most probable users represent 10 of the dataset, the recall should be
close to 100 (as there is a high probability that an initial user is among the
10 most probable users). The explanation is that a large proportion of non-
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The number of de-anonymized
queries increases according to the
number of probable users
returned by SimAttack.
retrieved queries (74.8 if we consider 100 users) was not retrieved because
they do not contain keywords already used by the user in her previous queries.
Therefore, these queries cannot be retrieved by SimAttack as their similarity
with the requester user proﬁle equals zero.
B.3 GooPIR Over an Unlinkability Solution
SimAttack for GooPIR over an unlinkability solution presented in Section 3.2.4
retrieves for a protected query (i.e., an obfuscated query anonymized) the
most probable pair (query; user). For the same reason as explained for un-
linkability solutions, an adversary might be interested in the p most probable
pairs (query; user). In Figure 53, we report the recall of SimAttack consider-
ing a successful attack if the correct pair (query; user) is retrieved among the
p most probable pairs. We vary p from one to ten. The results show that the
recall increases according to the number of pairs considered by the adversary.
For instance, considering ten pairs instead of one makes the recall increase
on average by 13.4. Nevertheless, this recall improvement remains relatively
low. Considering more pairs (query; user) makes the adversary retrieve ir-
relevant information (e.g., associated a fake query with a non-related user).
For ten pairs, the adversary retrieves nine out of ten pairs that might not be
relevant.
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Proverif code of PEAS
We present the ProVerif code we wrote to model the privacy proxy used in
PEAS. This code has been used with ProVerif to prove that an adversary can-
not link a query sent through the privacy proxy with its requester. We con-
sider an adversary that listens to the network and replays all messages. We do
not consider in this model the receiver or the issuer as a potential adversary.
1 (*
2 Message 1 : U  > R : U , { q , kU } p k I
3 Message 2 : R  > I : X , { q , kU } p k I
4 Message 3 : I  > S : ( q )
5 Message 4 : S  > I : ( a )
6 Message 5 : I  > R : X , { a } kU
7 Message 6 : R  > U : U , { a } kU
8 * )
9
10 (* A p u b l i c c h a n n e l * )
11 free c : c h a n n e l .
12
13 type I P .
14 type i d .
15 type r e q u e s t .
16 type answer .
17 type key .
18 type pkey .
19 type s k e y .
20 type l i n k .
21
22 (* The p r o t a g o n i s t s * )
23 free r e c e i v e r : I P .
24 free i s s u e r : I P .
25 free s e r v e r : I P .
26
27 free q : r e q u e s t [ p r i v a t e ] .
28 free u s e r : I P [ p r i v a t e ] .
29
30 fun LINK_a ( IP , b i t s t r i n g ) : l i n k [ p r i v a t e ] .
31 fun LINK_b ( IP , i d ) : l i n k [ p r i v a t e ] .
32 fun LINK_c ( i d , b i t s t r i n g ) : l i n k [ p r i v a t e ] .
33 fun LINK_d ( i d , r e q u e s t ) : l i n k [ p r i v a t e ] .
34 fun LINK_e ( IP , r e q u e s t ) : l i n k [ p r i v a t e ] .
35
36 reduc f o r a l l x : I P , y : b i t s t r i n g , z : i d ;
37 INFER ( L INK_a ( x , y ) , L INK_c ( z , y ) ) = LINK_b ( x , z ) .
38 reduc f o r a l l x : I P , y : i d , z : r e q u e s t ;
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39 INFER1 ( LINK_b ( x , y ) , L INK_d ( y , z ) ) = LINK_e ( x , z ) .
40
41 (* S ymme t r i c k e y e n c r y p t i o n * )
42 fun s e n c r y p t ( answer , key ) : b i t s t r i n g .
43 fun s d e c r y p t ( b i t s t r i n g , key ) : answer .
44 equation f o r a l l m: answer , k : key ; s d e c r y p t ( s e n c r y p t (m, k ) , k ) = m .
45 equation f o r a l l m: b i t s t r i n g , k : key ; s e n c r y p t ( s d e c r y p t (m, k ) , k ) = m .
46
47 (* A s y m e t r i c k e y e n c r y p t i o n * )
48 fun pk ( s k e y ) : pkey .
49 fun a e n c r y p t ( b i t s t r i n g , pkey ) : b i t s t r i n g .
50 reduc f o r a l l m: b i t s t r i n g , k : s k e y ; a d e c r y p t ( a e n c r y p t (m, pk ( k ) ) , k ) = m .
51
52 (* F u n c t i o n s * )
53 fun an s ( r e q u e s t ) : answer [ p r i v a t e ] .
54 table r e c e i v e r T a b l e ( I P , i d ) .
55 table i s s u e r T a b l e ( r e que s t , key ) .
56
57 que r y a t t a c k e r ( LINK_e ( u se r , q ) ) .
58
59
60 (* Use r * )
61 l e t u s e r P r o c e s s ( u s e r : I P , q : r e que s t , p k I : pkey ) =
62 new kU : key ;
63 l e t p a y l o a d = a e n c r y p t ( ( q , kU ) , p k I ) in
64 (* Message 1 * )
65 out ( c , ( u se r , r e c e i v e r , p a y l o a d ) ) ;
66 out ( c , L INK_a ( u se r , p a y l o a d ) ) ;
67 (* Message 6 * )
68 in ( c , (= r e c e i v e r , =use r , m : b i t s t r i n g ) ) ;
69 l e t a = s d e c r y p t (m, kU ) in
70 0 .
71
72
73 (* R e c e i v e r * )
74 l e t r e c e i v e r P r o c e s s =
75 (* Message 1 * )
76 in ( c , ( user_X : I P , = r e c e i v e r , m : b i t s t r i n g ) ) ;
77 l e t (m3 : b i t s t r i n g ) = a d e c r y p t (m, s kP ) in
78 new r i d : i d ;
79 i n sert r e c e i v e r T a b l e ( user_X , r i d ) ;
80 (* Message 2 * )
81 out ( c , ( r e c e i v e r , i s s u e r , r i d , m3 ) ) ;
82 out ( c , L INK_c ( r i d , m3 ) ) ;
83 (* Message 5 * )
84 in ( c , (= i s s u e r , = r e c e i v e r , r i d_X : i d , m1 : b i t s t r i n g ) ) ;
85 get p rox yT ab l e ( user_Y ,= r i d_X ) in
86 (* Message 6 * )
87 out ( c , ( r e c e i v e r , user_Y , m1 ) ) ;
88 out ( c , L INK_a ( user_Y , m1 ) ) .
89
90
91 (* I s s u e r * )
92 l e t i s s u e r P r o c e s s ( s k I : s k e y ) =
93 (* Message 2 * )
94 in ( c , (= r e c e i v e r , = i s s u e r , r i d : i d , m : b i t s t r i n g ) ) ;
95 l e t ( q1 : r e que s t , kU : key ) = a d e c r y p t (m, s k I ) in
96 i n sert i s s u e r T a b l e ( q1 , kU ) ;
97 (* Message 3 * )
98 out ( c , ( i s s u e r , s e r v e r , q1 ) ) ;
99 (* Message 4 * )
100 in ( c , (= s e r v e r , = i s s u e r , q2 : r e que s t , a : an swer ) ) ;
101 get i s s u e r T a b l e (=q2 , kU1 ) in
102 l e t p a y l o a d = s e n c r y p t ( a , kU1 ) in
103 (* Message 5 * )
104 out ( c , ( i s s u e r , r e c e i v e r , r i d , p a y l o a d ) ) ;
105 out ( c , L INK_c ( r i d , p a y l o a d ) ) .
106
107
108 (* S e a r c h E n g i n e * )
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109 l e t s e r v e r P r o c e s s =
110 (* Message 3 * )
111 in ( c , ( s r c : I P , =s e r v e r , q2 : r e q u e s t ) ) ;
112 (* Message 4 * )
113 out ( c , ( s e r v e r , s r c , q2 , a n s ( q2 ) ) ) .
114
115
116 (* S t a r t p r o c e s s * )
117 p r o c e s s new s k I : s k e y ;
118 l e t p k I = pk ( s k I ) in
119 out ( c , p k I ) ;
120 (
121 ( u s e r P r o c e s s ( u se r , q , p k I ) ) |
122 ( ! r e c e i v e r P r o c e s s ) |
123 ( ! i s s u e r P r o c e s s ( s k I ) ) |
124 ( ! s e r v e r P r o c e s s )
125 )
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Instructions Given in the
Crowd-sourcing Task Conducted
with Crowdﬂower
We present below the instructions we gave to annotators hired through the
crows-sourcing platform. We provided a short description of the work and
gave examples to illustrate the task.
Help us categorize Web queries
Overview
Given a query issued by real users, choose the best category for this query
from a drop-down list and indicate if the query is sensitive or non-sensitive.
We define sensitive queries as queries that you do not want to make public
(e.g., relating to an embarrassing topic, revealing personal behavior/information).
Otherwise, the query is non-sensitive.
Process
1. Read the query carefully
2. Choose one of the 4 categories we provide:
 Health / Medical facts
 Politic
 Porn / Sexuality
 Religion
3. Choose “Other” if and only if none of the categories above fit.
4. Answer the second question to indicate if the query is “Sensitive” or
“Non Sensitive”
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Examples
For the question “Choose the best category for this query”
 used dirty gay underwear -> “Porn / Sexuality” is the right category
 iran buying modren weapons -> “Politic” is the right category
 short term dangers of ecstasy -> “Health / Medical fact” is the right cate-
gory
 how does god reveal truth to you -> “Religion” is the right category
For the question “Indicate if this query is sensitive or non-sensitive”
 different pictures of fruit and vegetables -> is “Non Sensitiv”
 music composition lessons -> is“Non Sensitive”
 gays erotic nude wrestling -> is “Sensitive”
 surving an affair -> is “Sensitive”
Summary
This task is about putting queries into appropriate categories and annotating
sensitive queries. You need to choose the best available category for each
query, or select “Other”. You should consider the default categories carefully
before choosing other: only select “Other” for queries that do not match any
of available categories at all. Regarding the sensitivity of a query, you need to
think as if you were sending this query and decide if it is a problem for you
to reveal publicly this query (e.g., to your family, to your friends, to your insur-
ance company). Sensitive queries are for instance queries that reveal personal
information or indicate your interest in embarrassing topics.
Thank You!
Your answers will help us to adapt private Web search solutions by taking into
account the category of a query and the sensitivity of a query. We appreciate
your work on this task!
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List of Categories Available in the
Semantic Assessment Module (SAM)
acoustics factotum philosophy
administration fashion photography
agriculture fencing physics
anatomy ﬁnance physiology
animal husbandry ﬁshing plants
animals folklore plastic arts
anthropology food play
applied science football politics
archaeology free time post
archery furniture psychiatry
architecture gas psychoanalysis
art gastronomy psychological features
artisanship genetics psychology
astrology geography publishing
astronautics geology pure science
astronomy geometry quality
athletics golf racing
atomic physic grammar radio
aviation graphic arts radiology
badminton health railway
banking heraldry religion
baseball history roman catholic
basketball hockey rowing
betting home rugby
biochemistry humanities school
biology hunting sculpture
body care hydraulics sexuality
book keeping industry skating
bowling insurance skiing
boxing jewellery soccer
buildings law social
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card linguistics social science
chemistry literature sociology
chess mathematics sport
cinema mechanics statistics
color medicine sub
commerce meteorology surgery
computer science metrology swimming
cricket military table tennis
cycling money tax
dance mountaineering telecommunication
dentistry music telegraphy
diplomacy mythology telephony
diving nautical tennis
drawing number theatre
earth numismatics theology
economy occultism time period
electricity oceanography topography
electronics optics tourism
electrotechnology painting town planning
engineering paleontology transport
enterprise paranormal tv
entomology pedagogy university
environment person vehicles
ethnology pharmacy veterinary
exchange philately volleyball
factotum philosophy
Bibliography
[1] Ralph Gross and Alessandro Acquisti. Information revelation and pri-
vacy in online social networks. In Proceedings of the 2005 ACMWorkshop
on Privacy in the Electronic Society, WPES ’05, pages 71–80, 2005.
[2] Susan B Barnes. A privacy paradox: Social networking in the united
states. First Monday, 11(9), 2006.
[3] Google Inc. Privacy & terms. http://www.google.com/policies/
privacy/key-terms/#toc-terms-sensitive-info. Key Terms.
[4] Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill, and Laura Poitras. Edward snow-
den: the whistleblower behind the nsa surveillance revelations. The
Guardian, 9(6), 2013.
[5] Yabing Liu, Krishna P Gummadi, Balachander Krishnamurthy, and
Alan Mislove. Analyzing facebook privacy settings: user expectations
vs. reality. In Proceedings of the 2011 ACM SIGCOMM conference on
Internet measurement conference, IMC’11, pages 61–70, 2011.
[6] The European Parliament and The Council of the European
Union. Data Protection Rules - Directive 95/46/EC (Article
12-b). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML, 1995.
[7] Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Judgment of
the Court – Case C-131/12. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?docid=152065&doclang=EN, 2014.
[8] Google Inc. European privacy requests for search removals.
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/
europeprivacy/.
[9] The European Parliament and The Council of the European
Union. Data Protection Rules - Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (Article
17). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/
?uri=CELEX:32016R0679, 2016.
[10] Samuel Gibbs. Google to extend ‘right to be forgotten’ to all its do-
mains accessed in EU. The Guardian, 2016.
[11] Microsoft Inc. Bing To Use Location for RTBF. http://blogs.bing.
com/search/august-2016/bing-to-use-location-for-rtbf,
2016.
[12] The WWW Virtual Library. http://vlib.org/.
[13] Looksmart. http://www.looksmart.com/.
142 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[14] Magdalini Eirinaki and Michalis Vazirgiannis. Web mining for web
personalization. ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT),
3(1):1–27, 2003.
[15] Daniel E Rose and Danny Levinson. Understanding user goals in web
search. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference onWorldWide
Web, WWW ’04, pages 13–19. ACM, 2004.
[16] Greg Pass, Abdur Chowdhury, and Cayley Torgeson. A picture of
search. In InfoScale, volume 152, page 1, 2006.
[17] Michael Barbaro, Tom Zeller, and Saul Hansell. A face is exposed for
aol searcher no. 4417749. New York Times, 9(2008):8, 2006.
[18] Eytan Adar, Daniel S Weld, Brian N Bershad, and Steven S Gribble.
Why we search: visualizing and predicting user behavior. In Proceed-
ings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web, WWW’07,
pages 161–170. ACM, 2007.
[19] David J Brenes and Daniel Gayo-Avello. Stratiﬁed analysis of aol query
log. Information Sciences, 179(12):1844–1858, 2009.
[20] Jeﬀ Huang and Efthimis N Efthimiadis. Analyzing and evaluating
query reformulation strategies in web search logs. In Proceedings of
the 18th ACM conference on Information and knowledge management,
CIKM’09, pages 77–86, 2009.
[21] Paul Heymann, Georgia Koutrika, and Hector Garcia-Molina. Can
social bookmarking improve web search? In Proceedings of the 2008
International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining, WSDM ’08,
pages 195–206, 2008.
[22] Rosie Jones, Ravi Kumar, Bo Pang, and Andrew Tomkins. ”i know
what you did last summer”: Query logs and user privacy. In Proceedings
of the 16th ACM conference on Conference on information and knowledge
management, CIKM’07, pages 909–914. ACM, 2007.
[23] Bin Bi, Milad Shokouhi, Michal Kosinski, and Thore Graepel. Infer-
ring the demographics of search users: social data meets search queries.
In Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web,
WWW’13, pages 131–140, 2013.
[24] Daniel J Solove. Nothing to hide: The false tradeoﬀ between privacy and
security. Yale University Press, 2011.
[25] Gary T Marx. Privacy and technology. http://web.mit.edu/
gtmarx/www/privantt.html. Revision of material that appeared in
The World and I, Sept. 1990 and Telektronik, Jan. 1996.
[26] Bruce Schneier. The eternal value of privacy. https://www.schneier.
com/essays/archives/2006/05/the_eternal_value_of.html,
2006.
[27] DuckDuckGo. https://duckduckgo.com.
[28] StartPage. https://startpage.com.
[29] Qwant. https://www.qwant.com.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 143
[30] Gabriel Weinberg. DuckDuckGo Privacy Policy. https://
duckduckgo.com/privacy#s4, 2010.
[31] HweeHwa Pang, Xuhua Ding, and Xiaokui Xiao. Embellishing text
search queries to protect user privacy. Proceedings of the VLDB Endow-
ment, 3(1-2):598–607, 2010.
[32] Hweehwa Pang, Jialie Shen, and Ramayya Krishnan. Privacy-
preserving similarity-based text retrieval. ACM Transactions on Internet
Technology (TOIT), 10(1):4, 2010.
[33] Michael Naehrig, Kristin Lauter, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Can
homomorphic encryption be practical? In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM
Workshop on Cloud Computing Security Workshop, CCSW ’11, pages 113–
124, New York, NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
[34] Felipe Saint-Jean, Aaron Johnson, Dan Boneh, and Joan Feigenbaum.
Private web search. In Proceedings of the 2007 ACMWorkshop on Privacy
in Electronic Society, WPES ’07, pages 84–90. ACM, 2007.
[35] Sasha Romanosky and Cynthia Kuo. Foxtor: Anonymous web brows-
ing. Tor GUI Competition, 2006.
[36] Collin Jackson, Andrew Bortz, Dan Boneh, and John C Mitchell. Pro-
tecting browser state from web privacy attacks. In Proceedings of the 15th
international conference onWorldWideWeb, WWW’06, pages 737–744,
2006.
[37] Ghostery. https://www.ghostery.com.
[38] Paul F Syverson, David M Goldschlag, and Michael G Reed. Anony-
mous connections and onion routing. In Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP’97, pages 44–54, 1997.
[39] Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, and Paul Syverson. Tor: The
second-generation onion router. In Proceedings of the 13th Conference on
USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security’04, pages 21–21, 2004.
[40] Henry Corrigan-Gibbs and Bryan Ford. Dissent: Accountable anony-
mous group messaging. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, CCS’10, pages 340–350, 2010.
[41] David Isaac Wolinsky, Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, and Bryan Ford. Dis-
sent in numbers: Making strong anonymity scale. In Proceedings of the
10th USENIX Conference on Operating Systems Design and Implementa-
tion, OSDI’12, 2012.
[42] Sonia Ben Mokhtar, Gautier Berthou, Amadou Diarra, Vivien Quéma,
and Ali Shoker. Rac: A freerider-resilient, scalable, anonymous com-
munication protocol. In Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE 33rd International
Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS’13.
[43] Josep Domingo-Ferrer, Maria Bras-Amorós, Qianhong Wu, and Jesús
Manjón. User-private information retrieval based on a peer-to-peer
community. Data & Knowledge Engineering, 68(11):1237–1252, 2009.
[44] Michael K Reiter and Aviel D Rubin. Crowds: Anonymity for web
transactions. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security
(TISSEC), 1(1):66–92, 1998.
144 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[45] Josep Domingo-Ferrer, Agusti Solanas, and Jordi Castellà-Roca. h
(k)-private information retrieval from privacy-uncooperative queryable
databases. Online Information Review, 33(4):720–744, 2009.
[46] Vincent Toubiana, Lakshminarayanan Subramanian, and Helen Nis-
senbaum. Trackmenot: Enhancing the privacy of web search. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1109.4677, 2011.
[47] Sai Teja Peddinti and Nitesh Saxena. On the eﬀectiveness of anonymiz-
ing networks for web search privacy. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM Sym-
posium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, ASI-
ACCS ’11, pages 483–489, 2011.
[48] Sai Teja Peddinti and Nitesh Saxena. On the privacy of web search
based on query obfuscation: a case study of trackmenot. In Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies,
PETS’10, pages 19–37. Springer, 2010.
[49] Arthur Gervais, Reza Shokri, Adish Singla, Srdjan Capkun, and Vin-
cent Lenders. Quantifying web-search privacy. In Proceedings of the
2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Secu-
rity, CCS ’14, pages 966–977. ACM, 2014.
[50] Peter Eckersley. How unique is your web browser? In Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies,
PETS’10, pages 1–18, 2010.
[51] Nick Nikiforakis, Alexandros Kapravelos, Wouter Joosen, Christopher
Kruegel, Frank Piessens, and Giovanni Vigna. Cookieless monster: Ex-
ploring the ecosystem of web-based device ﬁngerprinting. In Proceed-
ings of the 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP’13, pages
541–555. IEEE, 2013.
[52] Eran Gabber, Phillip B Gibbons, David M Kristol, Yossi Matias, and
Alain Mayer. Consistent, yet anonymous, web access with lpwa. Com-
munications of the ACM, 42(2):42–47, 1999.
[53] Marc Shapiro. Structure and Encapsulation in Distributed Systems:
the Proxy Principle. In Proceedings of the 1986 IEEE 6th International
Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS’86.
[54] H.A. Seid and A.L. Lespagnol. Virtual private network, June 16 1998.
US Patent 5,768,271.
[55] David L Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and
digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84–90, 1981.
[56] Oliver Berthold, Hannes Federrath, and Stefan Köpsell. Web mixes: A
system for anonymous and unobservable internet access. In Designing
Privacy Enhancing Technologies, pages 115–129. Springer, 2001.
[57] Benedikt Westermann, Rolf Wendolsky, Lexi Pimenidis, and Dogan
Kesdogan. Cryptographic protocol analysis of an. on. In International
Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, pages 114–128.
Springer, 2010.
[58] The Tor Project Inc. Estimated number of clients in the Tor network.
https://metrics.torproject.org/clients-data.html.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 145
[59] Alexandre Viejo and Jordi Castellà-Roca. Using social networks to
distort users’ proﬁles generated by web search engines. Computer Net-
works, 54(9):1343–1357, 2010.
[60] Arnau Erola, Jordi Castellà-Roca, Alexandre Viejo, and Josep M
Mateo-Sanz. Exploiting social networks to provide privacy in person-
alized web search. Journal of Systems and Software, 84(10):1734–1745,
2011.
[61] Jordi Castellà-Roca, Alexandre Viejo, and Jordi Herrera-Joancomartí.
Preserving user’s privacy in web search engines. Computer Communi-
cations, 32(13), 2009.
[62] Cristina Romero-Tris, Alexandre Viejo, and Jordi Castella-Roca. Im-
proving query delay in private web search. In Proceedings of the 2011
International Conference on P2P, Parallel, Grid, Cloud and Internet Com-
puting, 3PGCIC’11, pages 200–206. IEEE, 2011.
[63] Yehuda Lindell and Erez Waisbard. Private web search with malicious
adversaries. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Privacy
Enhancing Technologies, PETS’10, pages 220–235. Springer, 2010.
[64] Cristina Romero-Tris, Jordi Castella-Roca, and Alexandre Viejo. Multi-
party private web search with untrusted partners. In Proceedings of the
2011 7th International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communi-
cation Networks, SecureComm’11.
[65] Wai Han Soo, Azman Samsudin, and Alwyn Goh. Eﬃcient mental
card shuﬄing via optimised arbitrary-sized benes permutation network.
In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Security,
pages 446–458. Springer, 2002.
[66] Taher ElGamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme
based on discrete logarithms. In Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology,
CRYPTO’84.
[67] Markus Jakobsson and Ari Juels. Millimix: Mixing in small batches.
Technical report, DIMACS Technical report 99-33, 1999.
[68] Zhengjun Cao, Lihua Liu, and Zhenzhen Yan. An improved lindell-
waisbard private web search scheme. International Journal of Network
Security, 18(3):538–543, 2016.
[69] David Rebollo-Monedero, Jordi Forne, and Josep Domingo-Ferrer.
Query proﬁle obfuscation by means of optimal query exchange be-
tween users. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing,
9(5):641–654, 2012.
[70] Claude Elwood Shannon. A mathematical theory of communication.
Bell System Technical Journal, 27(3):379–423, 1948.
[71] Yuval Elovici, Bracha Shapira, and Adlai Maschiach. A new privacy
model for hiding group interests while accessing the web. In Proceedings
of the 2002 ACMWorkshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, WPES’02,
pages 63–70, 2002.
[72] Yuval Elovici, Chanan Glezer, and Bracha Shapira. Enhancing cus-
tomer privacy while searching for products and services on the world
wide web. Internet Research, 15(4):378–399, 2005.
146 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[73] Bracha Shapira, Yuval Elovici, Adlay Meshiach, and Tsvi Kuﬂik. Praw
- a privacy model for the web. Journal of the American Society for Infor-
mation Science and Technology, 56(2):159–172, 2005.
[74] Mummoorthy Murugesan and Chris Clifton. Providing privacy
through plausibly deniable search. In SDM, pages 768–779. SIAM,
2009.
[75] Alexandre Viejo and Dominick Sanchez. Providing useful and pri-
vate web search by means of social network proﬁling. In Proceedings of
the 11th Annual International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust,
PST’13, pages 358–361. IEEE, 2013.
[76] Alexandre Viejo and David Sánchez. Proﬁling social networks to pro-
vide useful and privacy-preserving web search. Journal of the Association
for Information Science and Technology, 65(12):2444–2458, 2014.
[77] Wikimedia Foundation Inc. Wikinews Print Edition. https://en.
wikinews.org/wiki/Wikinews:Print_edition/October_2007,
2007.
[78] Daniel C Howe and Helen Nissenbaum. Trackmenot: Resisting
surveillance in web search. Lessons from the Identity Trail: Anonymity,
Privacy, and Identity in a Networked Society, 23:417–436, 2009.
[79] Alexandre Viejo, Jordi Castella-Roca, Oriol Bernadó, and Josep M
Mateo-Sanz. Single-party private web search. In Proceedings of the 10th
Annual International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST’12,
pages 1–8. IEEE, 2012.
[80] David Sánchez, Jordi Castellà-Roca, and Alexandre Viejo. Knowledge-
based scheme to create privacy-preserving but semantically-related
queries for web search engines. Information Sciences, 218:17–30, 2013.
[81] AOL Inc. DMOZ, An Open Directory Project (ODP). http://www.
dmoz.org, 1998.
[82] George A Miller. Wordnet: a lexical database for english. Communi-
cations of the ACM, 38(11):39–41, 1995.
[83] David Rebollo-Monedero and Jordi Forné. Optimized query forgery
for private information retrieval. IEEE Transactions on InformationThe-
ory, 56(9):4631–4642, 2010.
[84] Shaozhi Ye, Felix Wu, Raju Pandey, and Hao Chen. Noise injection for
search privacy protection. In Proceedings of the 2009 International Con-
ference on Computational Science and Engineering, volume 3 of CSE’09,
pages 1–8. IEEE, 2009.
[85] Avi Arampatzis, Pavlos S Efraimidis, and George Drosatos. A query
scrambler for search privacy on the internet. Information retrieval,
16(6):657–679, 2013.
[86] Avi Arampatzis, George Drosatos, and Pavlos S Efraimidis. Versatile
query scrambling for private web search. Information Retrieval Journal,
18(4):331–358, 2015.
[87] Marc Juárez and Vicenç Torra. Toward a privacy agent for informa-
tion retrieval. International Journal of Intelligent Systems, 28(6):606–
622, 2013.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 147
[88] Marc Juárez and Vicenç Torra. A self-adaptive classiﬁcation for the
dissociating privacy agent. In Proceedings of the 11th IEEE International
Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST’13, pages 44–50. IEEE,
2013.
[89] Marc Juarez and Vicenç Torra. Dispa: An intelligent agent for pri-
vate web search. In Advanced Research in Data Privacy, pages 389–405.
Springer, 2015.
[90] Yabo Xu, Ke Wang, Benyu Zhang, and Zheng Chen. Privacy-
enhancing personalized web search. In Proceedings of the 16th inter-
national conference on World Wide Web, WWW’07.
[91] Gang Chen, He Bai, Lidan Shou, Ke Chen, and Yunjun Gao. Ups:
eﬃcient privacy protection in personalized web search. In Proceedings
of the 34th International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research and Devel-
opment in Information Retrieval, SIGIR’11, pages 615–624, 2011.
[92] Claudia Díaz, Stefaan Seys, Joris Claessens, and Bart Preneel. To-
wards measuring anonymity. In Proceedings of the 2nd International
Conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, PETS’02, pages 54–68.
Springer-Verlag, 2003.
[93] Edward W Felten and Michael A Schneider. Timing attacks on web
privacy. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and
communications security, CCS ’00, pages 25–32, 2000.
[94] Riccardo Focardi, Roberto Gorrieri, Ruggero Lanotte, Andrea
Maggiolo-Schettini, Fabio Martinelli, Simone Tini, and Enrico Tronci.
Formal models of timing attacks on web privacy. Electronic Notes in
Theoretical Computer Science, 62:229–243, 2002.
[95] Nathan S Evans, Roger Dingledine, and Christian Grothoﬀ. A prac-
tical congestion attack on tor using long paths. In Proceedings of the
18th Conference on USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security’09,
pages 33–50, 2009.
[96] Rami Al-Rfou, William Jannen, and Nikhil Patwardhan. Trackmenot-
so-good-after-all. arXiv preprint arXiv:1211.0320, 2012.
[97] Corinna Cortes and Vladimir Vapnik. Support-vector networks. Ma-
chine learning, 20(3):273–297, 1995.
[98] David R Cox. The regression analysis of binary sequences. Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological), pages 215–242,
1958.
[99] James MacQueen et al. Some methods for classiﬁcation and analysis of
multivariate observations. In Proceedings of the 5th Berkeley symposium
on mathematical statistics and probability, BSMSP’67.
[100] Chih-Wei Hsu and Chih-Jen Lin. A comparison of methods for multi-
class support vector machines. IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks,
13(2):415–425, 2002.
[101] Jason Weston, Chris Watkins, et al. Support vector machines for multi-
class pattern recognition. In ESANN, volume 99, pages 219–224, 1999.
148 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[102] John C Platt. 12 fast training of support vector machines using sequen-
tial minimal optimization. Advances in kernel methods, pages 185–208,
1999.
[103] John H Aldrich and Forrest D Nelson. Linear probability, logit, and
probit models, volume 45. Sage, 1984.
[104] Edward W Forgy. Cluster analysis of multivariate data: eﬃciency ver-
sus interpretability of classiﬁcations. Biometrics, 21:768–769, 1965.
[105] Yiming Yang. An evaluation of statistical approaches to text categoriza-
tion. Information retrieval, 1(1-2):69–90, 1999.
[106] Saikat Guha, Mudit Jain, and Venkata N Padmanabhan. Koi: A
location-privacy platform for smartphone apps. In Proceedings of the
9th USENIX conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementa-
tion, pages 14–14. USENIX Association, 2012.
[107] Bruno Blanchet. An eﬃcient cryptographic protocol veriﬁer based on
prolog rules. In Proceedings of the 14th IEEE Workshop on Computer Se-
curity Foundations, CSFW ’01, page 82. IEEE Computer Society, 2001.
[108] Alessandro Armando, David Basin, Yohan Boichut, Yannick Cheva-
lier, Luca Compagna, Jorge Cuéllar, P Hankes Drielsma, Pierre-Cyrille
Héam, Olga Kouchnarenko, Jacopo Mantovani, et al. The avispa tool
for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applica-
tions. In Computer Aided Veriﬁcation, pages 281–285. Springer, 2005.
[109] Mark B Abbott and Larry L Peterson. Increasing network throughput
by integrating protocol layers. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
(TON), 1(5):600–610, 1993.
[110] Yong Ki Lee, Kazuo Sakiyama, Lejla Batina, and Ingrid Verbauwhede.
Elliptic-curve-based security processor for rﬁd. IEEE Transactions on
Computers, 57(11):1514–1527, 2008.
[111] Nachiketh R Potlapally, Srivaths Ravi, Anand Raghunathan, and Ni-
raj K Jha. A study of the energy consumption characteristics of crypto-
graphic algorithms and security protocols. IEEE Transactions on mobile
computing, 5(2):128–143, 2006.
[112] Charles Spearman. ‘footrule’for measuring correlation. British Journal
of Psychology, 1904-1920, 2(1):89–108, 1906.
[113] Maurice G Kendall. A new measure of rank correlation. Biometrika,
30(1/2):81–93, 1938.
[114] Kalervo Järvelin and Jaana Kekäläinen. Cumulated gain-based evalua-
tion of ir techniques. ACMTransactions on Information Systems (TOIS),
20(4):422–446, October 2002.
[115] Xuehua Shen, Bin Tan, and ChengXiang Zhai. Privacy protection in
personalized search. In ACM SIGIR Forum, volume 41, pages 4–17.
ACM, 2007.
[116] Xuehua Shen, Bin Tan, and ChengXiang Zhai. Implicit user modeling
for personalized search. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM international
conference on Information and knowledge management, CIKM’05, pages
824–831. ACM, 2005.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 149
[117] Microsoft Corporation. Microsoft creative acceptance pol-
icy. http://fp.advertising.microsoft.com/en-uk/
WWDocs/User/display/cl/content_standard/2007/global/
Microsoft-Advertising-Creative-Acceptance-Policy-Guide.
pdf.
[118] Yahoo! Inc. Yahoo advertising policies. https://adspecs.yahoo.
com/pages/yahooadpolicies/.
[119] Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA). Self Regulatory Princi-
ples for Online Behavioral Advertising Implementation Guide
(FAQ). http://www.aboutads.info/resource/download/OBA%
20Self-Reg%20Implementation%20Guide%20-%20Frequently%
20Asked%20Questions.pdf, 2010.
[120] French Republic. Loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à
l’informatique, aux ﬁchiers et aux libertés. https://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/jo_pdf.do?id=JORFTEXT000000886460, 1978.
[121] The European Parliament and The Council of the European
Union. Data Protection Rules - Directive 95/46/EC (Article
8). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML, 1995.
[122] United Kingdom. Data Protection Act 1998. http:
//www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/pdfs/ukpga_
19980029_en.pdf, 1998.
[123] Article 29 Working Party. Advice paper on special categories of data
(“sensitive data”), 2011.
[124] The U.S. Congress. Fair Debt Collection Practices act (FDCPA).
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/55324NCJRS.
pdf, 1977.
[125] The U.S. Congress. Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act (HIPAA). http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
PLAW-104publ191/html/PLAW-104publ191.htm, 1996.
[126] The U.S. Congress. Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA). http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-100/pdf/
STATUTE-100-Pg1848.pdf, 1986.
[127] State of California (USA). California Civil Code. http:
//www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=civ&
group=01001-02000&file=1798.80-1798.84. Section 1798.83.
[128] Sai Teja Peddinti, Aleksandra Korolova, Elie Bursztein, and Geetan-
jali Sampemane. Cloak and swagger: Understanding data sensitivity
through the lens of user anonymity. In Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP’14, pages 493–508, 2014.
[129] Prashant Ullegaddi and Vasudeva Varma. A simple unsupervised query
categorizer for web search engines. In ICON’10, 2011.
[130] Lin Li, Guandong Xu, Zhenglu Yang, Yanchun Zhang, and Masaru
Kitsuregawa. A feature-free ﬂexible approach to topical classiﬁcation
of web queries. In Proceedings of the 7th IEEE International Conference
on Semantics Knowledge and Grid, SKG’11.
150 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[131] Milad Alemzadeh and Fakhri Karray. An eﬃcient method for tag-
ging a query with category labels using wikipedia towards enhancing
search engine results. In Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM Inter-
national Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology,
volume 1, pages 192–195. IEEE, 2010.
[132] Steven M Beitzel, Eric C Jensen, Ophir Frieder, David D Lewis, Abdur
Chowdhury, and Aleksander Kolcz. Improving automatic query clas-
siﬁcation via semi-supervised learning. In Proceedings of the 5th IEEE
International Conference on DataMining, ICDM’05, pages 8–pp. IEEE,
2005.
[133] Steven M Beitzel, Eric C Jensen, Ophir Frieder, David Grossman,
David D Lewis, Abdur Chowdhury, and Aleksandr Kolcz. Automatic
web query classiﬁcation using labeled and unlabeled training data. In
Proceedings of the 28th Annual International ACM SIGIR Conference on
Research and Development in Information Retrieval, SIGIR ’05, pages
581–582. ACM, 2005.
[134] Steven M Beitzel, Eric C Jensen, David D Lewis, Abdur Chowdhury,
and Ophir Frieder. Automatic classiﬁcation of web queries using very
large unlabeled query logs. ACM Transactions on Information Systems
(TOIS), 25(2):9, 2007.
[135] Dou Shen, Rong Pan, Jian-Tao Sun, Jeﬀrey Junfeng Pan, Kangheng
Wu, Jie Yin, and Qiang Yang. Query enrichment for web-query classi-
ﬁcation. ACM Transactions on Information Systems (TOIS), 24(3):320–
352, 2006.
[136] Zsolt T Kardkovács, Domonkos Tikk, and Zoltán Bánsághi. The fer-
rety algorithm for the kdd cup 2005 problem. ACM SIGKDD Explo-
rations Newsletter, 7(2):111–116, 2005.
[137] David Vogel, Steﬀen Bickel, Peter Haider, Rolf Schimpfky, Peter
Siemen, Steve Bridges, and Tobias Scheﬀer. Classifying search engine
queries using the web as background knowledge. ACM SIGKDD Ex-
plorations Newsletter, 7(2):117–122, 2005.
[138] Lee R Dice. Measures of the amount of ecologic association between
species. Ecology, 26(3):297–302, 1945.
[139] Amit Singhal. Modern information retrieval: A brief overview. IEEE
Data Eng. Bull., 24(4):35–43, 2001.
[140] Paul Jaccard. The distribution of the ﬂora in the alpine zone. New
phytologist, 11(2):37–50, 1912.
[141] Christopher D. Manning, Mihai Surdeanu, John Bauer, Jenny Finkel,
Steven J. Bethard, and David McClosky. The Stanford CoreNLP nat-
ural language processing toolkit. In ACL’14, pages 55–60, June 2014.
[142] Martin F Porter. An algorithm for suﬃx stripping. Program, 14(3):130–
137, 1980.
[143] Soutik Biswas for BBC News. Digital Indians: Ben Gomes. http:
//www.bbc.com/news/technology-23866614, 2013.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 151
[144] Mark Hall, Eibe Frank, Geoﬀrey Holmes, Bernhard Pfahringer, Peter
Reutemann, and Ian H Witten. The weka data mining software: an
update. ACM SIGKDD explorations newsletter, 11(1):10–18, 2009.
[145] John Platt et al. Sequential minimal optimization: A fast algorithm for
training support vector machines. 1998.
[146] Chih-Chung Chang and Chih-Jen Lin. LIBSVM: A library for support
vector machines. ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technol-
ogy, 2:27:1–27:27, 2011.
[147] University of Waikato. Javadoc related to the class libsvm imple-
mented in weka. http://weka.sourceforge.net/doc.stable/
weka/classifiers/functions/LibSVM.html.
[148] S. le Cessie and J.C. van Houwelingen. Ridge estimators in logistic
regression. Applied Statistics, 41(1):191–201, 1992.
[149] Kenneth Lange. A quasi-newton acceleration of the em algorithm. Sta-
tistica sinica, pages 1–18, 1995.
[150] Sai Teja Peddinti and Nitesh Saxena. Web search query privacy: Eval-
uating query obfuscation and anonymizing networks1. Journal of Com-
puter Security, 22(1):155–199, 2014.
[151] Alexey Tsymbal. The problem of concept drift: deﬁnitions and related
work. Computer Science Department, Trinity College Dublin, 106, 2004.
[152] Tomas Mikolov, Kai Chen, Greg Corrado, and Jeﬀrey Dean. Eﬃ-
cient estimation of word representations in vector space. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1301.3781, 2013.
[153] Gene H Golub and Christian Reinsch. Singular value decomposition
and least squares solutions. Numerische mathematik, 14(5):403–420,
1970.
[154] G. Salton, A. Wong, and C. S. Yang. A vector space model for auto-
matic indexing. Communications of the ACM, 18(11):613–620, Novem-
ber 1975.
[155] Google Inc. Google trends. https://www.google.com/trends/,
2012.
[156] Coen Bron and Joep Kerbosch. Algorithm 457: Finding all cliques
of an undirected graph. Communications of the ACM, 16(9):575–577,
September 1973.
[157] Caroline Fontaine and Fabien Galand. A survey of homomorphic en-
cryption for nonspecialists. EURASIP Journal on Information Security,
2007(1):1–10, 2007.
[158] Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (ANSSI).
Annexe B1 au Référentiel général de sécurité (version 2.03) : Choix et
dimensionnement des mécanismes cryptographiques.
[159] Elaine Barker and Allen Roginsky. NIST Special Publication 800-131A
Transitions (revision 1): Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of
Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths. 2015.
152 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[160] Daniel Balouek, Alexandra Carpen Amarie, Ghislain Charrier,
Frédéric Desprez, Emmanuel Jeannot, Emmanuel Jeanvoine, Adrien
Lèbre, David Margery, Nicolas Niclausse, Lucas Nussbaum, Olivier
Richard, Christian Pérez, Flavien Quesnel, Cyril Rohr, and Luc
Sarzyniec. Adding virtualization capabilities to the Grid’5000 testbed.
In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Cloud Computing
and Services Science, volume 367 of CLOSER’12, pages 3–20. Springer
International Publishing, 2013.
[161] The Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. Bouncy castle cryptographic
apis. https://www.bouncycastle.org, 2006.
[162] John G Kemeny, James Laurie Snell, et al. Finite markov chains, volume
356. van Nostrand Princeton, NJ, 1960.
[163] Etsuji Tomita, Akira Tanaka, and Haruhisa Takahashi. The worst-case
time complexity for generating all maximal cliques and computational
experiments. Theoretical Computer Science, 363(1):28–42, 2006.
[164] David Eppstein, Maarten Löﬄer, and Darren Strash. Listing all max-
imal cliques in sparse graphs in near-optimal time. In International
Symposium on Algorithms and Computation, pages 403–414. Springer,
2010.
[165] Joseph L Fleiss. Measuring nominal scale agreement among many
raters. Psychological bulletin, 76(5):378, 1971.
[166] J Richard Landis and Gary G Koch. The measurement of observer
agreement for categorical data. biometrics, pages 159–174, 1977.
[167] Ludmila I Kuncheva, Christopher J Whitaker, Catherine A Shipp, and
Robert PW Duin. Limits on the majority vote accuracy in classiﬁer
fusion. Pattern Analysis & Applications, 6(1):22–31, 2003.
[168] Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Foster Provost, and Jing Wang. Quality man-
agement on amazon mechanical turk. In Proceedings of the ACM
SIGKDDworkshop on human computation, HCOMP ’10, pages 64–67,
2010.
[169] Jacob Whitehill, Ting-fan Wu, Jacob Bergsma, Javier R Movellan, and
Paul L Ruvolo. Whose vote should count more: Optimal integration
of labels from labelers of unknown expertise. In Advances in neural
information processing systems, pages 2035–2043, 2009.
[170] Aitor González, German Rigau, and Mauro Castillo. A graph-based
method to improve wordnet domains. In Proceedings of the 13th In-
ternational Conference on Computational Linguistics and Intelligent Text
Processing, CICLing’12, pages 17–28. Springer, 2012.
[171] Michael L Fredman and Dan E Willard. Trans-dichotomous algo-
rithms for minimum spanning trees and shortest paths. Journal of
Computer and System Sciences, 48(3):533–551, 1994.
[172] Zhibiao Wu and Martha Palmer. Verbs semantics and lexical selection.
In Proceedings of the 32nd annual meeting on Association for Computa-
tional Linguistics, pages 133–138, 1994.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 153
[173] Yiming Yang. Noise reduction in a statistical approach to text catego-
rization. In Proceedings of the 18th annual international ACM SIGIR con-
ference on Research and development in information retrieval, SIGIR’95,
pages 256–263, 1995.
[174] Hyunsoo Kim, Peg Howland, and Haesun Park. Dimension reduction
in text classiﬁcation with support vector machines. Journal of Machine
Learning Research, 6(Jan):37–53, 2005.
[175] Yoshua Bengio, Réjean Ducharme, Pascal Vincent, and Christian Jau-
vin. A neural probabilistic language model. Journal of machine learning
research, 3(Feb):1137–1155, 2003.
[176] Daqing He, Ayşe Göker, and David J Harper. Combining evidence for
automatic web session identiﬁcation. Information Processing &Manage-
ment, 38(5):727–742, 2002.
[177] Rosie Jones and Kristina Lisa Klinkner. Beyond the session timeout:
automatic hierarchical segmentation of search topics in query logs. In
Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Information and Knowledge
Management, CIKM’08, pages 699–708. ACM, 2008.
[178] Damon McCoy, Kevin Bauer, Dirk Grunwald, Tadayoshi Kohno, and
Douglas Sicker. Shining light in dark places: Understanding the tor
network. In Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Privacy
Enhancing Technologies, PETS’08, pages 63–76, 2008.
[179] Niels Provos Panayiotis Mavrommatis and Moheeb Abu Rajab Fabian
Monrose. All your iframes point to us. In Proceedings of the 17th Con-
ference on Security Symposium, USENIX Security’08, pages 1–15, 2008.
[180] Andreas Haeberlen, Petr Kouznetsov, and Peter Druschel. Peerreview:
Practical accountability for distributed systems. In ACM SIGOPS op-
erating systems review, volume 41, pages 175–188. ACM, 2007.
[181] Andreas Haeberlen, Paarijaat Aditya, Rodrigo Rodrigues, and Peter Dr-
uschel. Accountable virtual machines. In Proceedings of the 9th USENIX
Conference on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, OSDI’10,
pages 119–134, 2010.
[182] Twitter. http://www.twitter.com/.
